Article 61 of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) creates a process unique among international criminal bodies: the confirmation of charges process. Specifically, the article provides that, prior to committing a suspect to trial before the Court, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC shall hold a hearing to assess whether the Prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the suspect bears responsibility for the charged crime or crimes. In theory, the confirmation process is intended to achieve several goals, including ensuring prosecutorial fairness and efficiency, protecting the rights of the suspect, and promoting judicial economy. However, as evidenced in the review in this report of the twelve confirmation hearings held at the ICC to date, in practice, the process has fallen far short of achieving these goals.

Given the disconnect between the intended goals of the confirmation process and the way the process has played out in practice, it is clear that changes to the system are in order. While some attempts have been made both from within and outside of the Court to improve the Article 61 process in recent years, these initiatives have either been too minor in scope or have tended towards an expansion of the confirmation process, which would likely exacerbate several of the problems identified in this report. We therefore recommend a fundamental change in the approach to the confirmation process by significantly scaling back the proceedings in a way that realigns the confirmation process with the intent of the Rome Statute’s drafters. Specifically, we recommend requiring that the confirmation process be conducted primarily on the basis of written submissions and that it be completed within ninety days of a suspect’s first appearance before the Court, absent exceptional circumstances. As detailed in the report, this could be achieved through a series of amendments to the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Regulations of the Court, coupled with a basic shift in the approach of the Pre-Trial Chambers regarding their role in the confirmation process.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Susana SáCouto, War Crimes Research Office (WCRO) Director, and Katherine Cleary Thompson, WCRO Assistant Director, prepared this report. The WCRO also received research assistance from Washington College of Law (WCL) J.D. students Thomas Martal, Robert Carter Paréz, and Richard Varnies, as well as additional assistance from WCL J.D. students Alexandra Brown, Alanna Kennedy, M. Braxton Marcela, Kendall Niles, Doran Shemin, and Calvine Tiengwe and WCRO Staff Assistant Matthew Bowers. We are grateful for the generous support of the Open Society Foundations, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and the WCL, without which this report would not have been possible. We also wish to thank all those who gave generously of their time to this project, including Robert Goldman, Commissioner and Member of the Executive Committee of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and WCL Professor, and the members of the WCRO’s ICC Advisory Committee: Unity Dow, Commissioner of the ICJ, Member of the ICJ’s Executive Committee, and former Judge of the Botswana High Court; Siri Frigaard, Chief Public Prosecutor for the Norwegian National Authority for Prosecution of Organized and Other Serious Crimes and former Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes in East Timor; Justice Richard Goldstone, former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR); Chief Justice Phillip Rapiroa of the Massachusetts Appeals Court and Reserve Judge of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) Supreme Court Chamber and former Chief International Judge serving as Coordinator of the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor; and Juan Mendez, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment and former Special Advisor on Prevention to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

ABOUT THE WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE

The core mandate of the WCRO is to promote the development and enforcement of international criminal and humanitarian law, primarily through the provision of specialized legal assistance to international criminal courts and tribunals. The Office was established by the Washington College of Law in 1995 in response to a request for assistance from the Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, established by the United Nations Security Council in 1993 and 1994 respectively. Since then, several new internationalized or “hybrid” war crimes tribunals have been established under the auspices or with the support of the United Nations, each raising novel legal issues. This, in turn, has generated growing demands for the expert assistance of the WCRO. As a result, in addition to the ICTY and ICTR, the WCRO has provided in-depth research support to the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. It has also provided similar assistance to mechanisms and institutions involved in accountability efforts for serious international crimes at the domestic level, including the War Crimes Section of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Argentina’s Assistance Unit for Cases of Human Rights Violations Committed under State Terrorism, Peru’s Instituto de Defensa Legal (dedicated to representing victims in serious crimes cases before Peru’s National Criminal Court), and the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Global Criminal Justice.

The WCRO has also conducted legal research projects on behalf of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, in view of how significant the impact of the Court’s early decisions are likely to be on the ICC’s future and in recognition of the urgent need for analytical critique at early stages of the Court’s development, in 2007 the WCRO launched a new initiative, the ICC Legal Analysis and Education Project, aimed at producing public, impartial, legal analyses of critical issues raised by the Court’s early decisions. With this initiative, the WCRO took on a new role in relation to the ICC. While past projects were carried out in support of the OTP the WCRO is committed to analyzing and commenting on the ICC’s early activities in an impartial and independent manner. In order to avoid any conflict of interest, the WCRO did not engage in legal research for any organ of the ICC while producing this report, nor will the WCRO conduct research for any organ of the ICC prior to the conclusion of the ICC Legal Analysis and Education Project. Additionally, in order to ensure the objectivity of its analyses, the WCRO created an Advisory Committee comprised of the experts in international criminal and humanitarian law named in the acknowledgments above.
THE CONFIRMATION OF CHARGES PROCESS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE

WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE
International Criminal Court
Legal Analysis and Education Project
October 2015
Cover photographs (from left)

A Darfuri rebel fighter sets aside his prosthetic legs. Abeche, Chad, 2007, courtesy Shane Bauer

The International Criminal Court building in The Hague, courtesy Aurora Hartwig De Heer

A village elder meets with people from the surrounding area. Narkaida, Darfur, Sudan, 2007, courtesy Shane Bauer

Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Minister Simone Veil at the second annual meeting of the Trust Fund for Victims, courtesy ICC Press Office
M. The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé ............................................72

IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................75

A. The Failure of the Confirmation Process to Achieve Its Intended Goals ........................................................................75

B. Alternatives .................................................................................86

V. CONCLUSION .............................................................................104

Annex One: Dates Relevant to the Confirmation of Charges Process ..................................................................................105

Annex Two: Dates Relevant to the Post-Confirmation, Pre-Trial Process ..................................................................................109

Annex Three: Dates Relevant to the Entire Pre-Trial Phase............111

Annex Four: Dates Relevant to the Suspect’s Wait Time for Potentially Exculpatory Evidence .........................................................113
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Article 61 of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) creates a process unique among international criminal bodies: the confirmation of charges process. Specifically, the article provides that, prior to committing a suspect to trial before the Court, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC shall hold a hearing to assess whether the Prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the suspect bears responsibility for the charged crime or crimes. In theory, the confirmation process is intended to achieve several goals, including ensuring prosecutorial fairness and efficiency, protecting the rights of the suspect, and promoting judicial economy.

However, as evidenced in the detailed review in this report of the twelve confirmation hearings held at the ICC to date, in practice, the process has fallen far short of achieving these goals. Indeed, rather than promoting efficiency, the confirmation process has added significant time to the overall length of trials before the ICC, with the shortest amount of time between a suspect’s initial appearance and a decision on whether to confirm the charges being more than seven months and the longest period being more than two and a half years. Furthermore, the delay a suspect faces to actually get to trial does not end once the decision confirming charges is issued, as both the Defense and the Prosecution can file a request for leave to appeal the decision. Following a decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber on this request, and, if granted, a decision by the Appeals Chamber, the Presidency must constitute a Trial Chamber to handle the case, which has taken up to three months. At that point, the Trial Chamber can begin to set a date for trial, although the actual start of trial is frequently delayed by issues such as those relating to disclosure, translations, witness security, etc. Issues regarding the precise nature of the charges against the accused have also persisted well into the trial due to Trial Chambers’ extensive use of a regulation that permits the Court to change the legal characterization of the facts under certain circumstances during the trial, meaning that the Court is spending on average more than fourteen months to confirm charges that may be substantially altered over the course of trial.
While one could argue that the confirmation process has at least protected certain suspects from being required to undergo a lengthy trial on unmeritorious charges, it seems clear that the cases that have not been confirmed have been so weak that the charges could have been easily disposed of pursuant to a process far less extensive than that which has come to characterize Article 61 proceedings. Finally, in those cases that have proceeded to trial, the Pre-Trial Chambers have produced lengthy decisions assessing the charges against the suspect in detail, raising questions not only about judicial economy, but also as to whether the process is consistent with the right to be presumed innocent until a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Given the disconnect between the drafters’ and the Court’s intentions regarding the confirmation process and the way that process has played out in practice, it is clear that changes to the system are in order. Notably, two serious initiatives have been undertaken in recent months, one by the judges of the Court and one by a group of outside experts, aimed at improving the confirmation process. However, the changes proposed by each of these initiatives appear insufficient to render the overall scheme consistent with the goals of the drafters and the Court itself. Thus, this report recommends a fundamental restructuring of the confirmation process.

One way to bring about such a dramatic restructuring – albeit not the one we ultimately recommend – is to significantly expand the confirmation process in a manner that would result in a case being much more “trial ready” than is currently the case. Notably, some of the Court’s Pre-Trial Chambers appear to be increasingly moving towards this approach. For instance, although the provisions governing disclosure only require that the parties share with each other and with the Pre-Trial Chamber the evidence upon which they intend to rely at the confirmation hearing, some Chambers have required that the Prosecutor disclosure all exculpatory evidence prior to confirmation and that all evidence disclosed between the parties be shared with the Chamber in order to assist it in its “truth seeking” function. Additionally, one Chamber went so far as to adjourn the confirmation proceedings to demand more evidence from the Prosecution on the theory that the Prosecution is required to present its strongest case against the suspect at the confirmation hearing, based on a largely completed investigation. This position not only directly contradicts the plain language of Article 61, which states that the Prosecution need only present sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to
believe the charged crimes have been committed, but is also at odds with the fact that Article 61 expressly authorizes the Prosecution to rely on summary evidence at confirmation. Furthermore, even if a prolonged confirmation process reduces the amount of preparation required at the trial stage, there will undoubtedly be issues that need to be resolved by the Chamber that will ultimately be deciding on the guilt of the accused, meaning the overall time savings are likely to be insignificant in terms of protecting the suspect’s right to a speedy trial and judicial efficiency. A prolonged confirmation stage would be even more problematic for suspects whose cases are ultimately not confirmed, as it means such suspects would be deprived of liberty for a substantial period of time before a determination is made that the charges against them did not meet the low standard that is to be applied at confirmation.

The other option for a fundamental change in the confirmation process is to significantly scale back the proceedings in a way that realigns the confirmation process with the intent of the drafters, which is the approach recommended in this report. Specifically, we recommend requiring that the confirmation process be conducted solely on the basis of written submissions and that it be completed within ninety days of a suspect’s first appearance before the Court, absent exceptional circumstances. As detailed in the report, this could be achieved through a series of amendments to the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Regulations of the Court, coupled with a basic shift in the approach of the Pre-Trial Chambers regarding their role in the confirmation process. Specifically, we recommend three amendments to the ICC’s Rules:

- First, the Rules would need to be revised to provide that the “hearing” referred to in Article 61 would be limited to a non-evidentiary, non-testimonial hearing. This would mean that the parties would be given a brief opportunity to present their arguments for and against confirmation and the Chamber would be able to pose clarifying questions to the parties. However, the Chamber would primarily base its confirmation decision on the Document Containing the Charges (DCC), together with supporting evidence, and a written response from the Defense. Limiting the Prosecution to presenting the DCC with supporting evidence is consistent with the notion that the confirmation process is not intended to be a “mini-trial,” which is a theme that dates back to the drafting of the Rome Statute and has been consistently
espoused, at least in theory, by the Court. At the same time, this approach will permit the Pre-Trial Chamber to perform its task of evaluating whether the Prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe each charge and will give the suspect the opportunity to exercise his or her rights under Article 61(6) of the Rome Statute to object to the charges; challenge the Prosecution’s evidence; and present his or her own evidence.

- Second, we recommend that the Rules be amended to set forth strict time limits governing the written submissions upon which the Pre-Trial Chamber will render its confirmation decision. Consistent with the Prosecution’s stated strategy of being as trial-ready as possible from the start of proceedings, we recommend requiring the submission of the DCC within thirty days of the suspect’s first appearance. Of course, the rule could allow for an extension of this time period in exceptional circumstances. We would then recommend that the Defense be given thirty days to prepare a written response, which is consistent with the current framework requiring that the Defense receive the DCC thirty days prior to the hearing.

- Finally, in order to ensure that the parties are able to operate within the recommended time frame, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence should be amended to strictly limit pre-confirmation disclosure between the parties, which has been one of the primary causes of delay at the confirmation stage. In particular, we recommend that the Rules provide that the parties disclose only that evidence upon which they directly rely in their written submissions (i.e., the Document Containing the Charges and response thereto) and postpone the disclosure of exculpatory evidence until after confirmation. Further, the amended Rules should eliminate the availability of redactions to evidence at the pre-confirmation stage, thereby leaving it to the Prosecution to disclose summaries of evidence containing sensitive information, as expressly contemplated under Article 61(5) of the Rome Statute. Such changes would save substantial time and resources, as they will result in a significant decrease in the number of documents disclosed, circumventing delays related to missed disclosure deadlines, time-consuming translations and redactions of disclosed documents, and the need to allow the Defense time to review many thousands of pages of documents in advance of the hearing.
Although it may seem detrimental to the Defense to delay the disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence until after charges have been confirmed, there is a strong argument to be made that the right to such evidence does not attach until post-confirmation, as the right to exculpatory evidence is found under Article 67, which is entitled “rights of the accused,” as opposed to the “rights of suspects.” In any event, Article 67(2) requires only that exculpatory material be shared with the Defense “as soon as practicable,” and a rapid confirmation process may actually ensure that the Defense start receiving such evidence earlier than it has in many of the cases to date. It is also worth noting that no case to date has failed to pass the confirmation stage due to one or more pieces of exculpatory evidence. Rather, each case that has been dismissed at the confirmation stage has failed due to the insufficiency of inculpatory evidence presented by the Prosecution. Lastly, even under the recommended scenario, persons charged with crimes by the ICC will remain in a better position than suspects at other international criminal bodies, as they will have the opportunity very early in the process to put forward evidence gathered through their own investigations which may exonerate them. Thus, a suspect subjected to truly “unfounded” charges – such as one with an unimpeachable alibi or one who has been the victim of mistaken identity – has a built-in procedural opportunity to establish his or her innocence at the outset.

In addition to the forgoing amendments to the Rules, we recommend that the Regulations of the Court be amended as follows:

- First, the Regulations should require the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision under Article 61 within thirty days of the Defense’s written submission responding to the Document Containing the Charges. Although the judges are currently given sixty days to issue this decision, the Chambers will be in a position to deliver more timely decisions because they will be limited to reviewing only that evidence directly relied upon by the parties in their written submissions. Importantly, this limited review of evidence, which stands in stark contrast to the approach taken by some Chambers to date, is consistent with the process envisioned by the drafters of the provisions governing the confirmation process. Furthermore, Pre-Trial Chambers will be able to work within the thirty-day time limit by writing shorter decisions dedicated solely to establishing whether the Prosecution has met the minimal
burden established by Article 61. Importantly, if the Pre-Trial Chambers truly apply this minimal standard, which they repeatedly espouse in theory, the parties could adjust their own approach to the confirmation process, rather than using the confirmation stage at a means of testing the cases they plan to litigate at trial.

- In addition to shortening the time within which the Pre-Trial Chamber must issue its decision under Article 61(7), we recommend that a new regulation be adopted setting time limits in the event that one or both parties seek leave to appeal the decision. Specifically, limits should be established regarding the amount of time within which the Pre-Trial Chamber must respond to any requests for leave to appeal and, in the event leave is granted, the timing for the parties to submit briefs to the Appeals Chamber and the issuance of a decision by that chamber.

If adopted, these changes will ensure that a decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber on whether to confirm charges is issued promptly after a suspect’s initial appearance and, in the event charges are confirmed, that trial preparations may begin before the Trial Chamber in a timely manner.
I. INTRODUCTION

Article 61 of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) creates a process unique among international criminal bodies: the confirmation of charges process. Specifically, the article provides that a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC shall hold “a hearing to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial” within a “reasonable time” after a suspect’s surrender to or voluntary appearance before the Court. The Pre-Trial Chamber may confirm only those charges for which the Prosecutor has presented “sufficient evidence” to establish “substantial grounds to believe” that the person bears responsibility for the charged crime.

As discussed below, the confirmation process as envisioned by Article 61 was intended to achieve several goals, including ensuring prosecutorial fairness and efficiency, protecting the rights of the suspect, and promoting judicial economy. However, as evidenced in the detailed review below of the twelve confirmation hearings held to date, in practice, the process has fallen far short of achieving these goals. At the same time, it has added significant time to the overall length of trials before the ICC and resulted in lengthy decisions assessing the charges against the suspect in detail, raising questions as to whether the process is consistent with right to a speedy trial and the right to be presumed innocent until a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This report seeks to identify the problematic

---

1 Although the Rome Statute refers to an individual who is the subject of an arrest warrant or summons to appear as “the person” or “the person charged” until charges are confirmed against that individual, we use the term “suspect” for ease of readability.


3 Id. Art. 61(7).

4 These rights are guaranteed to an “accused” under Article 67 the Rome Statute, and thus unquestionably apply to any person against whom charges are confirmed at the ICC, but also attach more generally to anyone charged with a criminal offense under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Rome Statute, supra n. 2, Art. 67; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entry into force 23 March 1976, Arts. 9(3), 14(2). The Rome Statute expressly authorizes the Court to apply “where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of
aspects of the confirmation process as it has played out over the past decade and ultimately recommends a dramatic restructuring of that process in order to more closely align the realities of confirmation with its intended goals and with the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the presumption of innocence.

international law” and states that “[t]he application and interpretation of law… must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights…” Rome Statute, supra n. 2, Art. 21.
II. THE CONFIRMATION OF CHARGES PROCESS AS ENVISIONED IN THE DOCUMENTS GOVERNING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

A. Text and Drafting History

As stated above, Article 61 of the Rome Statute provides that a Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court “shall” hold “a hearing to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial” within a “reasonable time” after a suspect’s surrender to or voluntary appearance before the Court.5 The provision further states that, prior to the hearing, the suspect shall be: (i) “provided with a copy of the document containing the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to bring the person to trial;” and (ii) “informed of the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely at the hearing.”6 Towards achieving the latter, the Pre-Trial Chamber is empowered to “issue orders regarding the disclosure of information” prior to the hearing.7 In the course of the hearing on the confirmation of charges, “the Prosecutor shall support each charge with sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed the crime charged.”8 In putting on its case, the Prosecution may “rely on documentary or summary evidence and need not call the witnesses expected to testify at the trial.”9 In response, the suspect may: (i) object to the charges; (ii) challenge the evidence presented by the Prosecutor; and (iii) present evidence of his or her own.10

Finally, Article 61 states that the “Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the basis of the hearing, determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged,”11 and, based on this determination, it “shall” do one of the following:

---

5 Rome Statute, supra n. 2, Art. 61(1).
6 Id. Art. 61(3).
7 Id. Art. 61(2).
8 Id. Art. 61(5).
9 Id.
10 Id. Art. 61(6).
11 Id. Art. 61(7).
(i) confirm the charges and commit the suspect to trial on those charges;

(ii) decline to confirm the charges; or

(iii) adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecutor to consider providing further evidence on a particular charge or amending a charge.\textsuperscript{12}

As discussed at length in a report published by the War Crimes Research Office in October 2008 entitled “The Confirmation of Charges Process at the International Criminal Court,” Article 61 was the product of negotiations between countries that favored the type of indictment review process used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and those that sought the creation of an “investigating chamber.”\textsuperscript{13} Under the “indictment review” approach, embodied in the 1994 Draft Statute created by the International Law Commission, a case would proceed to trial before the ICC upon a determination by the Presidency of the Court that a \textit{prima facie} case existed under the terms of the Statute.\textsuperscript{14} This determination would be made solely on the basis of an indictment and supporting documents supplied by the Prosecutor; there would be no opportunity for the suspect to challenge the case before it went to trial.\textsuperscript{15} In response to this proposal, several countries advocated for some type of pre-trial chamber with authority to deal with “preliminary investigations,” “indictments,” or “pre-trial matters.”\textsuperscript{16} In

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{13} See War Crimes Research Office, \textit{The Confirmation of Charges Process at the International Criminal Court}, at 44-62 (October 2008), \url{https://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/WCROReportonConfirmationofCharges.pdf}.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, \textit{Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court}, vol. II (Compilation of Proposals), U.N. Doc. A/51/22, at 8 (1996) (noting that France had called for the creation of preliminary investigations chambers and the Netherlands had called for creation of an investigative judge); \textit{id.} at 21 (explaining that France had proposed that a preliminary investigations chamber would “perform pre-trial functions”); \textit{id.} at 24 (relaying Austria’s call for the President to establish an “Indictment Chamber”); \textit{id.} at 25 (noting that delegations
\end{itemize}
particular, France proposed a “Preliminary Investigations Chambers” with the power to amend the indictment *sua sponte* and ultimately frame the case against the suspect. Importantly, under the French proposal, the suspect would receive a copy of the proposed indictment and the supporting evidence prior to the preliminary chamber’s review and would have the opportunity to challenge the case before it was confirmed.

While there was substantial support for the creation of a pre-trial chamber, such proposals also “raised concerns among those delegations who feared excessive judicial interference at such an early stage would undermine the independence of the Prosecutor.” Additionally, while the concept of a public confirmation “hearing” was seen as beneficial to the extent that it would afford the suspect with greater protection, states also thought it was critical that the confirmation of the indictment “in no way to be seen as a pre-judgment by the court as to the actual guilt or innocence of the accused.” Consistent with this concern, the proposals regarding the appropriate level of information to be provided to the suspect prior to confirmation made clear that the “full presentation of witnesses and

---

17 Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court: Working Paper Submitted by France to the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an ICC, A/AC.249/L.3, Art. 10, 6 August 1996. See also id. Art. 48(5) (“Following the hearing and after deliberations, the Preliminary Investigations Chamber may: Confirm the indictment in its entirety: Confirm only part of the indictment and amend it, either by declaring the case inadmissible in part, for the reasons listed in article 35, if the Court has not already ruled on this issue, or by withdrawing certain charges deemed not sufficiently serious, or by giving some facts another characterization, in accordance with articles 27 to 32; Refuse to confirm the indictment.”).


20 Id.

evidence as at trial [was] not contemplated”\textsuperscript{22} and that the Prosecutor should be authorized to rely on summary evidence.\textsuperscript{23}

Ultimately, the Pre-Trial Chamber was created under the Rome Statute, although the powers afforded to it are not as extensive as some countries would have liked, given that it has no authority to amend the charges as prepared by the Prosecutor.\textsuperscript{24} Furthermore, nothing in the Rome Statute or the subsequently adopted Rules of Procedure and Evidence mandates any disclosure to the suspect prior to the confirmation hearing beyond the evidence to be relied upon by the Prosecution at the hearing. Notably, France proposed that the Rules mandate that all disclosure take place prior to confirmation, saying that “the Pre-Trial Chamber, during the pre-trial phase, should settle such matters, so that the trial itself is not disrupted by problems related to disclosure.”\textsuperscript{25} As one of the French delegates to the Preparatory Commission explained: “it would be a waste of time to have just a partial disclosure at the pre-trial stage and then still disputes at the trial stage.”\textsuperscript{26} Yet others were of the opinion that “at this stage of the


\textsuperscript{23} Id.

\textsuperscript{24} See Rome Statute, supra n. 2, Art. 61(7). See also, e.g., Michela Miraglia, The First Decision of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 188, 190 (2006) (“The way in which the [ICC pre-trial] process is a compromise between different proposals brought into negotiations by the delegates represents a novel solution compared with the ones adopted in the traditional procedural models: Pre-trial Chambers are to act as an organ of judicial scrutiny and review, not as an investigating judge.”); Jérôme de Hemptinne, The Creation of Investigating Chambers at the International Criminal Court: An Option Worth Pursuing?, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 402, 404 (May 2007) (noting that the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber “is not an investigating chamber in the proper sense,” as it “has only limited power to conduct investigations and oversee the prosecutor’s activities”); David Scheffer, A Review of the Experiences of the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers of the International Criminal Court Regarding the Disclosure of Evidence, 21 Leiden J. Int’l Law 151, 153 (2008) (explaining that the Pre-Trial Chamber was not designed to “become the investigatory engine of the Court,” in part because this “would have tilted the ICC too far in the direction of the type of civil law court that relies heavily on the role of an investigating judge and minimizes the prosecutor’s functions”).


proceedings it is unnecessary for the Pre-Trial Chamber to undertake the more detailed disclosure exercise that will be necessary before the trial,” noting that “such a process is likely to be time-consuming and may delay the straightforward task of determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support the prosecution charges.” The latter view ultimately prevailed, as Article 61(3) of the Rome Statute merely states that the Pre-Trial Chamber “may issue orders regarding the disclosure of information for the purposes of the hearing.” Furthermore, disclosure is discussed in general terms in the final version of the Rules, implying that the drafters did not intend for disclosure to be handled exclusively at the pre-trial stage. Finally, there is no requirement that any particular level of disclosure be completed prior to the confirmation hearing other than Rule 77, which requires the Prosecution to allow the Defense to inspect “any books, documents, photographs and other tangible objects in the possession or control of the Prosecutor, which are … intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence for the purposes of the confirmation hearing or at trial…”

27 Id. (quoting Peter Lewis, a British delegate to the Preparatory Commission).
28 Rome Statute, supra n. 2, Art. 61(3) (emphasis added).
30 Id. R. 77 (emphasis added). While Rule 77 also outlines the right of the Defense to inspect evidence in the possession or control of the Prosecutor “which [is] material to the preparation of the defense,” it does not state that such inspection must be complete prior to confirmation. Id. Other relevant rules include Rule 76, which requires that the Prosecution disclose “the names of witnesses whom the Prosecutor intends to call to testify and copies of any prior statements made by those witnesses,” is simply entitled “pre-trial disclosure relating to prosecution witnesses” and contains no requirement that the Prosecution disclose the identities of all witnesses it plans to use at trial prior to the confirmation hearing. Id. R. 76(1). Similarly, Rule 81(4), which sets forth the procedure by which the Prosecution may seek permission to withhold certain evidence – such as confidential information or information that may put a victim or witness at risk if disclosed – states that the Prosecution must obtain authorization from “the Chamber,” without specifying the Pre-Trial Chamber or the Trial Chamber. Id. R. 81(4). Finally, Rule 121, which governs “[p]roceedings before the confirmation hearing,” states that “[i]n accordance with [Article 61(3)], the Pre-Trial Chamber shall take the necessary decisions regarding disclosure between the Prosecutor and the person in respect of whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear has been issued.” Id. R. 121(3). As noted above, however, Article 61(3) itself does not require any particular level of disclosure prior to the confirmation hearing. See supra n. 28 and accompanying text.
B. The Goals of the Confirmation Process

From the drafting history, it appears that Article 61 was initially adopted with two distinct goals in mind. First, the confirmation of charges process was created as check against the Prosecutor’s authority to determine the appropriate charges in a case.\(^{31}\) By vesting the Presidency – and then later the Pre-Trial Chamber – with the authority to review the indictment against the suspect, the Chambers would be able to ensure prosecutorial fairness and effectiveness in investigations.\(^{32}\) Second, the confirmation of charges process was created to protect the rights of the suspect, as it would allow a suspect to challenge the charges before proceeding to trial.\(^{33}\) At the same time, however, the drafters agreed that the confirmation of charges hearing was not intended to be a “mini-trial,” as they wanted to avoid allowing the confirmation process to become a pre-judgment of the suspect.\(^{34}\) Indeed, given the low standard applied at the confirmation stage, subsequent Pre-Trial Chambers have made clear that the purpose of

\(^{31}\) See, e.g., Kai Ambos & Dennis Miller, *Structure and Function of the Confirmation Procedure before the ICC from a Comparative Perspective*, 7 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 335, 341 (2007) (claiming that the “primary function of the confirmation procedure is to check and balance the Prosecutor”) (emphasis in original).


\(^{33}\) War Crimes Research Office, *The Confirmation of Charges Process at the International Criminal Court*, supra n. 13, at 25, 45, 48-50, 60, 64. See also *The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/06-803, ¶ 37 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 January 2007); *The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo*, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, ¶ 28 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15 June 2009); *The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda*, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red, ¶ 39 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 8 February 2010); *The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, et al.*, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, ¶ 52 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012); *The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, et al.*, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, ¶ 40 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012). See also 1994 Draft Statute, *supra* n. 14, Art. 27 Commentary, ¶ 3 (emphasizing the Court respecting a suspect’s right to a fair and speedy trial, as guaranteed under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).

Article 61 is simply to protect the suspect from “wrongful and wholly unfounded charges.”

While not explicit in the drafting history of the Rome Statute, judges of the ICC and commentators have repeatedly stressed a third rationale for the confirmation of charges process: judicial economy. Thus, for instance, ICC Judge Claude Jorda, who wrote the first confirmation decision delivered by the Court, explained: “The pre-trial phase aims to contribute to good trial preparation and thereby to an efficient trial. Taken as a whole, it aims to safeguard the right of the [suspect], in full equality, to be tried without undue delay.” Similarly, in the context of the Bemba case, the Trial Chamber observed that “the role of Pre-Trial Chambers is to prepare the case for trial.” Likewise, an academic analysis of the “structure and function” of the confirmation process concluded: “The confirmation hearing pursues two objectives in particular: On the one hand, it operates as a filter and thus ensures that only the really important cases go to trial, and therefore protects the suspect against improper or unsubstantiated charges. On the other hand, it serves to avoid time-consuming discussions about disclosure of evidence in the trial phase.”

---

35 See, e.g., Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 33, ¶ 37 (emphasis added); The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, ¶ 63 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 Sept 2008) (emphasis added).
36 Claude Jorda & Marianne Saracco, The Raisons d’être of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court, in FROM HUMAN RIGHTS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF AN AFRICAN JURIST, THE LATE JUDGE LAITY KAMA 430 (Emmanuel Decaux, et al., eds. 2007).
37 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Admission Into Evidence of Materials Contained in the Prosecution’s List of Evidence, ICC-01/05-01/08-1022, ¶ 27 (Trial Chamber III, 19 November 2010). See also The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, ICC-02/11-01/11-432, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Fernández de Grumendi, ¶¶ 21, 26 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 3 June 2013) (referring to the “judicial efficiency that Pre-Trial Chambers are called to ensure”).
38 Ambos & Miller, supra n. 31, at 347-48.
III. THE CONFIRMATION OF CHARGES PROCESS IN PRACTICE

A. Overview

As of the time of writing, the Court has completed twelve confirmation of charges proceedings for twenty-one suspects, each of which is summarized below. Generally, the process has taken multiple months from a suspect’s initial appearance to the release of a decision regarding whether the case will be sent to trial. The shortest amount of time between a suspect’s initial appearance and a decision on whether to confirm the charges was seven months and nineteen days,39 and the longest period was two years, six months, and eight days.40 However, the delay a suspect faces to actually get to trial does not end once the decision confirming charges is issued, as both the Defense and the Prosecution can file a request for leave to appeal the decision.41 Following a decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber on this request, and, if granted, a decision by the Appeals Chamber, the Presidency must constitute a Trial Chamber to handle the case, which has taken up to three months.42

Figure One below summarizes the amount of time between a suspect’s first appearance before the ICC and the Presidency’s decision constituting a Trial Chamber for those cases in which charges have been confirmed.

39 See infra n. 408 et seq. and accompanying text (describing the confirmation proceedings against Charles Blé Goudé).
40 See infra n. 343 et seq. and accompanying text (describing the confirmation proceedings against Laurent Gbagbo).
41 See generally ICC Rules, supra n. 29, R. 155(1) (requiring permission from the Pre-Trial Chamber to appeal a decision issued under Rome Statute Article 82(1)(d) or 82(2)).
42 See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Decision re-constituting Trial Chamber I and referring to it the case of The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-682 (The Presidency, 17 September 2014).
**FIGURE ONE: Length of Confirmation Process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Time Between Suspect’s First Appearance and Presidency’s Decision Constituting a Trial Chamber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lubanga</strong></td>
<td>&gt; 11 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Katanga &amp; Ngudjolo</strong></td>
<td>&gt; 12 months &lt;br/&gt; &gt; 7 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bemba</strong></td>
<td>&gt; 14 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banda &amp; Jerbo</strong></td>
<td>&gt; 8 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ruto, et al.</strong></td>
<td>&gt; 11 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kenyatta, et al.</strong></td>
<td>&gt; 11 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ntaganda</strong></td>
<td>&gt; 15 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gbagbo</strong></td>
<td>&gt; 33 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bemba, et al.</strong></td>
<td>Between &gt; 14 months and &gt; 10 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blé Goudé</strong></td>
<td>&gt; 8 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the Trial Chamber can begin to set a date for trial, although, as discussed below, the actual start of trial is frequently delayed by issues

---

43 For the dates of each suspect’s first appearance before the ICC, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision on whether to confirm the charges against that suspect, and the Presidency’s decision constituting a Trial Chamber, together with relevant citations, see Annex One. Note that the *Abu Garda* and *Mbarushimana* cases are not included in Figure One because, as explained in detail below, the charges were not confirmed and thus no Trial Chamber was ever constituted. However, as seen in Annex One, the confirmation process in those cases was equally lengthy. Specifically, in the *Abu Garda* case, more than eight months passed between the suspect’s first appearance and the decision declining to confirm any charges, whereas the process took eleven months in the *Mbarushimana* case. Id.
such as those relating to disclosure, translations, witness security, etc. Issues regarding the precise nature of the charges against the accused have also persisted well into the trial stage and, in those few cases that have reached final judgment at trial, on appeal. Figure Two summarizes the amount of time between the Presidency’s decision constituting a Trial Chamber and the first day of trial for those cases that have actually proceeded to trial at the time of this writing.

**FIGURE TWO: Length of Post-Confirmation, Pre-Trial Phase**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Time Between Constitution of Trial Chamber and First Day of Trial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lubanga</td>
<td>&gt; 22 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga &amp; Ngudjolo</td>
<td>13 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemba</td>
<td>&gt; 14 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruto, et al.</td>
<td>&gt; 17 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntaganda</td>
<td>&gt; 13 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure Three combines the dates in the first two figures to show the amount of time between a suspect’s first appearance before the Court and the first day of trial for those cases that have proceeded to trial at the time of this writing.

---

44 For the dates of the Presidency’s decision constituting a Trial Chamber in each case and the first day of trial, together with relevant citations, see Annex Two.
FIGURE THREE: Overall Length of Pre-Trial Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Time Between Suspect’s First Appearance and First Day of Trial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lubanga</td>
<td>&gt; 24 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga &amp; Ngudjolo</td>
<td>&gt; 25 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt; 20 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemba</td>
<td>&gt; 28 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruto, et al.</td>
<td>&gt; 29 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntaganda</td>
<td>&gt; 29 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo

Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the first suspect to be taken into the custody of the International Criminal Court, was surrendered to the ICC on 17 March 2006. Mr. Lubanga, whose case arose from the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), was arrested pursuant to a finding by Pre-Trial Chamber I that there were reasonable grounds to believe he was criminally responsible for the war crime of conscripting, enlisting, and using children to participate actively in the course of armed conflict, as leader of the Union des Patriotes Congolais/Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo. Shortly after Mr. Lubanga’s transfer to the ICC, the Pre-Trial Chamber scheduled the confirmation of charges hearing for 27 June 2006, leaving the parties more than three months to prepare. The Chamber

---

45 For the dates of each suspect’s first appearance before the ICC and the first day of trial, together with relevant citations, see Annex Three.
46 See The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Order Scheduling the First Appearance of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-38 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 17 March 2006).
47 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Warrant of Arrest, ICC-01/04-01/06-2, at 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10 February 2006).
then appointed Judge Sylvia Steiner to serve as a Single Judge of Pre-Trial Chamber I for purposes of overseeing preparations for the confirmation of charges hearing, including taking the necessary decisions regarding disclosure between the Prosecution and the Defense.49

1. The Confirmation Process

One of the first decisions issued by Judge Steiner was one setting forth a “system of disclosure” for the parties,50 which included the following principles:

- The Prosecution was required to provide the Defense with the names and statements of all witnesses on which it intended to rely at the confirmation hearing, “regardless of whether the Prosecution intend[ed] to call them to testify or to rely on their redacted statements, non-redacted statements, or a written summary of the evidence contained in those statements.”51

- As a “general rule,” witness statements, transcripts of interviews with witnesses, and notes from witness interviews had to be disclosed to the Defense “in full;” any restriction on such disclosure had to “be authorised by the single judge.”52

- All exculpatory material53 was to be disclosed by the Prosecution “as soon as practicable.”54
The parties need only share with the Pre-Trial Chamber the evidence upon which they intended to rely at the confirmation hearing.\textsuperscript{55}

Judge Steiner’s first decision also set forth a timetable according to which the parties would make all required disclosures well in advance of the scheduled 27 June 2006 confirmation hearing.\textsuperscript{56}

After setting forth the general system of disclosure, Judge Steiner issued a second decision, detailing some of the principles governing applications to restrict disclosure.\textsuperscript{57} Judge Steiner noted that, in ascertaining the relevant principles, particular attention must be paid to “the limited scope of the confirmation hearing” and to “the fact that protection of sensitive evidence, materials, and information must be consistent with the rights of the Defense.”\textsuperscript{58} Furthermore, in view of the Article 67(2) requirement that all potentially exculpatory evidence in the possession of the Prosecution be disclosed to the Defense “as soon as practicable,” the judge held that she would not authorize any redactions to “potentially exculpatory excerpts” of statements made by witnesses upon whom the Prosecution intended to rely.\textsuperscript{59}

Despite Judge Steiner’s detailed disclosure timeline, it was quickly apparent the Prosecution would be unable to comply with the

practicable, disclose to the defense evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession or control which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence.” Rome Statute, \textit{supra} n. 2, Art. 67(2). The second is Rule 77, which provides that the Prosecutor “shall, subject to the restrictions on disclosure as provided for in the Statute and in [R]ules 81 and 82, permit the defense to inspect any books, documents, photographs and other tangible objects in the possession or control of the Prosecutor, which are material to the preparation of the defense or are intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence for the purposes of the confirmation hearing or at trial, as the case may be, or were obtained from or belonged to the person.” ICC Rules, \textit{supra} n.29, R. 77.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Lubanga}, Decision on the Final System of Disclosure and the Establishing of a Timetable, \textit{supra} n. 50, Annex 1, ¶¶ 121-25.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Id.} ¶ 41-43.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Id.} at 8-13.

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo}, Decision Establishing General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-01/04-01/06-108-Corr (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 19 May 2006).

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Id.} ¶ 6.

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Id.} ¶¶ 36-38.
disclosure deadlines necessary to commence the confirmation hearing as scheduled on 27 June 2006. Specifically, the delays arose because the Prosecution was seeking protective measures for “a number” of the witnesses upon whom it intended to rely at the confirmation hearing, and the process under which the Victims and Witnesses Unit (VWU) granted such protective measures took approximately three months from the time the Prosecution submitted the request.\(^{60}\) Thus, on 24 May 2006, the Single Judge postponed the confirmation hearing from 27 June to 28 September 2006 and adjusted the timeline for disclosures accordingly.\(^{61}\)

Under the new timetable, Judge Steiner ordered the Prosecution to file any requests for redactions by 29 August, suggesting the confirmation hearing would go forward as planned on 28 September 2006.\(^{62}\) However, on 20 September, Judge Steiner was forced once again to postpone the hearing, noting that the Prosecution had submitted applications as late as 19 September 2006, and therefore “part of the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely at the confirmation hearing is not yet accessible to the [D]efence.”\(^{63}\) Eventually, the hearing was rescheduled for 9 November 2006 – more than four months after the initial date of the hearing, and nearly nine months after Mr. Lubanga was transferred to ICC custody.\(^{64}\)

The confirmation of charges hearing finally commenced on 9 November 2006.\(^{65}\) The hearing lasted approximately two weeks, closing on 28 November 2006.\(^{66}\) Following the hearing, the parties and

---

\(^{60}\) The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Postponement of the Confirmation Hearing and the Adjustment of the Timetable Set in the Decision on the Final System of Disclosure, ICC-01/04-01/06-126, at 4-5 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 24 May 2006).

\(^{61}\) Id.

\(^{62}\) The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecution Practice to Provide to the Defense Redacted Versions of Evidence and Materials Without Authorisation by the Chamber, ICC-01/04-01/06-355, at 4-5 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 25 August 2006).

\(^{63}\) The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Postponement of the Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/06-454, at 2-3 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 20 September 2006).

\(^{64}\) The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Date of the Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/06-521, at 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 5 October 2006).

\(^{65}\) Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 33, ¶ 30.

\(^{66}\) Id.
participating victims were granted the opportunity to submit post-hearing briefs. On 29 January 2007, the Chamber issued its decision confirming the charges against Mr. Lubanga. In its decision, the Chamber stressed that the confirmation process was “limited to committing for trial only those persons against whom sufficiently compelling charges going beyond mere theory or suspicion have been brought,” thus avoiding trial on “wrongful and wholly unfounded charges.” It found that this threshold had been met in this case.

The case against Mr. Lubanga was technically referred to Trial Chamber I on 6 March 2007; nearly one year after the suspect was first taken into custody by the ICC. However, the Prosecution and Defense both requested leave to appeal the confirmation of charges decision, with responses by the Legal Representatives of Victims, and the Pre-Trial Chamber did not issue its decision rejecting these requests until 24 May 2007. Thus, Mr. Lubanga’s case was finally able to clear pre-trial proceedings over one year and two months after the suspect initially appeared at the ICC.

2. Post-Confirmation, Pre-Trial Delays

Despite the case being assigned to Trial Chamber I on 6 March 2007, a vast array of issues remained to be resolved before the trial could commence. Indeed, one year after the confirmation hearing had begun, on 9 November 2007, the Trial Chamber issued a decision noting that the Prosecution had only disclosed a fraction of the exculpatory documents in its possession to the Defense and had only identified eleven of thirty-seven witnesses it was planning to call at trial.

---

67 Id. at ¶ 31.
68 See generally id.
69 Id. ¶ 37.
70 Id.
71 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Constituting Trial Chamber I and Referring to It the Case of The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01-04-01-06-842 (Presidency, 6 March 2007).
72 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecution and Defense Applications for Leave to Appeal the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-04-01/06-915, ¶¶ 2-7 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 24 May 2007).
73 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Regarding the Timing and Manner of Disclosure and the Date of Trial, ICC-01/04-04-01/06-1019, ¶¶ 2-7 (Trial Chamber I, 9 November 2007). See also The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on Article 54(3)(e) Documents Identified as Potentially Exculpatory or Otherwise Material for the Defense’s Preparation for the
Ultimately, the failure of the Prosecutor to disclose exculpatory material led the Trial Chamber to stay the proceedings for more than five months, causing a significant delay in proceedings. Moreover, the Trial Chamber held that evidence admitted before the Pre-Trial Chamber at the confirmation of charges hearing would not be automatically entered into evidence for purposes of trial, but must be introduced *de novo*, meaning any evidentiary disputes would have to be re-litigated.

Another issue that arose prior to the start of trial related to the nature of the charges. Specifically, although the Prosecutor had charged Mr. Lubanga with committing war crimes in *non-international* armed conflict under Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that Mr. Lubanga should be tried, in part, for committing the war crime of conscripting, enlisting, and using children to participate actively in *international* armed conflict under Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi). Notably, the Prosecution had expressly addressed its decision to limit the charges to the context of non-international armed

---


75 *The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Decision on the Status Before the Trial Chamber of the Evidence Heard by the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber in Trial Proceedings, and the Manner in Which Evidence Shall Be Submitted, ICC-01/04-01/06-1084, ¶¶ 4-8 (Trial Chamber I, 13 December 2007).

76 *The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Submission of the Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(3)(a) and of the List of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 121(3), ICC-01/04-01/06-356, ¶ 12(i) (Office of the Prosecutor, 28 August 2006)

77 *Lubanga*, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, *supra* n. 33, at 156.
conflict in its Document Containing the Charges, saying that although there was some evidence of foreign state support of militias within the DRC, that evidence did “not suffice to enable the Prosecution to meet its burden of establishing an international armed conflict as the term is defined by international criminal jurisprudence.” The Prosecution reiterated this point during the actual confirmation hearing, and it presented no evidence during the hearing in support of a charge against Mr. Lubanga for committing war crimes in the context of an international armed conflict. Nevertheless, the Pre-Trial Chamber included the charge in its decision. Subsequently, the Trial Chamber determined that it possessed no authority to review the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to amend the legal characterization of the charges against Mr. Lubanga. Specifically, it held that, although the Trial Chamber may modify the legal characterization of the facts under Regulation 55 of the Court’s Regulations, it could not exercise that authority until the trial had begun and evidence had been presented. Thus, the Trial Chamber concluded that the Prosecutor should be prepared to present, and the Defense should be in a position to address, all available evidence on the issue of whether the relevant conduct

---

78 Lubanga, Submission of the Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(3)(a) and of the List of Evidence Pursuant to Rule 121(3), supra n. 76, ¶ 12(i) (citing The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Judgment, ¶¶ 68-171 (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999)).


80 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Status Before the Trial Chamber of the Evidence Heard by the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber in Trial Proceedings, and the Manner in Which Evidence Shall Be Submitted, ICC-01/04/01-06-1084, ¶¶ 39-50 (Trial Chamber I, 13 December 2007).

81 Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court is a provision that permits a Trial Chamber to convict an accused of a crime other than that with which he was originally charged by the Prosecution, or to base its conviction on a different mode of liability than originally charged, subject to certain conditions. See International Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court, ICC-BD/01-01-04, Reg. 55, adopted 26 May 2004. In particular, the re-characterization will only be permitted if it does not exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges as confirmed by the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber. See The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Open Session, ICC-01/04/01-06-T-33-EN, at 96: 12-23 (Transcript, 13 November 2006).

82 Lubanga, Decision on the Status Before the Trial Chamber of the Evidence Heard by the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Decisions of the Pre-Trial Chamber in Trial Proceedings, and the Manner in Which Evidence Shall Be Submitted, supra n. 80, ¶¶ 47-48.
took place in the context of international or non-international armed conflict.  

Given several of the issues presented above, as well as others not discussed in this report, Mr. Lubanga’s trial did not commence until 26 January 2009. Thus, Mr. Lubanga sat in ICC detention for almost three years between his initial appearance and his trial actually beginning, with almost two full years to the day elapsing between the confirmation decision and the start of Mr. Lubanga’s trial.

3. Ongoing Litigation Over the Nature of the Charges

On 22 May 2009, while the Prosecution was still presenting its case before the Trial Chamber, the Legal Representatives of Victims requested that the Chamber invoke Regulation 55 to apply “an additional legal characterization” to the facts and circumstances of the charges confirmed against the suspect. In particular, the victims’ application argued that the Trial Chamber should “re-characterize” the charges against Mr. Lubanga to include the crime against humanity of sexual slavery and the war crimes of sexual slavery and cruel and/or inhuman treatment. According to the victims, these charges could properly be added under the Trial Chamber’s authority under Regulation 55 to “change the legal characterisation of the facts” because, in the view of the victims, the proposed additional charges fell within the context of the facts and circumstances described in the charges against Mr. Lubanga as confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.

In a decision issued 14 July 2009, the same day that the Prosecution finished presenting its evidence in the case, the majority of Trial Chamber I notified the parties that it would consider adding the
victims’ proposed charges. In this decision, the Trial Chamber held that it would apply a particular reading of Regulation 55 that would effectively allow it to consider facts and circumstances not described in the charges confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. The Prosecution and Defense were granted leave to obtain interlocutory review of this interpretation of Regulation 55 and the Trial Chamber suspended the proceedings until the Appeals Chamber could resolve the issue. On 8 December 2009, The Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s decision and held that the Trial Chamber cannot re-characterize charges based on facts and circumstance that were not described in the confirmation of charges. Given the more restricted reading of Regulation 55 mandated by the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber was forced to reject the victims’ request for re-characterization, but only after a significant delay in trial proceedings.

4. Trial Chamber Judgment and Issue of Notice of Charges

Following 204 days of hearings, the presentation of evidence in the Lubanga case closed on 20 May 2011 and the Trial Chamber issued its judgment on 14 March 2012, convicting the suspect of three crimes involving children in armed conflict under Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute. Significantly, the Trial Chamber reached the conclusion that Mr. Lubanga was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

---

88 See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Giving Notice to the Parties and Participants that the Legal Characterisation of the Facts May Be Subject to Change in Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-01/04-01/06-2049 (ICC Trial Chamber I, 14 July 2009).
89 Id. ¶¶ 27-32.
90 See The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Adjourning the Evidence in the Case and Consideration of Regulation 55, ICC-01/04-01/06-2143, ¶ 10 (ICC Trial Chamber I, 2 October 2009).
91 Id. ¶ 23.
92 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeals of Mr Lubanga Dyilo and the Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 14 July 2009 entitled “Decision Giving Notice to the Parties and Participants that the Legal Characterisation of the Facts May Be Subject to Change in Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court,” ICC-01/04-01/06-2205, ¶ 112 (ICC Appeals Chamber, 8 December 2009).
93 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Legal Representatives’ Joint Submissions concerning the Appeals Chamber’s Decision on 8 December 2009 on Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-01/04-01/06-2223, ¶ 37 (ICC Trial Chamber I, 8 January 2010).
94 Lubanga, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, supra n. 84, ¶ 11.
95 See generally id.
despite having excluded the evidence provided by each of the nine child soldiers relied upon by the Prosecution in its Document Containing the Charges (DCC) to support the allegations against the suspect.96 Specifically, the Trial Chamber determined that, although it could not rely on the evidence of any of these nine witnesses, other evidence presented at trial, taken together, satisfied the Chamber of Mr. Lubanga’s guilt.97

After the issuance of the judgment, Mr. Lubanga filed an appeal arguing, inter alia, that he had received insufficient notice of the charges against him, given that the evidence ultimately relied upon by the Trial Chamber was insufficiently detailed in the DCC.98 In assessing this claim, the Appeals Chamber first confirmed that, pursuant to Article 67(1) of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor must provide the suspect with “details as to the date and location of the underlying acts [for which he is charged] and identify the alleged victims to the greatest degree of specificity possible in the circumstances.”99 However, on the question of “where and how the detailed information about the charges is to be provided to the accused,” the Appeals Chamber rejected the notion that such information must be contained in the DCC given to the accused prior to the confirmation hearing.100 Rather, the Chamber held that, in assessing whether sufficient notice has been provided to the accused, it must consider “all documents that were designed to provide information about the charges,” including “auxiliary documents” provided to the accused after confirmation but prior to the start of the trial hearing.101 In this case, the Chamber noted that Mr. Lubanga’s appeal referred primarily to the initial Document Containing the Charges submitted by the Prosecution, with some cursory references to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, but did not refer to details included in the Amended Document Containing the Charges and Summary of Evidence submitted by the Prosecution.

96 Id. ¶ 480.
97 See generally id.
98 International Criminal Court, Public Redacted Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against His Conviction, ICC-01/04-01/06-3121-Red, ¶ 131 (Appeals Chamber, 1 December 2014) (“Mr Lubanga argues that he was informed of those underlying criminal acts, except for those in relation to the nine named child soldiers, in insufficient detail.”).
99 Id. ¶ 123.
100 Id. ¶ 124.
101 Id. ¶¶ 128-29.
to the Trial Chamber prior to the start of trial. The Appeals Chamber held that Mr. Lubanga “should have substantiated his submissions by reference to these latter documents” and declined to “conduct proprio motu an exhaustive review of the charging documents and relate the information contained therein to the findings” of the Trial Chamber in its judgment. Accordingly, a majority of the Appeals Chamber, Judge Anika Ušacka dissenting, dismissed the ground of appeal. It likewise dismissed Mr. Lubanga’s other grounds of appeal and affirmed the Trial Chamber’s conviction.

C. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui

Approximately four months after the Lubanga case was referred to the Trial Chamber, in July 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber I authorized the issuance of an arrest warrant for a second suspect identified in the context of the situation in the DRC, Germain Katanga. The Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Katanga was criminally responsible for a range of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including crimes involving sexual slavery and murder. As discussed further below, the case against Mr. Katanga was eventually joined with the one against Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, who

102 Id. ¶ 133.
103 Id. ¶ 134.
104 See generally id. In her dissenting opinion, Judge Ušacka argued that “the factual detail in the charges against Mr Lubanga was sufficient only in respect of the nine children who were allegedly conscripted, enlisted and used in hostilities by” Lubanga’s army and, because these nine cases were excluded from evidence by the Trial Chamber, “Mr Lubanga was convicted of charges that were insufficiently detailed.” Id. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ušacka, ¶ 1. Stressing that it was “entirely unforeseeable” at the start of trial that the Trial Chamber would exclude the evidence of the nine child soldiers, Judge Ušacka observed that even the Prosecution focused on these individual cases through trial and in its final submissions. Id. ¶ 20. Thus, in Judge Ušacka’s opinion, Lubanga’s right to be informed of the charges against him “was violated to such an extent that it was utterly impossible for him to defend himself against the charges presented.” Id.
105 See generally id.
107 Id.
108 See infra n. 121 et seq. and accompanying text.
was charged with bearing criminal responsibility for the same crimes alleged against Mr. Katanga.  

1. The Confirmation Process

Although Mr. Katanga was not transferred to the custody of the ICC until October 2007, Judge Sylvia Steiner – once again appointed to act as Single Judge – began to address issues of disclosure as soon as Pre-Trial Chamber I had authorized the arrest warrant. Specifically, on 6 July 2007, Judge Steiner issued a decision “establishing from the outset” a disclosure calendar, expressing hope that such action would lead to more expeditious pre-trial proceedings as compared with the Lubanga case. Nevertheless, a number of disclosure issues remained outstanding at the time of Mr. Katanga’s transfer to the Court on 18 October 2007, thus the date of the confirmation hearing was initially set for 28 February 2008.

In accordance with the initial date of the confirmation hearing, Judge Steiner issued a set of deadlines to ensure that the Defense would have

109 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga & Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision of the Joinder of the Cases Against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-257 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10 March 2008).
111 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on the Designation of a Single Judge, ICC-01/04-328 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 11 May 2007) (designating Judge Steiner as Single Judge for the DRC situation “and any related case”).
112 See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision Rejecting the Prosecution Urgent Request and Establishing a Calendar for the Disclosure of the Supporting Materials for the Prosecution Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Germain Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-5 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 6 July 2007); The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision Altering the Calendar for the Submission of Formatted Version of the Arrest Warrant Application and Redacted Witness Statements, ICC-01/04-01/07-9 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10 July 2007); The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application Pursuant to Rules 81(2) and 81(4), ICC-01/04-01/07-16 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 August 2007).
113 Katanga, Decision Rejecting the Prosecution Urgent Request and Establishing a Calendar for the Disclosure of the Supporting Materials for the Prosecution Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Germain Katanga, supra n. 112, at 5.
access to all of the evidence on which the Prosecutor intended to rely, as well as the bulk of exculpatory evidence, within thirty days of the start of the hearing.\textsuperscript{116} However, as of 30 January 2008, requests for measures of protection relating to “more than half of the witnesses on which the Prosecution intend[ed] to rely at the confirmation hearing” remained pending before the Victims and Witnesses Unit.\textsuperscript{117} At the same time, the Prosecutor had instituted a new practice, not used in the context of the Lubanga proceedings, which involved requesting redactions to witness statements and related material to protect the names or identifying information of so-called “innocent third parties” – \textit{i.e.}, persons who were neither Prosecution sources themselves nor related in any way to a Prosecution source, but who are nevertheless mentioned in a witness statement.\textsuperscript{118} Thus, even in relation to those witnesses accepted into the Court’s protection program, the identity of whom was disclosed to the Defense, the Prosecution was still submitting a high number of redaction requests for the material related to that protected witness.\textsuperscript{119} Accordingly, on 30 January 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber indefinitely postponed the confirmation hearing scheduled for 28 February.\textsuperscript{120}

A further delay arose in the confirmation of Mr. Katanga when, in March 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that the case against

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga}, Corrigendum to the Decision Establishing Time Limits for Decisions on Protective Measures and Requests for Redactions, ICC-01/04-01/07-103 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 13 December 2007).

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga}, Decision on the Suspension of the Time-Limits Leading to the Initiation of the Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/07-172, at 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 January 2008).

\textsuperscript{118} See, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga}, First Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements, ICC-01/04-01/07-90, ¶¶ 44-56 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 7 December 2007); \textit{The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga}, Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Statements of Witnesses 4 and 9, ICC-01/04-01/07-160, ¶ 5 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 23 January 2008).

\textsuperscript{119} See, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{Katanga}, First Decision on the Prosecution Request for Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements, \textit{supra} n. 118, ¶ 10 (noting that the decision deals only with the “redactions requested by the Prosecution in relation to the statements and interviews of seven witnesses who have already been accepted in the protection program of the Victims and Witnesses Unit,” but that the confidential portion of the decision analyzing those requests was nevertheless “particularly lengthy”).

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Katanga}, Decision on the Suspension of the Time-Limits Leading to the Initiation of the Confirmation Hearing, \textit{supra} n. 117.
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui would be joined with that of Mr. Katanga. The following month, when the Chamber joined the two cases, it maintained the 21 May date for the start of the joint hearing.

In late April, the Pre-Trial Chamber again postponed the confirmation of charges hearing, pushing the date back to 27 June 2008. Around the same time, on 25 April 2008, Judge Steiner issued yet another decision relating to the level of disclosure required prior to the start of the confirmation of charges hearing. Judge Steiner made a number of observations regarding the Prosecution’s practices regarding witness protection during the pre-trial stage of proceedings. In light of these observations, and the large number of requests for redactions still pending, Judge Steiner decided that, as a general rule, she would reject the Prosecution’s requests for redactions in documents relating to witnesses on whom it intended to rely at the hearing, thereby leaving it to the Prosecution to disclose summaries of the evidence rather than the redacted statements of the witnesses themselves. In another decision issued shortly thereafter, the judge also clarified that

---

121 Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision of the Joinder of the Cases Against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, supra n. 109.
122 See id. at 3.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 12.
125 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision Establishing a Calendar According to the Date of the Confirmation Hearing: 27 June 2008, 01/04-01/07-459 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 April 2008).
127 Id. ¶ 55. For example, the judge highlighted the “Prosecution’s practice of referring the great majority of the witnesses on whom it intends to rely at the confirmation hearing” to the witness protection program. Id. She also observed that the Prosecution has demonstrated a tendency to rely on a “high number of witnesses” at the confirmation hearing. Id. These factors, according to the judge, have “led to a situation that is not sustainable in relation to every confirmation hearing held before this Court,” particularly as the witness protection programs for each case do not come to an end at the close of the confirmation hearings, and indeed are likely to grow as the Prosecutor prepares for trial. Id.
128 Id. ¶ 90.
the Prosecution need only disclose the “bulk” of exculpatory material in its possession prior to the confirmation hearing.129

The confirmation hearing in the Katanga & Ngudjolo case commenced on 27 June 2008 and ended on 16 July 2008.130 Following the close of the oral hearing, the Chamber once again authorized the filing of post-hearing submissions by the parties and participating victims.131 The Chamber also announced that, although the Court’s regulations require that the confirmation decision be issued within sixty days “from the date the confirmation hearing ends,”132 this clock would not start to run until after the Chamber received the final post-hearing brief,133 an approach that has been followed in all subsequent cases.134

129 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on Article 54(3)(e) Documents Identified as Potentially Exculpatory or Otherwise Material to the Defense’s Preparation for the Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/07-621 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 20 June 2008).
130 Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 35, ¶ 59.
132 ICC Regulations of the Court, supra n. 81, Reg. 53.
133 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Transcript of Hearing (Open Session), ICC-01/04-01/07-T-50-ENG, at 8-9 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 16 July 2008) (“Following the precedents of this Chamber in the case versus Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, of giving the parties and participants time to file written statements, the Chamber considers the end of the confirmation hearing to be the submission of the last written observations, and therefore the 60 days will start running from the 29th of July.”).
134 See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Transcript of Hearing, ICC-02/05-02/09, at 83; 4-9 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 October 2009); The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, et al., Decision on the Issuance of the Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-01/11-357, ¶ 9 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 26 October 2011); The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Transcript of Hearing, ICC-02/11-01/11-T-21-ENG, at 51; 5-9 (Transcript, 28 February 2013). It should be noted that, in a recently published manual setting forth best practices at the pre-trial stage, the judges of the ICC’s Pre-Trial Division state that “[t]he 60-day time limit for the issuance of the decision on the confirmation of charges in accordance with regulation 53 of the Regulations of the Court starts running from the moment the confirmation hearing ends with the last oral final observation.” International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Practice Manual, at 15 (September 2015) (emphasis added). However, there is nothing to suggest that the observations in the manual are binding.
On 1 October 2008, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a decision confirming the majority of the charges against each of the two suspects.135 In its decision, the Chamber reiterated that the purpose of the confirmation process was to “protect the rights of the Defence against wrongful and wholly unfounded charges.”136 The Chamber also affirmed that the “confirmation hearing has a limited scope and purpose and should not be seen as a ‘mini-trial’ or a ‘trial before the trial.’”137 Finally, in its assessment of evidence, the Chamber stressed that “any ruling on the admissibility of a particular item of evidence for the purposes of the confirmation hearing and the present decision will not preclude a subsequent determination of the admissibility of that same evidence later in the proceedings,” as “the admission of evidence [at the pre-trial stage] is without prejudice to the Trial Chamber’s exercise of its functions and powers to make a final determination as to the admissibility and probative value of any evidence.”138

On 24 October 2008, the Presidency constituted Trial Chamber II and referred to it the case against Messrs. Katanga and Ngudjolo.139 Initially, the Trial Chamber set the commencement of the trial for 24 September 2009.140 However, on 31 August 2009, the Trial Chamber postponed the trial start date to 24 November 2009, over two years since Mr. Katanga’s initial appearance at the Court.141 The Trial Chamber ordered the postponement of the commencement of the trial because of substantial issues regarding the disclosure and presentation

---

135 Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 35. Note that, although the charges were confirmed on 26 September 2008, the decision was not publicly released until 1 October 2008.
136 Id. ¶ 63.
137 Id. ¶ 64.
138 Id. ¶ 71.
139 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision Constituting Trial Chamber II and Referring to It the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-729 (Presidency, 24 October 2008).
140 Le Procureur c. Germain Katanga et Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Décision fixant la date du procès (règle 132-1 du Règlement de procédure et de preuve), ICC-01/04-01/07-99 (Trial Chamber II, 27 March 2009).
141 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision Postponing the Date of the Commencement of the Trial (Rule 132(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), ICC-01/04-01/07-1442-tENG, ¶ 1 (Trial Chamber II, 31 August 2009).
of incriminating evidence, issues regarding the potentially unlawful arrest of Mr. Katanga in the DRC, and issues related to protective measures for both the Prosecution and Defense witnesses.

2. Trial Chamber’s Decision Under Regulation 55 and the Judgment Acquitting Mr. Ngudjolo

The presentation of evidence by both parties in the case ended on 11 November 2011. One year later, over five years since Mr. Katanga’s initial appearance, and more than four years after the Pre-Trial Chamber had confirmed the charges in the case, the Trial Chamber issued a decision alerting the parties that it would exercise its Regulation 55 powers and consider re-characterizing the mode of liability charged against Mr. Katanga from indirect co-perpetration to complicity. Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert dissented from the decision, arguing that the majority’s decision both violated Regulation 55 itself and violated the rights of the accused to a fair trial. As to the first point, Judge Van den Wyngaert argued, inter alia, that the majority was improperly relying on Regulation 55 because its proposed recharacterization would “fundamentally change the narrative of the charges in order to reach a conviction on the basis of a crime or form of criminal responsibility that was not originally charged by the prosecution.” On the issue of the accused’s rights to a fair trial, Judge Van den Wyngaert explained that “by triggering

---

142 Id. ¶¶ 2-16 (noting problems with understanding the Table Presenting all Incriminating Evidence the Prosecution intended to use at trial, particularly that the table was 1,165 pages, relied on the same factual allegations and evidence to prove different constituent crimes with different elements, and relied on the document containing the charges instead of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decision Confirming the Charges).

143 Id. ¶¶ 18-21 (waiting for the response of the Registry and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to file observations on defense allegations that Mr. Katanga was unlawfully arrested and detained by the DRC authorities).

144 Id. ¶¶ 22-26 (noting a myriad of protections issues, including: the Prosecution’s late request for redactions and differing approaches between Trial Chamber I and Trial Chamber II on protective orders).

145 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges Against the Accused Persons, ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG/FRA, ¶ 3 (Trial Chamber II, 21 November 2012).

146 Id. ¶ 7.

147 Id. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert.

Regulation 55 to change the mode of liability at the end of the deliberation stage,” the majority had created “the unpalatable suspicion that the Chamber is intervening to ensure the conviction of Germain Katanga.” Furthermore, Judge Van den Wyngaert contended that, because the majority’s notification was “entirely unforeseeable” to the Defense and was given “at a point in the proceedings when the [D]efence is unable to effectively respond to it,” the decision violated the accused’s right to be “informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge,” as well as the right “not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt.” Finally, Judge Van den Wyngaert argued that the majority’s decision threatened the accused’s right to a speedy trial because, to “meaningfully defend itself against the charges under Article 25(3)(d)(ii), the [D]efence may… have to present an entirely new case.”

Because the decision only affected the case against Mr. Katanga, the Trial Chamber also severed the two cases, holding that it would issue a separate judgment against Mr. Ngudjolo in line with the initial charges confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. That judgment, acquitting Mr. Ngudjolo of all charges, was delivered on 18 December 2012.

3. Trial Chamber Judgment against Mr. Katanga

On 7 March 2014, nearly six and one half years after Mr. Katanga’s arrest, the Trial Chamber issued its judgment finding Mr. Katanga guilty, by majority, of one crime against humanity and four war

---

150 Id. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 36.
151 Id. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 49. The Katanga Defense appealed the Trial Chamber’s invocation of Regulation 55, but a majority of the Appeals Chamber, with Judge Tarfusser dissenting, held that the Trial Chamber would not necessarily violate any of Mr. Katanga’s due process rights by changing the mode of liability. See The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr German Katanga Against the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 21 November 2012 entitled “Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges Against the Accused Person” (Appeals Chamber, 27 March 2013).
152 Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on the Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the Charges Against the Accused Persons, supra n. 145, ¶¶ 9, 58-64.
153 The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-02/12-3-tENG (Trial Chamber II, 18 December 2012).
In convicting Mr. Katanga, the majority modified the mode of liability applied to Mr. Katanga from indirect co-perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute to “accessoryship [sic] through a contribution made ‘in any other way to the commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose’” under Article 25(3)(d). Judge Van den Wyngaert again issued a minority opinion dissenting from the Trial Chamber’s judgment, reiterating the objections she raised to the majority’s initial notice of its intention to use Regulation 55. Additionally, Judge Van den Wyngaert stated that, even if re-characterizing the mode of liability was proper, the evidence was insufficient to convict Mr. Katanga.

On May 23 2014, Mr. Katanga was sentenced to twelve years imprisonment. Although both parties initially appealed the judgment convicting Mr. Katanga, they ultimately submitted a Notice of Discontinuance of Appeal, terminating the appeal proceedings.

D. The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo

On 9 May 2008, the Prosecutor filed an Article 58 application for a warrant of arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. Pre-Trial Chamber III granted an initial warrant on 23 May 2008, concluding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Bemba was criminally responsible for two counts of crimes against humanity and four counts of war crimes.
of war crimes, and Mr. Bemba was arrested the next day in Belgium. Following Mr. Bemba’s arrest, the Prosecution submitted additional information regarding certain charges against the suspect per a request by the Pre-Trial Chamber, and the Chamber ultimately issued a new warrant of arrest adding one count of murder as a crime against humanity and one count of murder as a war crime. Mr. Bemba made his initial appearance on 4 July 2008.

1. The Confirmation Process

The Prosecution filed its initial Document Containing the Charges against the suspect on 1 October 2008, with an anticipated confirmation of charges start date of 4 November 2008. Once again, a disclosure calendar was established in view of this date. Unlike the first two cases that went through confirmation, however, the Chamber overseeing the Bemba confirmation held that the Prosecutor needed to disclose all evidence in its possession that it believed may be exculpatory pursuant to Article 67(2) or should be shared with the Defense pursuant to Rule 77, rather than just the “bulk” of such evidence. Furthermore, the Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber required that all evidence disclosed between the parties be shared with the Chamber, even though Rule 121(2)(c) states only that “[a]ll

161 Id. ¶ 21 (finding reasonable grounds to believe that Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo was criminally responsible for rape as a crime against humanity, rape as a war crime, torture as a crime against humanity, torture as a war crime, outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime, and pillaging as a war crime).
162 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-14-tENG, ¶ 8 (Pre-Trial Chamber III, 10 June 2008) (surrendering Mr. Bemba to the ICC on 3 July 2008).
163 Id. ¶ 9.
164 Bemba, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, supra n. 33, ¶ 4.
165 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Adjourning the Hearing Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08-388, ¶ 2 (Pre-Trial Chamber III, 3 March 2009).
166 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Postponement of the Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/05-01/08-170-tENG, ¶ 1 (Pre-Trial Chamber III, 17 October 2008).
167 Id. ¶¶ 1-23.
169 Id. ¶¶ 8-19.
evidence disclosed between the Prosecutor and the person for the purposes of the confirmation hearing shall be communicated to the Pre-Trial Chamber.” The Chamber justified this approach by citing to Article 69(3) of the Rome Statute, which states that “[t]he Court shall have the authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth.” While acknowledging that this provision appears under Part IV of the Statute, which is entitled “The trial,” the Chamber nevertheless determined that the language “establishes a general principle which applies to the various stages of the proceedings.”

The Chamber also introduced a new requirement in the form of an in-depth analysis chart, which was to be shared with both the Defense and the Chamber. The general approach of the analysis chart requires every piece of evidence, especially incriminatory evidence, to be linked to the relevant constituent elements of the crimes charged by the Prosecutor. The Chamber reasoned that this method would allow it to verify that each constituent element of any charged crime, including contextual elements as well as modes of liability, has at least one corresponding piece of evidence. The Chamber also held that if the Defense intended to present evidence or rely on evidence disclosed by the Prosecutor it would also have to follow the same approach.

As seen in earlier cases, the Prosecution once again failed to comply with the disclosure timetable and the hearing date was postponed to 8 December 2008. In announcing this postponement, the Chamber

---

170 ICC Rules, supra n. 29, R. 121(2)(c) (emphasis added).
172 Id. ¶ 9.
173 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Status Conference, CC-01/05-01/08-T-8-CONF-ENG CT, at 30: 10-20 (Transcript, 22 October 2008) (“Even if this is already in the transcript, I repeat that the order – the Chamber orders the Prosecution to disclose an analysis chart of the evidence, incriminating and exonerating, which must be in one document, consolidated in one document, and disclosed 30 days at the latest before the date of the Confirmation Hearing.”).
174 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Submission of an Updated, Consolidated Version of the In-depth Analysis Chart of Incriminatory Evidence, ICC-01/05-01/08-232, ¶ 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber III, 10 November 2008).
175 Id.
176 Id. ¶ 9.
177 Bemba, Decision on the Postponement of the Confirmation Hearing, supra n. 166, at 7; The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Setting the Date of the
expressed its concern over the disclosure process, noting “the existence of significant problems...[.] especially regarding the Prosecutor’s obligation to disclose this material to the Defence correctly, fully and diligently in accordance with the timetable set in the Decision of 31 July 2008.” The hearing was postponed a second time due to a family emergency on the part of one of the Pre-Trial Chamber judges, and ultimately took place from 12 to 15 January 2009.

Following the confirmation hearing, the Chamber exercised its powers under Article 61(7)(c)(ii) and adjourned the hearing to request that the Prosecution consider adding charges under a superior responsibility theory of liability. The Chamber granted the Prosecution until 30 March 2009 and the Defense until 24 April 2009 to file written submissions regarding this request. Further, the Chamber again determined that its sixty-day deadline to issue a confirmation decision did not start until all submissions were received. The Chamber finally issued a decision in June 2009, almost a full year after Mr. Bemba’s initial appearance, confirming the majority of charges under a theory of superior responsibility. The Prosecutor sought leave to appeal the decision with regard to three counts that were not

Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/05-01/08-199-tENG, 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber III, 31 October 2008).

Id. ¶ 23.

See also The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Postponement of the Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/05-01/08-304, ¶ 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber III, 2 December 2008). See also The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Setting the Date of the Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/05-01/08-335, at 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber III, 29 December 2008).

Bemba, Decision Adjourning the Hearing Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 165, ¶¶ 6-7.

Bemba, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, supra n. 33, ¶ 343.

Bemba, Decision Adjourning the Hearing Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 165, at 19.

Id. ¶ 11. See also The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Public Redacted Version of the Amended Document Containing the Charges Filed on 30 March 2009, ICC-01/05-01/08-395-Anx3 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 30 March 2009); The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Conclusions de la Defense en reponse a l’acte d’accusation amende du 30 mars 2009, ICC-01/05-01/08-413 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 24 April 2009).

See generally Bemba, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, supra n. 33.
confirmed, but on 18 September 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber denied the request. On the same day, the Presidency constituted Trial Chamber III and referred to it the case against Mr. Bemba.

2. Admission of Evidence Used During the Confirmation Hearing

Approximately four months after the case was transferred to the Trial Chamber, the Prosecution submitted its list of the evidence upon which it intended to rely at trial. Eleven months later, the Trial Chamber issued a decision holding that it would prima facie admit all such evidence in an effort to contribute to the “expeditiousness and proper conduct of the proceedings.” In support of its decision, the Trial Chamber noted that “[m]ost of the witnesses’ written statements and related documents to be relied upon by the prosecution at trial were collected, disclosed and used as evidence forming the basis for confirming the charges at pre-trial stage” and that “the role of Pre-Trial Chambers is to prepare the case for trial.” However, both parties appealed the ruling and the Appeals Chamber reversed, holding that the admission of evidence without an “item-by-item evaluation” was not contemplated by the legal framework of the Court. In explaining its holding, the Appeals Chamber noted that “the Trial Chamber’s argumentation as to the link between the pre-trial and trial phases is unpersuasive,” stressing that, although there “is, and must be,
a strong link between the two phases of the proceedings, this does not mean that the same evidentiary rules apply."¹⁹¹

3. Trial Chamber’s Notice Under Regulation 55

Mr. Bemba’s trial commenced on 22 November 2010,¹⁹² and the Prosecution’s case closed on 20 March 2012.¹⁹³ The Defense opened its case on 14 August 2012.¹⁹⁴ However, on 21 September 2012 – three years after the charges were confirmed and almost two years after the start of the trial – the Trial Chamber gave notice pursuant to Regulation 55 that it may modify the legal characterization of the facts.¹⁹⁵ Specifically, the Trial Chamber informed the parties that it would consider not only whether Mr. Bemba is responsible for the charged crimes on the ground that he “knew” that forces under his effective command and control had committed or were about to commit the relevant crimes, as confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, but also whether he “should have known” about such acts.¹⁹⁶ The Trial Chamber made clear that it would not decide whether to re-characterize the charges until it had heard all of the evidence in the case, and that it was merely notifying the parties of the possibility of a re-characterization, pursuant to Regulation 55(2).¹⁹⁷

The presentation of evidence in the Bemba case closed on 7 April 2014, and briefly reopened from 22 to 24 October 2014 to recall one witness regarding potential allegations under Article 70 of the Rome Statute, which governs offenses against the administration of justice.¹⁹⁸ At the time of writing, the Trial Chamber has yet to set a date for the release of the judgment.

¹⁹¹ Id. ¶ 80.
¹⁹² The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Defense Submission on the Trial Chamber’s Notification under Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-01/05-01/08-2365-Red, ¶ 6 (Defense, 18 October 2012).
¹⁹³ Id.
¹⁹⁴ Id. ¶ 8.
¹⁹⁵ The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Giving Notice to the Parties And Participant that the Legal Characterisation of the Facts May Be Subject to Change in Accordance with Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-01/05-01/08-2324, ¶ 5 (Trial Chamber III, 21 September 2012).
¹⁹⁶ Id.
¹⁹⁷ Id. ¶ 4.
E. The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda

Bahar Idriss Abu Garda was charged with allegedly leading a faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel group in Darfur responsible for attacking members of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) peacekeeping personnel at the Military Group Site (MGS) Haskanita in North Darfur, Sudan. Mr. Abu Garda was the first suspect to be summoned for voluntary appearance before the Court under Article 58(7), as opposed to being the subject of a warrant of arrest. He made his initial appearance on 18 May 2009, and the hearing was set for 12 October 2009.

In terms of disclosure, the Pre-Trial Chamber chose to follow the system implemented in the Lubanga and Katanga & Ngudjolo confirmation proceedings, as opposed to that adopted by the Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber, meaning that disclosure would take place inter partes and the parties were required to share with the Chamber only that evidence that they intended to rely upon at the hearing. Notably, whereas the Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber had supported its decision requiring that all evidence be shared with the Chamber by citing to the provision of the Rome Statute stating that “[t]he Court shall have the authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth,” the Abu Garda Chamber held that the purpose of communicating evidence to the Pre-Trial Chamber was simply to allow the Chamber to “properly organize and conduct the confirmation hearing.”

In contrast to previous cases, the start of the confirmation hearing in the Abu Garda case was only delayed one week from the initial date set during the first status conference. Again, however, the delay was

---

199 *The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda*, Summons to Appear for Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/08-2, ¶¶ 10-12 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 7 May 2009).
200 *Id. ¶ 20.*
201 *Abu Garda*, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 33, ¶ 5.
202 *Id.*
204 See supra n. 171 and accompanying text.
206 *See The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda*, Decision Scheduling a Hearing on Issues Relating to Disclosure between the Parties, ICC-02/05-02/05-18, ¶ 1 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 May 2009) (setting the confirmation of charges hearing for 12
due to a failure on the part of the Prosecution to meet disclosure deadlines.\(^{207}\) Indeed, in one decision granting an extension of a disclosure deadline to the Prosecution, the Chamber noted that the Office had repeatedly submitted requests for extension of time limit at the actual expiration of the time late, making it nearly impossible for the Chamber to decide in a timely manner or for the Prosecution to meet its deadline should the request be denied.\(^{208}\)

Ultimately, the confirmation hearing in the case was held between 19 and 30 October 2009.\(^{209}\) The Pre-Trial Chamber issued its decision on 8 February 2010, declining to confirm any of the charges after finding that the Prosecution had not met its burden of establishing substantial grounds to believe that there was a nexus between Mr. Abu Garda and the alleged attack on MGS Haskanita.\(^{210}\) Specifically, the Chamber noted that none of the witnesses presented by the Prosecution provided any first-hand knowledge regarding a meeting where Mr. Abu Garda was alleged to have planned an attack on MGS Haskanita.\(^{211}\) Moreover, the Chamber found that the Prosecution failed to even establish that Mr. Abu Garda was in charge of the armed group that attacked the peacekeeping forces, due to inconsistencies between the witnesses’ summaries put forward.\(^{212}\) On 23 April 2010, the Chamber issued a decision rejecting the Prosecutor’s application to appeal the decision declining to confirm the charges.\(^{213}\)

It is worth noting that, notwithstanding the Chamber’s decision to decline the charges against Mr. Abu Garda, the Pre-Trial Chamber engaged in a lengthy factual and legal analysis of the issues in the case. Specifically, the Chamber expounded on the Darfur conflict;\(^{214}\)


\(^{208}\) Id.

\(^{209}\) *Abu Garda*, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, *supra* n. 33, ¶ 13 (stating the confirmation of charges hearing took place from 19 October 2009 to 30 October 2009).

\(^{210}\) Id. ¶¶ 173, 178-79, 196, 208, 213, 215.

\(^{211}\) Id. ¶ 168.

\(^{212}\) Id. ¶ 196.

\(^{213}\) *The Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda*, Decision on the “Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal the ‘Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,’” ICC-02/05-01/09-267 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 23 April 2010).

discussed the jurisdiction and admissibility of the case,\textsuperscript{215} despite Mr. Abu Garda not challenging the jurisdiction or admissibility;\textsuperscript{216} and analyzed whether or not there was an armed conflict in Darfur at the time of the alleged attack, even though this finding was irrelevant given the Chamber’s finding regarding the lack of evidence against Mr. Abu Garda personally.\textsuperscript{217} The Chamber also defined element by element each of the charges against Mr. Abu Garda, not in relation to his individual criminal responsibility, but rather in a theoretical and abstract approach.\textsuperscript{218} In concurring with the decision to decline the confirmation of charges against Mr. Abu Garda, Judge Cuno Tarfusser issued a separate opinion criticizing the Chamber’s insistence on conducting a full legal analysis despite the Prosecution’s presentation of insufficient evidence.\textsuperscript{219} Specifically, Judge Tarfusser wrote that the “lacunae and shortcomings exposed by the mere factual assessment of the evidence” presented by the Prosecution were “so basic and fundamental” that the Chamber should have completely refrained from analyzing the “legal issues pertaining to the merits of the case,”\textsuperscript{220} reasoning that such analysis is merely “academic.”\textsuperscript{221} Moreover, Judge Tarfusser emphasized that the Pre-Trial Chamber has a duty of judicial economy, and engaging in lengthy, yet irrelevant, legal exercises directly contradicts this duty.\textsuperscript{222} Finally, Judge Tarfusser argued that the Chamber could potentially prejudice future decisions by making legal determinations regarding the facts of a specific attack when the Prosecution failed to meet its burden with respect to a specific suspect.\textsuperscript{223}

\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Id.} ¶¶ 25-34.
\textsuperscript{216} \textit{Id.} ¶¶ 26-27.
\textsuperscript{217} \textit{Id.} ¶¶ 56-57.
\textsuperscript{218} \textit{See, e.g., Id.} ¶¶ 60-96 (discussing the meaning of each element of the crime of Article 8(2)(e)(iii) in terms of customary international law, the UN Charter, Additional Protocol I, and various academic sources, yet not discussing the elements in relation to the alleged attack).
\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Id.} Separate Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, ¶ 5.
\textsuperscript{220} \textit{Id.} Separate Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, ¶ 3.
\textsuperscript{221} \textit{Id.} Separate Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, ¶ 7(i).
\textsuperscript{222} \textit{Id.} Separate Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, ¶ 7(ii).
\textsuperscript{223} \textit{Id.} Separate Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, ¶ 7(iii).
F. The Prosecutor v. Abdullah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus

The case against Abdullah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus arises out of the same factual situation as *Abu Garda*. Similarly to Mr. Abu Garda, both Messrs. Banda and Jerbo were summoned to appear instead of being subject to warrants of arrest, and they made their initial appearances on 17 June 2010. While the confirmation hearing was initially set for 22 November 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber suspended the hearing after receiving a joint submission from the Prosecution and Defense in which both suspects waived their rights to be present at the confirmation hearing and agreed they would not be contesting any of the factual allegations against them. The suspects’ challenge at the confirmation hearing was limited to the existence of a crime based on the admitted factual allegations. In response to the joint submission, Chamber delayed the confirmation hearing until 8 December 2010 to allow for written submissions on each suspect’s waiver of the right to present at the hearing.

---


227 *The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus*, Joint Submission by the Office of the Prosecutor and the Defense as to Agreed Facts and Submissions Regarding Modalities for the Conduct of the Confirmation Hearing, ICC-02/05-03/09-80 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 19 October 2010).


229 *The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus*, Decision Postponing the Confirmation Hearing and Setting a Deadline for the Submission of the Suspects’ Written Request to Waive their Right to Attend the Confirmation Hearing, ICC-02/05-03/09-181, ¶¶ 10-11 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 22 October 2010).
Ultimately, the Chamber accepted the waivers and held a confirmation hearing on 8 December 2010, during which the Prosecutor presented evidence in the case in summary form to the Chamber. Despite the fact that the suspects did not challenge the underlying factual allegations, and despite the similarities between the case and that of the one against *Abu Garda*, which had been heard by the same three judges, it took the Chamber another three months to issue a decision confirming the charges against the suspects.

Shortly after the charges were confirmed against Messrs. Banda and Jerbo, the Presidency constituted Trial Chamber IV to handle the case, yet various delays, including those relating to translation, prevented the trial from beginning. On 4 October 2013, proceedings against Mr. Jerbo were terminated due to evidence suggesting he had died in Darfur. While the case against Mr. Banda is still ongoing, his voluntary cooperation with the Court appears to have come to an end and a warrant for his arrest has been issued that is outstanding at the time of this writing.

---


231 Pre-Trial Chamber I was comprised of Judges Tarfusser, Steiner, and Monageng for both *The Prosecutor v. Abu Garda* and *The Prosecutor v. Banda and Jerbo*. Judge Steiner acted as Presiding Judge in *Abu Garda* and Judge Tarfusser acted as Presiding Judge in *Banda and Jerbo*.


234 See, e.g., *The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus*, Report of the Registrar Pursuant to Regulation 24 bis of the Regulations of the Court Concerning on the Issue of Languages to be Used in the Proceedings, ICC-02/05-03/09-150 (Trial Chamber IV, 24 May 2011) (suggesting that the Court should first translate the proceedings into Arabic and then into Zaghawa, and it would only delay proceedings by 30-35 percent provided that the parties remember to pause 15 seconds in between statements).


G. The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana

Callixte Mbarushimana was charged with committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in North and South Kivu, DRC, through his role as Executive Secretary of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). An arrest warrant was issued on 28 September 2010, and Mr. Mbarushimana made his initial appearance on 28 January 2011.

Regarding the system of disclosure, the Mbarushimana Chamber followed the Abu Garda Chamber’s approach, meaning it only required that the parties share with the Chamber the evidence that they intended to rely upon at the hearing. Nevertheless, throughout the period leading up to the confirmation hearing, the Pre-Trial Chamber expressed concern at the way both the Prosecution and the Defense conducted themselves, particularly with regards to disclosure and filings. The first issue arose when the Prosecution attempted to file an addendum to the Document Containing the Charges five days after the deadline, explaining that it was merely correcting inconsistencies and duplications in the initial filing. However, when submitting its “corrected” version, the Prosecution significantly altered the filing, to the point where it was almost a new document. Thus, the Chamber ordered the Prosecution to re-file the addendum without any of the extra allegations and evidence it tried to admit. Moreover, the Chamber ordered the Registry to strike any additional information,

237 See The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Callixte Mbarushimana, ICC-01/04-01/10-1, ¶ 8, 29 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 28 September 2010).
239 Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
241 See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision on “Defense Request to Deny the Use of Certain Incriminating Evidence at the Confirmation Hearing” and Postponement of Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/10-378, ¶ 15 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 16 August 2011).
243 Id. at 5-6.
244 Id. at 7.
around ten extra pages of material, from the record. The second delay was brought about by the fact that the Prosecution did not properly disclose audio files and transcripts of witness statements in a language that Mr. Mbarushimana understood, and then the Defense waited until nine days before the start of the confirmation hearing to raise the matter with the Chamber. The Chamber was forced to delay proceedings by one month to allow the Prosecutor more time to properly disclose the evidence in a language that the suspect could understand.

The confirmation hearing was held from 16 to 21 September 2011. Neither the Defense nor the Prosecution called any live witnesses during the hearing.

On 16 December 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a decision holding there were not substantial grounds to believe that Mr. Mbarushimana could be held criminally liable for the charges alleged by the Prosecutor. Ultimately, the Chamber struggled with the lack of consistent and sufficient evidence to establish the commission of a majority of the individual attacks alleged by the Prosecutor, as well as Mr. Mbarushimana’s nexus to the charged crimes. Specifically, regarding the individual attacks alleged by the Prosecutor, the Chamber stressed it “had serious difficulties in determining, or could

---

245 Id.
246 The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision on “Defense Request to Deny the Use of Certain Incriminating Evidence at the Confirmation Hearing” and Postponement of Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/10-378, ¶¶ 20-22 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 16 August 2011) (condemning the Prosecution’s practice of promising full transcripts in Kinyarwanda when the Prosecution did not have those transcripts created, nor intended to create them).
247 Id. ¶ 19 (noting that the Defense was aware of the issue as early as 28 June 2011, yet did not raise its claim until 8 August 2011).
248 Id. ¶ 24.
249 Mbarushimana, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 238, ¶ 32.
250 The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Defence Response to the Order Requesting Views and Proposals on the Schedule for the Confirmation Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/10, ¶ 2 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, August 4 2011); The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Prosecution’s Views and Proposals on the Schedule of the Confirmation Hearing and Application to Bar the Testimony of a Defence Expert If Essential Documentation Is Not Provided, ICC-01/04-01/10, ¶ 2 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 4 August 2011).
251 Mbarushimana, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 238, ¶ 31.
252 Id. ¶¶ 110, 264.
253 Id. ¶ 333.
not determine at all, the factual ambit of a number of the charges.”254 For example, under Count 1 (attacking civilians) of the charges section of the Document Containing the Charges, the Prosecutor named twenty-two different attacks, but, in the pertinent part of the DCC, only provided the factual description of seven attacks.255 Similarly, Count 3 charged twelve different instances of murder, but the factual allegations only supported four of those murders.256 The Chamber further found, in nearly a dozen instances, that charges that were sufficiently described in the DCC were supported by evidence that was “so scant” the Chamber could not properly assess or make a determination on whether the charged crimes were committed by the FDLR.257 While the Chamber did find that the FDLR committed war crimes in five of the twenty-five occasions submitted by the Prosecutor,258 it found that “the little evidence” put forward by the Prosecution to support the suspect’s responsibility for these was “either too limited or too inconsistent.”259 Moreover, the Chamber “stress[ed] the lack of any suggestion that Mr. Mbarushimana was bestowed with the power to exercise any form of authority over FDLR commanders.”260

The Prosecution subsequently obtained leave to appeal the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision, raising the issues, inter alia, of whether the burden of proof applied by the Chamber was too high and whether it incorrectly assessed the credibility of the Prosecution’s witnesses.261 The Appeals Chamber dismissed the appeal, holding that the Pre-Trial Chamber may evaluate ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions in the evidence without applying too high a burden on the Prosecutor.262 The Appeals Chamber further reminded the

254 Id. ¶ 110.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. ¶ 113.
258 Id. at 264.
259 Id. ¶ 333.
260 Id. ¶ 297 (emphasis added).
261 The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushima, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the ‘Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,’” ICC-01/04-01/10-487 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 1 March 2012) (granting the Prosecution leave to appeal three out of the four alleged errors for appeal).
Prosecution that “the investigation should largely be completed at the stage of the confirmation of charges hearing,” although it also emphasized that “the Prosecutor need not submit more evidence than is necessary to meet the threshold of substantial grounds to believe.”


In the first of the two contentious Kenya cases, the Prosecutor charged William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey, and Joshua Arap Sang with committing crimes against humanity during the 2007 Kenyan post-election violence. All three suspects made their initial appearance, following an issuance of a summons to appear for each, on 7 April 2011.

1. The Confirmation Process

In an attempt to be proactive on the potential issues surrounding disclosure, Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova, acting as Single Judge in the proceedings leading up to the confirmation hearing, set forth a disclosure regime before any of the suspects made his initial appearance. Notably, the Chamber returned to the Bemba system of disclosure, mandating that the Prosecution disclose to the Defense all potentially exculpatory evidence and that “all evidence disclosed between the parties… be communicated to the Chamber, regardless of whether the parties intend to rely on or present the said evidence at the

---

263 Id. ¶ 46.
265 Ruto, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 33, ¶ 4.
266 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, et al., Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters, ICC-01/09-01/11-44 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 6 April 2011). See also The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, et al., Decision on the “Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the ‘Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters’ (ICC-01/09-01/11-44),” ICC-01/09-01/11-74 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 2 May 2011) (denying the Prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal the decision on disclosure, which alleged that the Chamber was unfairly prejudicing the proceedings).
confirmation hearing."267 Although the Prosecution sought to appeal the decision setting forth this regime, the request for leave to appeal was denied by the Pre-Trial Chamber268 and the Office of the Prosecutor largely complied with the relevant deadlines.269 Over the course of the period leading up to the confirmation hearing, “several thousand pages” of evidence were disclosed and communicated to the Chamber.270

The Single Judge also sought to streamline proceedings by limiting the number of viva voce witnesses each party could present during the confirmation hearing.271 Thus, although the three Defense teams had originally planned to call forty-three witnesses in total, they were ultimately limited to two witnesses each, while the Prosecution chose not to call any.272 The confirmation of charges hearing took place on schedule on 1 September 2011 and lasted until 8 September 2011.273

On 23 January 2012, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a decision finding there were substantial grounds to believe that Mr. Ruto was responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator for three counts of crimes against humanity and that Mr. Sang contributed to the commission of the same crimes.274 Conversely, the Chamber determined that there were not substantial grounds to believe that Mr. Kosgey could be held criminally liable for crimes against humanity, stressing that the

267 Ruto, et al., Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters, supra n. 266, ¶ 6.
268 Ruto, et al., Decision on the “Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the ‘Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters’ (ICC-01/09-01/11-44),” supra n. 266.
269 Indeed, it appears the Prosecution only requested one extension to the disclosure calendar. See The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, et al., Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for Extension of the Third Disclosure Deadline of 8 July 2011” (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 4 July 2011) (granting the Prosecution a five-day extension in relation to the disclosure of three witness statements).
270 Ruto, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 33, ¶ 10.
271 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, et al., Order to the Defence to Reduce the Number of Witnesses to be Called to Testify at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and to Submit an Amended List of Viva Voce Witnesses, ICC-01/09-01/011 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 25 July 2011).
272 Id. See also Ruto, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 33, ¶ 14.
273 Ruto, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 33, ¶ 18.
274 Id. ¶¶ 349, 367.
Prosecution had only put forward one anonymous witness to testify to Mr. Kosgey’s involvement within the organization allegedly responsible for the commission of the crimes.\textsuperscript{275}

Following the decision confirming the charges against Messrs. Ruto and Sang, both sought leave to appeal the decision, but the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the request.\textsuperscript{276} Thus, on 29 March 2012, the Presidency constituted Trial Chamber V and referred to it the case against Messrs. Ruto and Sang.\textsuperscript{277}

\textbf{2. Trial Chamber’s Decision Invoking Regulation 55}

Two months prior to the start of trial in the \textit{Ruto & Sang} case, the Prosecution filed a submission requesting that the Trial Chamber give notice to the parties that it may invoke Regulation 55 to change the legal characterization of Mr. Ruto’s criminal responsibility from that of an indirect co-perpetrator to one of several other forms of liability under Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute.\textsuperscript{278} The Prosecution urged the Trial Chamber to provide this notice as early as possible to ensure the fairness of the trial and permit the Defense to present evidence regarding all potential forms of liability.\textsuperscript{279}

In response to the Prosecution’s submission, Ruto’s Defense team argued that the Prosecution’s request was “too hypothetical” and that it was based on an improper understanding of Regulation 55.\textsuperscript{280}

\textsuperscript{275} \textit{Id.} ¶ 293 (noting further that anonymous witnesses are treated with a lower probative value and require more corroboration to be credible).
\textsuperscript{276} \textit{The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang}, Decision of the Defenses’ Applications for Leave to Appeal the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-01/11-399, at 22 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 9 March 2012).
\textsuperscript{277} \textit{The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang}, Decision Constituting Trial Chamber V and Referring to it the Case of \textit{The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang}, ICC-01/09-01/11-406 (Presidency, 29 March 2012).
\textsuperscript{278} \textit{The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang}, Prosecution’s Submissions on the Law of Indirect Co-Perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute and Application for Notice to Be Given Under Regulation 55(2) With Respect to William Samoei Ruto’s Individual Criminal Responsibility, ICC-01/01-01/11-433 (Office of the Prosecutor, 3 July 2012).
\textsuperscript{279} \textit{Id.} ¶ 41 (arguing advanced knowledge will only help the accused and advance the interests of a fair trial).
\textsuperscript{280} \textit{The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang}, Defense Response to the Prosecution’s Submissions on the Law of Indirect Co-Perpetration
Stressing the right of the accused to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against him, the Defense argued the Chamber “should be vigilant in ensuring that Mr. Ruto is not subjected to uncertainty as to the mode in which he is alleged to have participated in the crimes,” and that therefore it should reject the Prosecution’s request.281

The Prosecution’s request remained pending when the trial commenced on 10 September 2013.282 However, two months later, on 12 December 2013, the Trial Chamber issued a decision consistent with the request, providing notice that pursuant to Regulation 55(2), there was a possibility that the legal characterization of the facts relating to Mr. Ruto’s alleged criminal responsibility could change.283 The Chamber reassured the parties that the Defense would be given the opportunity to argue that any proposed legal re-characterization would exceed the scope of the confirmed charges.284 Yet at the time of issuing its decision, the Chamber did not provide any further details regarding the nature of the potential re-characterization, saying only that “there is a possibility that the legal characterisation of the facts… may be subject to change to accord with Article 25(3)(b), (c), or (d)” of the Rome Statute.285

As of the time of this writing, the Ruto & Sang trial is ongoing and there have been no other developments regarding the potential re-characterization of the facts.

3. “No Case to Answer” Procedure

Two weeks after setting the start date for trial, the Trial Chamber issued an order requesting submissions from the parties and participating victims on a number of issues, including “whether ‘no

\[\text{under Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute and Application for Notice to Be Given Under Regulation 55(2) With Respect to William Samoei Ruto’s Individual Criminal Responsibility, ICC-01/09-01/11-442 (Defense, 24 July 2012).}\\ \] 281 \text{Id. ¶ 38.}\\ 282 \text{The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Trial Hearing (Open Session), ICC-01/09-01/11-T-27-ENG ET WT 10-09-2013 1-83-SZ T (Transcript, 10 September 2013).}\\ 283 \text{The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Applications for Notice of Possibility of Variation of Legal Characterisation, ICC-01/09-11-1122, at 20 (Trial Chamber V(a), 12 December 2013).}\\ 284 \text{Id. ¶ 37.}\\ 285 \text{Id. at 20.}
case to answer’ motions requesting dismissal of one or more counts at the conclusion of the Prosecution’s case should be allowed in the case.”

In response, both of the parties and the participating victims welcomed the Chamber’s proposed “no case to answer” procedure. On 9 August 2013, the Trial Chamber decided to allow, “in principle” the Defense teams to file a “no case to answer” motion at the close of the Prosecution’s case. The Chamber instructed the parties that it would elaborate on the reasoning, further instructions, and applicable legal standard in a future ruling. That ruling came on 3 June 2014. Relying on Articles 66(1) and 67(1) of the Rome Statute, the Trial Chamber explained that it had the right to hear a “no case to answer” motion out of the fundamental protections for the accused. The Chamber specifically acknowledged that the Rome Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence are silent on the matter, but noted that Article 64(3)(a) and Rule 134 grant the Chamber the ability to


288 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on the Conduct of Trial Proceedings (General Directions), ICC-01/09-01/11-1334 (Trial Chamber V(a), 3 June 2014).

289 Id.

290 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision No. 5 on the Conduct of Trial Proceedings (Principles and Procedure on ‘No Case to Answer’ Motions), ICC-01/09-01/11-1334 (Trial Chamber V(a), 3 June 2014).

291 Article 66(1) of the Rome Statute states that “[e]veryone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty before the Court in accordance with the applicable law.” Rome Statute, supra n. 2, Art. 66(1). Article 67(1) states, in part, that “[i]n the determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, having regard to the provisions of this Statute [and] to a fair hearing conducted impartially,” and it also includes a list of “minimum guarantees” to which the accused in entitled, including the right to be tried without undue delay. Id. Art. 67(1).

292 Ruto & Sang, Decision No. 5 on the Conduct of Trial Proceedings (Principles and Procedure on ‘No Case to Answer’ Motions), supra n. 290, ¶ 12.
instill “procedures as are necessary to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceeding” and decide “any issue concerning the conduct of the proceeding,” respectively. In fact, the Chamber determined that it was under a general obligation to conduct the trial procedures in a manner that is fair and expeditious.

In its decision, the Chamber also discussed the relationship between the confirmation of charges and the “no case to answer” proceeding. The Chamber concluded that, even though the confirmation of charges serves to filter cases without merit, given its lower evidentiary standard, limited evidentiary scope, and distinct rules related to that stage, it does not preclude the use of a “no case to answer” motion at the end of the Prosecution’s presentation of evidence. Further, the Chamber noted that the nature and content of the Prosecution’s evidence may change over the course of time and the Prosecution does not need to introduce the same evidence at trial as in the confirmation stage.

Regarding the relevant standard, the Chamber concluded that it would assess “whether or not, on the basis of a prima facie assessment of the evidence, there is a case, in the sense of whether there is sufficient evidence introduced on which if accepted, a reasonable Trial Chamber could convict the accused.” Moreover, the Chamber indicated that it will not evaluate the strength of the evidence in terms of credibility or reliability because these assessments must be made in light of the entirety of the evidence presented. The Chamber will only consider the evidence that has been “submitted and discussed” at trial and found to be admissible when considering a “no case to answer” proceeding. Ultimately, the Chamber will determine “whether there is evidence on which a reasonable Trial Chamber could convict” the accused, looking at each count in the Document Containing the

293 Id. ¶ 15.
294 Id. ¶ 16.
295 Id. ¶ 14.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id. ¶ 23.
299 Id. ¶ 24.
300 Id. ¶ 25.
Charges, but not analyzing credibility unless the evidence presented is “incapable of belief by any reasonable” Chamber.\textsuperscript{301}

4. Continued Disclosure

Despite being well into the Prosecution’s case-in-chief and over a year and a half since the commencement of trial, the Prosecution is still disclosing evidence to the defense. From 12 January to 10 April 2015, the Prosecution disclosed 704 items of evidence.\textsuperscript{302}

I. The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, and Mohammed Hussein Ali

In the second Kenya case, the Prosecutor charged Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, and Mohammed Hussein Ali with committing crimes against humanity during the 2007 Kenyan post-election violence.\textsuperscript{303} All three suspects made their initial appearance pursuant to summonses to appear on 8 April 2011.\textsuperscript{304} As of 27 August 2015, the Prosecution was still disclosing evidence.\textsuperscript{305}

\textsuperscript{301} Id. ¶ 32.
\textsuperscript{303} The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, et al., Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application For Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, ICC-01/09-02/11-1 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 8 March 2011).
\textsuperscript{304} Muthaura, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 33, ¶ 4.
\textsuperscript{305} The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Prosecution’s Communication of the Disclosure of Evidence, ICC-01/09-01/11-1941 (Trial Chamber V(A), 27 August 2015).
1. The Confirmation Process

Single Judge Trendafilova set up a disclosure system identical to that used in *Ruto, et al.*, setting the stage for the disclosure of some 14,640 pages of evidence for the purposes of the decision whether to confirm the charges, all of which was also shared with the Chamber. The confirmation hearing took place as initially scheduled between 21 September 2011 and 5 October 2011. As in the *Ruto, et al.* case, each Defense team called two live witnesses during the hearing, while the Prosecution refrained from calling any.

On 23 January 2012, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the charges against Messrs. Muthaura and Kenyatta, finding that there were substantial grounds to believe that they were criminally liable as indirect co-perpetrators for five counts of crimes against humanity. However, the Chamber declined to confirm any of the charges against Mr. Ali, who was Commissioner of the Kenya Police during the time of the alleged crimes. Specifically, the Chamber found that the Prosecution failed to substantiate its claim that Mr. Ali was criminally responsible for the inaction of the Kenya Police in the face of crimes against humanity because the evidence did not sufficiently establish that “there existed an identifiable course of conduct of the Kenya Police amounting to participation, by way of inaction” in the relevant crimes. As in the other cases in which a Chamber declined to confirm charges, the Pre-Trial Chamber cited only to the evidence put forward by the Prosecutor in establishing that the evidence was insufficient to support the charges, as opposed to relying on countervailing evidence put forward by the Defense. In particular, the Chamber determined that, while reliable, the Prosecutor’s own evidence revealed that any failings on the part of the police to prevent the violence that occurred in 2007 “mainly occurred as a result of

---

307 *Muthaura, et al.*, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, *supra* n. 33, ¶ 10.
308 *Id.* ¶ 16.
309 *Id.* ¶ 13.
310 *Id.* ¶ 428.
311 *Id.* ¶ 430.
312 *Id.* ¶ 425.
313 *Id.* ¶¶ 225-26.
ethnic bias on the part of individual police officers as well as of ineptitude and failure of senior police officers to sufficiently appreciate the violence in [the relevant areas], leaving the police officers on the ground often overwhelmed and outnumbered by the attackers.”

As in Ruto, et al. case, the Chamber denied requests from both Messrs. Muthaura and Kenyatta for leave to appeal the confirmation decision.315 The case was thus transferred to the Trial Chamber V on 29 March 2012,316 and reassigned to Trial Chamber V(b) on 21 May 2013 following Judge Ozaki’s request to be excused from the Ruto & Sang case.317

2. Prosecution’s Request for Notification Under Regulation 55

As in the other Kenya case, prior to the scheduled start of the trial, the Prosecution requested that the Trial Chamber provide the accused notice under Regulation 55.318 Specifically, the Prosecution requested that notice be given that both the mode of liability may be subject to change – again requesting that the accused be put on notice that the Chamber may characterize his responsibility under any of the subparagraphs of Article 25(3)319 – and that certain facts may be re-

314 Id. ¶ 226.
317 The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision Constituting Trial Chamber V(a) and Trial Chamber V(b) and referring to them the cases of The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang and The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-739 (Presidency, 21 May 2013).
319 Id. ¶¶ 26-31.
characterized as different crimes. The Trial Chamber had yet to respond to the Prosecution’s request when other events rendered the request moot, as discussed immediately below.

3. The Withdrawal of Charges Against the Accused

On 18 March 2013, the Prosecutor withdrew the charges against Mr. Muthaura after concluding that, due to a number of factors, it would not be able to prove the allegations from the confirmation of charges beyond a reasonable doubt against Mr. Muthaura. The trial against Mr. Kenyatta alone was scheduled to commence on 7 October 2014. However, on 5 September 2014, the Prosecution requested an adjournment of proceedings against Mr. Kenyatta, citing a lack of cooperation on the part of the Kenyan government with respect to the Prosecution’s request for records. The Prosecutor indicated that, without the records, it did not possess sufficient evidence to support a criminal conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. After hearing from the Prosecution, the Defense, and the Kenyan government, the Trial Chamber determined that the Prosecution failed to establish obstruction on the part of the government and denied the request for adjournment. In light of this decision, on 5 December 2014, the Prosecutor withdrew the charges against Mr. Kenyatta.

---

320 Id.
321 The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Prosecution Notification of Withdrawal of the Charges against Francis Kirimi Muthaura, ICC-01/09-02/11-687, ¶ 9 (Office of the Prosecutor, 11 March 2013). Specifically, the factors cited by the Prosecution in support of its decision included the lack of cooperation by the Government of Kenya, the recantation of a crucial witness against Mr. Muthaura, and various issues confronting witnesses, like individuals unwilling to testify or provide evidence to the Prosecution, the death of witnesses since the 2007 post-election violence, and several witnesses accepting bribes from individuals representing themselves as representatives of both accused.
322 The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Prosecution Notice Regarding the Provisional Trial Date, ¶ 1 (Office of the Prosecutor, 5 September 2014).
323 Id. ¶ 4.
324 Id. ¶ 2.
325 The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Further Adjournment, ICC-01/09-02/11-981, ¶ 53 (Trial Chamber V(b), 3 December 2014).
326 The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Notice of Withdrawal of the Charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-983 (Trial Chamber V(b), 5 December 2014). See also The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on
J. The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda

Bosco Ntaganda was initially charged with committing three counts of the war crime of recruiting children under the age of fifteen. Subsequently, the Prosecution obtained a second warrant, adding three counts of crimes against humanity and four new counts of war crimes to the case. Mr. Ntaganda was allegedly the Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of operations with the Union des Patriotes Congolais/Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo and responsible for attacks in the Ituri region of the DRC. He was on the run for over six years, but ultimately surrendered to the Court and made his initial appearance on 26 March 2013.

The confirmation hearing in the case against Mr. Ntaganda was initially scheduled to begin on 23 September 2013, approximately six months after the suspect’s first appearance before the Court. However, shortly after Single Judge Trendafilova established a disclosure calendar in accordance with the anticipated confirmation hearing, the Prosecution moved to have the hearing postponed on the grounds that, because Mr. Ntaganda had been a fugitive for so

the Prosecution’s Application for a Further Adjournment, ICC-01/09-02/11-981, ¶ 57 (Trial Chamber V(b), 3 December 2014) (denying the Prosecution’s request to further adjourn proceedings against Mr. Kenyatta).

328 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, ICC-01/04-02/06-36-Red (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 13 July 2012).
329 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, ¶ 15 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 9 June 2014).
330 Id. ¶ 2.
331 The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Urgent Request to Postpone the Date of the Confirmation Hearing” and Setting a New Calendar for the Disclosure of Evidence Between the Parties, ICC-01/04-02/06-73, ¶ 3 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 17 June 2013).
332 The Single Judge implemented the same disclosure protocol used in the Kenya cases, meaning that all evidence disclosed between the parties was also shared with the Chamber, regardless of whether the parties intended to rely on or present the said evidence at the confirmation hearing. See The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Setting the Regime for Evidence Disclosure and Other Related Matters, ICC-01/04-02/06-47, ¶¶ 10, 33 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 12 April 2013).
long, the original case had been “hibernated.”333 The Prosecution also noted that it had gathered over 43,276 documents in its investigation into the alleged crimes committed in Ituri and therefore could not possibly meet the Single Judge’s disclosure deadlines.334 Finally, the Prosecution acknowledged that, despite applying for warrants of arrest and having “completed significant analysis and investigation into the charges,” the investigation against Mr. Ntaganda was still not complete.335 The Single Judge granted the Prosecution’s request over the objection of the Defense and rescheduled the confirmation hearing for 10 February 2014.336 The hearing lasted four days.337

On 9 June 2014, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a decision concluding that there were substantial grounds to believe Mr. Ntaganda was liable, either through indirect co-perpetration, direct perpetration, ordering, inducing, contributing, or under command responsibility for eighteen counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.338 However, the Chamber could not conclude that there were substantial grounds to believe Mr. Ntaganda was liable as a direct co-perpetrator.339 On 18 July 2014, the Presidency constituted Trial Chamber VI to hear the case.340 The trial was initially slated to begin on 2 June 2015,341 but was postponed to 2 September 2015.342

334 *Id.* ¶ 16.
335 *Id.* ¶ 21.
336 *Ntaganda*, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Urgent Request to Postpone the Date of the Confirmation Hearing” and Setting a New Calendar for the Disclosure of Evidence Between the Parties, *supra* n. 331, at 19.
337 *Ntaganda*, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, *supra* n. 329, ¶ 5.
338 *Id.* ¶ 97.
339 *Id.*
341 *The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda*, Order Scheduling a Status Conference and Setting the Commencement Date for the Trial, ICC-01/04-02/06-382-Corr ¶8 (Trial Chamber VI, 9 October 2014).
K. The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo

Laurent Gbagbo is the former president of the Côte d’Ivoire and is charged with four counts of crimes against humanity committed against the supporters of current president Alassane Ouattara following the divisively contested 2010 presidential election. Mr. Gbagbo made his initial appearance on 5 December 2011.

1. The Confirmation Process

The Pre-Trial Chamber decided to closely follow the disclosure regime established in the Abu Garda case. Judge Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi ordered the Prosecution and Defense to share with the Chamber only the evidence that was to be presented during the confirmation hearing. Evidence that was disclosed via inter partes exchanges and not used during the confirmation hearing was not shared with the Chamber.

The confirmation of charges hearing was initially scheduled for 18 June 2012, but on 5 June 2012, the Defense requested the hearing be delayed until at least 27 August 2012 on the grounds that Mr. Gbagbo was unfit to stand trial and the team lacked the necessary resources to adequately prepare for the hearing. While the Chamber did not find the suspect unfit to stand trial, it did recognize that the Defense had

---

344 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Decision Establishing a Disclosure System and a Calendar for Disclosure, ICC-02/11-01/11-30, ¶ 1 (Pre-Trial Chamber III, 24 January 2012).
345 Id. ¶ 13.
346 Id. ¶ 15.
347 Id.
348 Gbagbo, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 37, ¶ 3.
unnecessary resources to allow it to prepare for the June 2012 hearing due to a delay in authorization of funds from the Registry.350 The Chamber therefore agreed to postpone the confirmation hearing to 13 August 2012.351 The Defense team again raised the issue of Mr. Gbagbo’s fitness to stand trial, however, and the hearing was once again delayed to allow the Chamber to resolve the question.352 Finally, after extended filings between the parties, on 2 November 2012, the Chamber again determined that Mr. Gbagbo was fit to participate in the confirmation hearing.353 The hearing took place from 19 February through 28 February 2013.354 Neither the Prosecution nor the Defense called *viva voce* witnesses.355

On 3 June 2013, while its decision on confirmation was still pending, a majority of the Chamber adjourned the proceedings pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute,356 which permits the Chamber to request that the Prosecutor “consider providing further evidence on a particular charge or amending a charge” presented at the hearing.357 The Chamber was particularly concerned with the Prosecution’s heavy reliance on hearsay evidence contained in reports from non-governmental organizations and press articles, stating “whenever testimonial evidence is offered, it should, to the extent possible, be

350 *Id.* ¶¶ 28-29, 36, 40.
351 *Id.* at 12.
353 *The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo*, Decision on the Fitness of Laurent Gbagbo to Take Part in the Proceedings before this Court, ICC-02/11-01/11-286-Red, ¶ 101 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 2 November 2012); .
354 *Gbagbo*, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Against Laurent Gbagbo, *supra* n. 343, ¶ 8.
356 *See generally Gbagbo*, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, *supra* n. 37.
357 Rome Statute, *supra* n. 2, Art. 61(7)(c).
based on the first-hand and personal observations of the witness.”  
Further, the Chamber expressed its concern that its ability to assess the credibility of witnesses would be reduced due to the Prosecution’s reliance on documentary and summary evidence instead of in-person testimony, and requested that the Prosecutor provide further evidence and investigation with regards to six sets of factual allegations underlying the charges against Mr. Gbagbo.  

It also ordered the Prosecution to submit an amended Document Containing the Charges that included the additional information sought by the Chamber no later than 15 November 2013.  

In justifying its decision, the Chamber cited to the Appeals Chamber’s holding in the *Mbarushimana* case that the Prosecution’s investigation should be largely completed at the time of the confirmation of charges, and extrapolated that the Prosecution should therefore present its “strongest possible case” for purposes of confirmation, submitting all the evidence it has gathered to the Pre-Trial Chamber.  

Judge Sylvia Fernández de Gurmendi dissented from the majority decision, expressing her opinion that the Chamber was overstepping its mandate by requesting the Prosecutor to submit additional factual allegations.  

She disagreed with the majority’s view of the applicable evidentiary standard, which, in her view, exceeded what was required by the Rome Statute.  

According to Judge Fernández de Gurmendi, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s role is merely to assess on the basis of the evidence presented to it whether there are substantial grounds to believe that crimes have been committed, rather than assess whether it has received all the evidence and/or has been presented with the Prosecution’s strongest possible case.  

Further, Judge Fernández de Gurmendi stated that the majority’s approach undermined the Prosecution’s ability to rely on documentary and summary evidence and frustrated the limited purpose of the confirmation of charges process.  

Finally, she warned that an “expansive interpretation” of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s role “affects the entire architecture of the  

---

358 *Gbagbo*, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 37, ¶¶ 27, 29.
359 *Id.* ¶¶ 33, 44.
360 *Id.* at 23.
361 *Id.* ¶ 25.
362 *Id.* Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Fernández de Gurmendi, ¶¶ 50-51.
363 *Id.* Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Fernández de Gurmendi, ¶ 3.
364 *Id.* Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sylvia Fernández de Gurmendi, ¶ 21.
procedural system of the Court and may, as a consequence, encroach upon the functions of trial Judges, generate duplications, and end up frustrating the judicial efficiency that Pre-Trial Chambers are called to ensure.”

The Prosecutor applied for leave to appeal the adjournment decision on three issues: 1) whether the Chamber had incorrectly applied the standard of proof applicable at the confirmation stage; 2) whether each incident underlying the contextual elements of crimes against humanity must be established to the standard of proof embodied in Article 61(7) of the Rome Statute; and 3) whether the Pre-Trial Chamber has the authority to order the Prosecutor to amend the DDC by including additional facts. The Pre-Trial Chamber granted leave for appeal only for the second issue. It rejected the first issue on grounds that it was not formulated with sufficient clarity and did not arise from the adjournment decision as it was framed. Similarly, the third issue was rejected on grounds that it did not arise from the adjournment decision. The Appeals Chamber upheld the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to adjourn. Specifically, the Appeals Chamber clarified that the impugned decision did not require that each of the incidents alleged by the Prosecution in support of the contextual elements be established to the standard of Article 61(7). Rather, the Appeals Chamber noted language in the impugned decision stating that incidents underlying the contextual element of “attack against any civilian population” may be proven together to establish a sufficient

367 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s and Defense Requests for Leave to Appeal the Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/11-01/11-464, ¶¶ 11, 27, 40 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 31 July 2013).
368 Id. at 33. Again, Judge Fernández de Gurmendi dissented, arguing that the majority misinterpreted the parties’ arguments and would have granted their leaves for appeal on all grounds. See generally id. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fernández de Gurmendi
369 Id. ¶ 19.
370 Id. ¶ 52.
372 Id. ¶ 47.
number of incidents and thus may collectively amount to the requisite standard under Article 61(7).\textsuperscript{373}

Following the Appeals Chamber’s decision, the Prosecution ultimately complied with the Pre-Trial Chamber’s request and submitted an Amended Document Containing the Charges with additional evidence.\textsuperscript{374} However, due to the time consumed by the interlocutory appeal, the date of the revised submission was ultimately pushed back to 13 January 2014.\textsuperscript{375}

On 12 June 2014 – two years, six months, and eight days after the suspect’s initial appearance – a majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed part of the charges against Laurent Gbagbo, finding substantial grounds to believe that he was responsible for the charged crimes pursuant to Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, although it declined to specify a particular prong of that provision.\textsuperscript{376} The Chamber refused to confirm the charges based on Mr. Gbagbo’s responsibility under Article 28, finding that the evidence and the facts of the case, as understood by the Pre-Trial Chamber, did not support

\textsuperscript{373} Id. Note that the Prosecutor asserted two grounds of appeal in its brief to the Appeals Chamber: (i) “The Majority erred in requiring that in this case a sufficient number of Incidents underlying the contextual elements, including the 41 Incidents, must be established to the standard of proof enshrined in Article 61(7) and by applying that standard of proof to the subsidiary facts and evidence that relate to the 41 Incidents”; and (ii) “The Majority erred in its interpretation and application of the standard of proof under Article 61(7) of the Statute.” \textit{The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo}, Prosecution’s Appeal against the “Decision adjourning the hearing on the confirmation of charges pursuant to article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute,” ICC-02/11-01/11-474, ¶ 6 (Office of the Prosecutor, 12 August 2013). However, the Appeals Chamber refused to consider the second ground of appeal, holding that it was an inappropriate attempt to introduce an issue for which leave to appeal was not granted by the Pre-Trial Chamber. \textit{Gbagbo}, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 3 June 2013 entitled “Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute,” \textit{supra} n. 371, ¶¶ 56, 61.

\textsuperscript{374} \textit{The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo}, Prosecution’s Submission of Document amendé de notification des charges, l’Inventaire amendé des éléments de preuve à charge, and le Tableau amendé des éléments constitutifs des crimes, and Response to issues raised by Pre-Trial Chamber I, ICC-02/11-01/11-592 (Office of the Prosecutor, 13 January 2013).

\textsuperscript{375} Id. ¶ 3.

\textsuperscript{376} See generally \textit{Gbagbo}, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Against Laurent Gbagbo, \textit{supra} n. 343.
this legal characterization. However, in doing so, the Chamber indicated that it “[could] not rule out the possibility that the discussion of the evidence at trial may lead to a different characterization of the facts.” Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert dissented from the decision confirming the charges, expressing the belief that the evidence remained insufficient to establish substantial grounds to believe Mr. Gbagbo is responsible for the charged crimes.

On 11 September 2014, Mr. Gbagbo’s application for leave to appeal the confirmation decision was rejected, meaning the case could proceed to trial. Six days later, on 17 September 2014, President Sang-Hyun Song referred the case against Mr. Gbagbo to a reconstituted Trial Chamber I.

2. Proceedings Before the Trial Chamber To Date

Due to continuing disclosure and the possibility of a joinder with The Prosecutor v. Blé Goudé case, on 17 November 2014, Trial Chamber I set the opening trial date for 7 July 2015, over three and half years since Mr. Gbagbo’s initial appearance. However, because

---

377 Id. ¶¶ 263-65.
378 Id.
381 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Decision Re-constituting Trial Chamber I and Referring To It the Case of The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11-682 (The Presidency, 17 September 2014).
382 The Prosecutor submitted a request to join the two cases on 22 December 2014, citing the similarity in facts between the two cases and claiming that joining the cases would minimize the impact of on witnesses, avoid duplication of evidence, promote judicial economy, and create consistent rulings regarding the evidence and issues. The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé, Prosecution’s Request to Join the Cases of The Prosecutor v. Laurent GBAGBO and The Prosecutor v. Charles BLE GOUĐÉ, ICC-02/11-02/11-194 (Office of the Prosecutor, 22 December 2014).
383 See The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Order Setting the Commencement Date for the Trial and the Time Limit for Disclosure, ICC-02/11-01/11-723 (Trial Chamber I, 17 November 2014).
the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé cases were ultimately joined on 11 March 2015, the Chamber vacated the 7 July 2015 trial start date. On 24 April 2015, the Prosecutor filed a submission requesting that the Trial Chamber give notice to the parties that it may invoke Regulation 55 to change the legal characterization of Mr. Gbagbo’s responsibility to command responsibility and superior responsibility under Article 28(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute. As stated above, this mode of responsibility had not been confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, although that Chamber had foreseen the possibility that the Trial Chamber would re-characterize the facts. On 19 August 2015, Trial Chamber I issued a decision consistent with the Prosecution’s request, notifying the parties that the legal characterization of the facts may be subject to change to include Mr. Gbagbo’s liability under Articles 28(a) and 28(b) of the Rome Statute. Notably, in its decision, the Trial Chamber acknowledged that the Pre-Trial Chamber had declined to confirm charges under Article 28, and also noted that the Prosecution had not sought to appeal that decision or to amend the charges pursuant to Article 61(9) of the Rome Statute. Nevertheless, it concluded that, in this case, “the Prosecution’s failure to exhaust other remedies does not impact on the Chamber’s obligation to give notice under Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations.”

---

384 Gbagbo & Blé Goudé, Decision on Prosecution Requests to Join the Cases of The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé and Related Matters, supra n. 343, ¶ 74.
386 Gbagbo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Against Laurent Gbagbo, supra n. 343, ¶ 265.
388 Id. ¶ 8. Article 69(1) states, in relevant part: “After the charges are confirmed and before the trial has begun, the Prosecutor may, with the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber and after notice to the accused, amend the charges. If the Prosecutor seeks to add additional charges or to substitute more serious charges, a hearing under this article to confirm those charges must be held.” Rome Statute, supra n. 2, Art. 61(9).
389 Gbagbo & Blé Goudé, Decision Giving Notice Pursuant to Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, supra n. 387, ¶ 8.
The joint trial is currently scheduled to commence 10 November 2015.390


On 20 November 2014, the Prosecutor sought a warrant of arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu, and Narcisse Arido for allegedly committing offences against the administration of justice during the course of the Bemba case.391 As discussed above, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo is currently on trial, accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in the DRC.392 Aimé Kilolo Musamba has acted as lead counsel for Mr. Bemba, with Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo as case manager.393 Fidèle Babala Wandu is a DRC politician and close associate of Mr. Bemba, and Narcisse Arido served as a witness in the case and acted as an intermediary for the Defense team.394 Each of the five is charged with corruptly influencing a witness and falsifying evidence.395 Messrs. Bemba, Kilolo, and Babala made their initial appearances on 27 November 2013; Mr. Mangenda on 5 December 2013; and Mr. Arido on 20 March 2014.396

Early in the confirmation process, Judge Cuno Tarfusser, acting as the Single Judge, decided to forgo an oral confirmation hearing pursuant

---

392 See supra n. 160 et seq. and accompanying text.
393 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, et al., Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/05-01/13-1-749, ¶ 37 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 November 2014).
394 Id. ¶ 37.
396 Bemba, et al., Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 393, ¶ 4.
to Rule 165(3) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,\textsuperscript{397} which states that a Pre-Trial Chamber may base its confirmation determination on written submissions alone in cases involving alleged offenses against the administration of justice.\textsuperscript{398} Initially, Judge Tarfusser set 18 April 2014 as the deadline to receive the written submissions from the Defense teams and Prosecution.\textsuperscript{399} However, this deadline was extended several times,\textsuperscript{400} largely due to a need to wait for the submission of a report by an Independent Counsel appointed by Judge Tarfusser in July 2013 to listen to recordings of phone calls conducted between Mr. Bemba and his counsel for purposes of “transmitting to the Prosecutor the relevant portions of any and all such calls which might be of relevance for the purposes of the investigation.”\textsuperscript{401}

\textsuperscript{397}Rule 165(3) provides that “for the purposes of article 61 the Pre-Trial Chamber may make any of the determinations set forth in that article on the basis of written submissions, without a hearing, unless the interests of justice otherwise require.” ICC Rules, supra n. 29, R. 165(3).


\textsuperscript{399}Id. at 15.


\textsuperscript{401}See, e.g., Bemba, et al., Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for Variation of Time Limits Pursuant to Regulation 35 of the Regulations of the Court Concerning the Confirmation of Charges” dated 3 March 2014, supra n. 400, at 7 (explaining that “the only ‘good cause’ shown by the Prosecutor in support of her request for postponement consists… of the persisting unavailability of the final report by Independent Counsel and that, accordingly, postponement should be strictly and precisely correlated with the need to ensure its availability to the Court and to the parties, in particular with a view to allowing the latter to peruse and include it, as appropriate, in the document containing the charges and in the other submissions to be prepared for the purposes of the confirmation of the charges in writing in lieu of hearing…”); The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, et al., Decision Amending the Calendar for the Confirmation of the Charges, ICC-01/05-01/13-443, at 4 (28 May 2014) (“Considering that, since Independent Counsel's third and final report was made available to the parties almost four weeks later than expected at the time of the First Amendment Decision, it is appropriate that the calendar for the confirmation of the charges in writing be accordingly amended.”).
Ultimately, the Prosecution submitted its brief on 21 August 2014, and the Defense teams submitted their responses on 11 September 2014.\textsuperscript{402} The confirmation decision was released on 11 November 2014, over eleven months after the initial appearance of Messrs. Bemba, Kilolo, and Babala.\textsuperscript{403} In the decision, the Chamber confirmed the charges against all five suspects.\textsuperscript{404} On 23 January 2015, Judge Tarfusser rejected the Defense teams’ requests for leave to appeal the confirmation of charges decision.\textsuperscript{405} On 30 January 2015, the Presidency constituted Trial Chamber VII to handle the Bemba, et al. case.\textsuperscript{406}

The trial is currently set to start on 29 September 2015.\textsuperscript{407}

M. The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé

Charles Blé Goudé, an Ivorian politician who served in the administration of Laurent Gbagbo, is charged with four counts of crimes against humanity allegedly committed on behalf of pro-Gbagbo forces following the contested 2010 election in Côte d’Ivoire.\textsuperscript{408} Although a warrant for his arrest was initially issued in December

\textsuperscript{402} Bemba, et al., Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 393, ¶¶ 5, 7 (“The calendar for the confirmation process was first set during the Initial Appearance and has since been amended three times. In particular, a postponement of about four months became unavoidable due to the time required by the Dutch authorities to make their own and Independent Counsel’s final reports on the intercepted communications available to the Court.”).

\textsuperscript{403} See generally id.

\textsuperscript{404} Id. at 47-54.

\textsuperscript{405} The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, et al., Joint Decision on the Applications for Leave to Appeal the “Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute,” ICC-01/05-01/13-801 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2015).


\textsuperscript{407} The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, et al., Order setting the Commencement Date for Trial, ICC-01/05-01/13-960 (Trial Chamber VII, 22 May 2015).

\textsuperscript{408} The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé, Warrant of Arrest For Charles Blé Goudé, ICC-02/11-02/11-1 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 21 December 2011).
2011, Mr. Blé Goudé evaded arrest for over two years, finally making his initial appearance before the ICC on 27 March 2014.\textsuperscript{409}

The disclosure regime established by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the \textit{Blé Goudé} case was similar to the disclosure regime in the \textit{Gbagbo} case. Judge Fernandez de Gurmendi, again, ordered the Prosecution and Defense to share with the Chamber only the evidence that was to be presented during the confirmation hearing.\textsuperscript{410} Since the \textit{Blé Goudé} and \textit{Gbagbo} cases are based on a similar set of facts, the Chamber authorized an expedited disclosure process in which the Prosecutor could disclose any potentially relevant evidence previously disclosed in the \textit{Gbagbo} case and maintain the same previously authorized redactions.\textsuperscript{411}

The Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the charges against Mr. Blé Goudé just over eight months after his initial appearance,\textsuperscript{412} making his confirmation process the quickest at the ICC to date. Specifically, on 11 December 2014, Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed all four charges, and one alternate charge,\textsuperscript{413} against Mr. Blé Goudé.\textsuperscript{414} As in the case against Laurent Gbagbo, the Chamber confirmed the charges with respect to multiple alternative modes of liability, finding there are substantial grounds to believe Mr. Blé Goudé can be criminally responsible under Article 25(3)(a) through (d) of the Rome Statute.\textsuperscript{415} Arguably, the speedy confirmation could be attributed to the \textit{Blé Goudé} and \textit{Gbagbo} cases being litigated before the same judge and under the same set of facts. On 20 December 2014, the Presidency referred \textit{Blé Goudé} to Trial Chamber I.\textsuperscript{416}

\textsuperscript{409} \textit{The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé}, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges against Charles Blé Goudé, ICC-02/11-02/11-186 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 11 December 2015).
\textsuperscript{410} \textit{The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé}, Decision Establishing a System for Disclosure of Evidence, ICC-02/11-02/11, ¶¶ 6-7 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 11 December 2014).
\textsuperscript{411} Id.
\textsuperscript{412} \textit{Blé Goudé}, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges against Charles Blé Goudé, supra n. 409, at 90.
\textsuperscript{413} Id. ¶¶ 120, 182.
\textsuperscript{414} Id. ¶¶ 184, 187-93.
\textsuperscript{415} Id. ¶¶ 133, 158, 166, 171, 181.
\textsuperscript{416} \textit{The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé}, Corrigendum to the “Decision Referring the Case of The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé to Trial Chamber I,” ICC-02/11-
Before the Trial Chamber had the opportunity to establish any decisions regarding disclosure or a trial start date, the Prosecution requested to join the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé cases. As explained above, the joinder was granted on 11 March 2015. The joint trial is currently scheduled to commence 10 November 2015.


418 Gbagbo & Blé Goudé, Decision on Prosecution Requests to Join the Cases of The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé and Related Matters, supra n. 343, ¶ 74.

419 The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, Order Setting the Commencement Date for Trial, ICC-02/11-01/15-58 (Trial Chamber I, 7 May 2015).
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The Failure of the Confirmation Process to Achieve Its Intended Goals

As is evident from the foregoing summary, despite repeated insistence on the part of the Pre-Trial Chambers that the confirmation hearing is not intended as a “mini-trial,” the process has consistently proven to be costly in terms of time and resources on the part of the parties and the Court. Importantly, this is not just a product of the ICC being a new institution and/or the confirmation process being an innovation unique to this Court. Indeed, one of the most recent cases to be brought before the Court, the Gbagbo case, proved to be one of the most litigious and lengthy confirmation of charges processes to date at the Court. Such a lengthy process is not only at odds with the summary proceedings envisioned by the drafters of the Rome Statute, but has also failed to fulfill the intended goals of the confirmation proceedings identified by the drafters of the Rome Statute and the ICC judges themselves, as discussed immediately below.

420 See, e.g., Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 35, ¶ 64; Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 33, ¶ 39.

421 As detailed above, Mr. Gbagbo made his initial appearance on 5 December 2011, yet the decision confirming the charges was not rendered until 12 June 2014, and leave for appeal was not rejected until 11 September 2014. See supra n. 344 et seq. and accompanying text. Altogether, two years, nine months, and seven days passed and 680 submissions, decisions, or orders were filed between Mr. Gbagbo’s initial appearance and the decision rejecting his leave to appeal. See International Criminal Court Website, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé: Court Records from Laurent Gbagbo Case: Filings of the Participants, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/icc0211/related%20cases /ICC-02_11-01_15/ICC-02_11-01_11/Pages/default.aspx.

422 See supra n. 21 et seq. and accompanying text. See also William Schabas, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 735 (Oxford University Press, 2010) (“[T] hose who conceived of the confirmation hearing viewed it as a much more summary and brief process than what it has become in the hands of the judges of the Court.”).
1. Ensuring Prosecutorial Fairness and Effectiveness in Investigations

As discussed in Section II.B, one of the reasons that the drafters of the Rome Statute decided to include a confirmation process was to serve as a check against the Prosecutor’s authority to determine the charges in a case. Specifically, it appears that the drafters envisioned the confirmation process as a means of ensuring prosecutorial fairness and effectiveness in investigations.423 With regard to ensuring prosecutorial fairness, it should first be stressed that, while the drafters of the Rome Statute were concerned about the power of a “rogue” international prosecutor with the authority to bring politically-motivated prosecutions,424 there is no evidence to suggest this would actually occur. Indeed, as William Schabas has observed:

The concerns about such vexatious or erroneous prosecution hardly seem legitimate, given the international context…. [T]he practice of international tribunals has shown that prosecution on wrongful or wholly unfounded charges is not a significant problem, notwithstanding the fact that accused persons are sometimes acquitted. This constitutes a rather poor and unconvincing justification for what has proven to be a rather significant, costly, and time-consuming process, resulting in decisions numbering in the hundreds of pages.425

In any event, if such a politically-motivated, frivolous case was brought by the Prosecution, presumably the Pre-Trial Chamber would

423 See supra n. 32 and accompanying text.
424 See, e.g., Ambos & Miller, supra n. 31, at 349 ("As is well known, the establishment of a strong Pre-Trial Chamber within the ICC was the answer of the like-minded States to demands of less ICC friendly States for a (political) control of the Prosecutor by the UN Security Council."); Christoph Safferling, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 342 (Oxford University Press, 2012) (explaining that one reason behind the creation of the Pre-Trial Chamber was “political,” namely: “to avoid the prosecutor from becoming a kind of superpower”); Scheffer, supra n. 24, at 157 (describing the intent of the Rome Statute’s negotiators “to create a [Pre-Trial Chamber] that would properly limit an overly ambitious Prosecutor from overreaching with his powers and check any zealotry in his investigations”).
425 Schabas, supra n. 422, at 734-35.
refuse to issue an arrest warrant or summons to appear and the case would never proceed to the confirmation stage, let alone trial.

To the extent the argument about prosecutorial fairness relates to protecting the suspect from being required to undergo a lengthy trial on unmeritorious charges, one could argue that the confirmation process has in fact served this function, as the Pre-Trial Chambers have refused to confirm charges against four suspects in cases. However, upon closer examination, it seems clear that the cases that have not been confirmed have been so weak that the charges could have been easily disposed of pursuant to a process far less rigorous than that which has come to characterize the confirmation process. This is certainly true for the *Abu Garda* case, about which Judge Tarfusser wrote that the “lacunae and shortcomings exposed by the mere factual assessment of the evidence” presented by the Prosecution were “so basic and fundamental” that the Chamber should have completely refrained from analyzing the “legal issues pertaining to the merits of the case.”

Similarly, in the *Mbarushimana* case, the Pre-Trial Chamber determined that, in a number of instances, the Prosecution either provided *no evidence* to support particular elements of the charged crime, or relied on a single witness who was unable to provide relevant details or anonymous hearsay statements not

---


427 See, *e.g.*, *Mbarushimana*, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, *supra* n. 238, ¶ 134 (“The Prosecution does not specifically allege that the acts relied on to support the charge of mutilation were carried out [REDACTED] was still alive and no evidence is provided to support the view that he was mutilated before, as opposed to after, he was killed. Accordingly, the Chamber is not satisfied that there is sufficient evidence establishing substantial grounds to believe that the crime of mutilation under either article 8(2)(c)(l)-2 or 8(2)(e)(xi)-l of the Statute was committed by FDLR soldiers in Busurungi and surrounding villages in March 2009.”); *id.* ¶ 135 (“No evidence was provided to the Chamber in relation to an attack against the civilian population in Busurungi on or about 28 April 2009.”); *id.* ¶¶ 204-05 (noting that, although the Prosecution alleged that the war crime of torture was committed in the village of Malembe in August 2009, “no evidence of torture being committed during the attack on Malembe was provided to the Chamber”).

428 For instance, although the Prosecution charged Mbarushimana with the war crime of attacking civilians in the village of Busurungi in late January 2009, the only evidence provided to support that the attack took place was the statement of one witness, who “mentioned an attack on Busurungi around January or February 2009, but… did not provide any further details in relation to this attack.” *Id.* ¶¶ 130-31. See also *id.* ¶¶ 204-06 (noting that the only evidence put forward by the Prosecution in support of the charge that the war crime of rape was committed in the village of
substantiated by other evidence. Likewise, the Chamber presiding over the *Ruto, et al.* case declined to confirm charges against Mr. Kosgey because the Prosecutor only put forward one anonymous witness to testify to Mr. Kosgey’s involvement within the alleged organization responsible for committing the charged crimes.

Finally, in discussing the charges against Mr. Ali in the *Kenyatta, et al.* case, the Chamber determined that, while reliable, the Prosecutor’s *own evidence* contradicted its theory that the conduct of the Kenyan police for which Mr. Ali was allegedly responsible was undertaken pursuant to a policy to commit crimes against humanity, as required by the Rome Statute. It is also worth highlighting in this context that neither of the *ad hoc* criminal tribunals have a procedural stage akin to the confirmation stage at the ICC, and yet both tribunals have had low rates of acquittal, and there are no cases that are generally

---

429 See *id.* ¶ 117 (rejecting the Prosecution’s allegations that the suspect bore responsibility for war crimes committed in the villages of Malembe and Busheke in late January 2009 because, “[i]n both cases the Prosecution relied only on a single UN or Human Rights Watch Report” to support the allegations, without providing “any other evidence in order for the Chamber to ascertain the truthfulness and/or authenticity of those allegations,” and in both cases the reports were themselves based on information from anonymous sources).

430 *Ruto, et al.*, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, *supra* n. 33, ¶ 293 (noting further that anonymous witnesses are treated with a lower probative value and require more corroboration to be credible).

431 *Id.* ¶ 266.

432 At both the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), a judge of the Trial Chamber reviews the initial indictment prepared by the Prosecutor and, if satisfied that a *prima facie* case is presented, issues an arrest warrant. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Art. 19 (September 2009); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 18 (January 2010); International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 49, R. 47(A) (22 May 2013); International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 47(A) (13 May 2015). A *prima facie* case is “understood to be a credible case which would (if not contradicted by the Defence) be a sufficient basis to convict the accused on the charge.” *Prosecutor v. Kordić*, Decision on Review of the Indictment, IT-95-14, ¶ 11 (ICTY Single Judge, 10 November 1995). The case then proceeds to trial before the Trial Chamber once the suspect is in custody. ICTY Statute, Art. 20; ICTR Statute, Art. 19.

433 According to a 2013 study, both the ICTY and the ICTR had acquittal rates of 13 to 14 percent. See Alette Smeulers, *et al.*, *Sixty-Five Years of International Criminal*
considered to have gone through trial based on “wrongful and wholly unfounded” charges.\textsuperscript{434} Thus, it is difficult to argue that the ICC, which deals with the same types of cases that have been brought before the \textit{ad hoc} tribunals, would see a dramatic increase in frivolous cases absent the confirmation process as it has taken place at the ICC to date. In fact, it is important to remember that, at the time the Rome Statute was drafted, the \textit{ad hoc} criminal tribunals were still relatively new institutions, meaning that the adoption of a confirmation process at the ICC should in no way be seen as an attempt to remedy a system that had proven unworkable at the Yugoslavia or Rwanda tribunals.

In any event, the utility of the confirmation process as a filtering mechanism is questionable in light of the fact that the Prosecution is permitted to continue investigating a case post-confirmation\textsuperscript{435} and “is not necessarily required to rely on entirely the same evidence at trial as it did at the confirmation stage.”\textsuperscript{436} Indeed, despite the Appeals Chamber’s observation that the Prosecution’s investigations should be “largely completed” by confirmation,\textsuperscript{437} the “clear variation in numerous cases between the evidence disclosed pre-confirmation and that disclosed for the purpose of trial” demonstrates that this has not


\textsuperscript{434} As noted above, the Pre-Trial Chambers have stated that the purpose of confirmation is to protect suspects from “wrongful and wholly unfounded charges.” See, e.g., \textit{Lubanga}, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, \textit{supra} n. 33, ¶ 37; \textit{Katanga \& Ngudjolo}, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, \textit{supra} n. 35, ¶ 63.

\textsuperscript{435} \textit{Mbarushimana}, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,” \textit{supra} n. 262, ¶ 44.

\textsuperscript{436} \textit{The Prosecutor v. Kenyatta}, Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests, ICC-01/09-02/11, ¶ 105 (ICC Trial Chamber, 26 April 2011). See also \textit{Ruto \& Sang}, Decision No. 5 on the Conduct of Trial Proceedings (Principles and Procedure on ‘No Case to Answer’ Motions), \textit{supra} n. 290, ¶ 14 (“The lower evidentiary standard, limited evidentiary scope and distinct evidentiary rules applicable at the confirmation of charges stage do not preclude a subsequent consideration of the evidence actually presented at trial by the Prosecution in light of the requirements for conviction of an accused. Furthermore, the nature and content of the evidence may change between the confirmation hearing and completion of the Prosecution’s presentation of evidence at trial. In addition, the Prosecution need not introduce the same evidence at trial as it did for confirmation.”).

\textsuperscript{437} \textit{Mbarushimana}, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,” \textit{supra} n. 262, ¶ 44.
been the case in practice.\textsuperscript{438} For instance, in \textit{Lubanga}, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the charges relying “for the most part” on witness statements from child soldiers called by the Prosecution,\textsuperscript{439} whose evidence was subsequently rejected entirely by the Trial Chamber.\textsuperscript{440} More recently, the Prosecution dramatically altered its witness list in each of the Kenya cases between confirmation and trial. Specifically, in \textit{Kenyatta}, it dropped seven of the twelve witnesses it relied upon for confirmation and added twenty-six new witnesses in the lead up to trial.\textsuperscript{441} In \textit{Ruto & Sang}, the Prosecution added new witnesses just six weeks prior to the start of trial.\textsuperscript{442} While circumstances in Kenya may have forced these changes on the Prosecution, the fact remains that the case confirmed was not the same as the case that would be presented at trial. This in turn raises serious questions about the filtering benefits gained from a process as time- and resource-intensive as the confirmation process has proved to be.

Finally, the practice at the Court to date in no way supports the notion that the confirmation process is encouraging “effective” investigations. Indeed, one may question whether the process may actually serve as a disincentive to the Prosecution in terms of having a case “trial ready”

\textsuperscript{438} Guénaël Mettraux, et al., Expert Initiative On Promoting Effectiveness At The International Criminal Court, at 124 (December 2014).
\textsuperscript{439} Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Mr Thomas Lubanga’s Appellate Brief Against the 14 March 2012 Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-2948-Red-EN, ¶ 11 (Defense, 3 December 2012). Notably, the Appeals Chamber does not take issue with the Defense’s characterization of the evidence relied upon by the Pre-Trial Chamber; rather, it holds that this evidence was subsequently supplemented by additional evidence that the Trial Chamber used in its ultimate finding of guilt. \textit{See Lubanga}, Public redacted Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against His Conviction, \textit{supra} n. 98, ¶ 132 (“Accordingly, in the present case, not only the Document Containing the Charges and the Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, but also the Amended Document Containing the Charges and the Summary of Evidence provided Mr Lubanga with information about this part of the charges. It follows that the question of whether Mr Lubanga was informed in sufficient detail of this part of the charges must be assessed not only by reference to the former, but also to the latter two documents.”).
\textsuperscript{440} Indeed, a review of the \textit{Lubanga} confirmation decision reveals that, although the Pre-Trial Chamber does cite to evidence other than the witness statements and testimony of child soldiers, that evidence was heavily relied upon by the Chamber in deciding to confirm the charges. \textit{See generally Lubanga}, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, \textit{supra} n. 33.
\textsuperscript{441} See \textit{supra} n. 96 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{442} Id.
prior to seeking a summons to appear or warrant for arrest, as it provides the Prosecution an interim stage during which to audition a case with a lower standard than that applied at trial. This possibility was starkly expressed by the Mbarushimana Pre-Trial Chamber, which criticized the Prosecution for including vague charges against the suspect without evidence to back up those charges, suggesting that the Prosecution was hoping to continue investigating after the charges were confirmed. Specifically, the Chamber expressed “concern” at what it characterized as an “attempt on the part of the Prosecution to keep the parameters of its case as broad and general as possible, without providing any reasons as to why [certain charges were not pled with greater specificity] and without providing any evidence to support the existence of broader charges, seemingly in order to allow it to incorporate new evidence relating to other factual allegations at a later date without following the procedure [governing amendments to the charges].” In fact, given the deep deficiencies in the Prosecution’s cases against Mr. Mbarushimana and other suspects whose cases have not been confirmed, it is questionable whether these cases ever would have been brought if the Prosecution had anticipated the need to be trial ready at the time it first initiated those cases before the Court.

2. Rights of the Suspect

A second goal of the confirmation process is to protect the rights of the charged person, as the process provides suspects the opportunity to contest wrongful charges before being committed to a lengthy trial. In practice, however, confirmation proceedings have seemed to

443 Mbarushimana, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 238, ¶¶ 81-82, 110.
444 Id. ¶ 82. See also id. ¶ 110 (“[T]he Chamber wishes to highlight that the charges and the statements of facts in the DCC have been articulated in such vague terms that the Chamber had serious difficulties in determining, or could not determine at all, the factual ambit of a number of the charges.”). Article 61(9) of the Rome Statute provides as follows: “After the charges are confirmed and before the trial has begun, the Prosecutor may, with the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber and after notice to the accused, amend the charges. If the Prosecutor seeks to add additional charges or to substitute more serious charges, a hearing under this article to confirm those charges must be held. After commencement of the trial, the Prosecutor may, with the permission of the Trial Chamber, withdraw the charges.” Rome Statute, supra n. 2, Art. 61(9).
445 See supra n. 33 et seq. and accompanying text.
operate contrary to the rights of the suspect by interfering with the right to a speedy trial. While the length of the proceedings may seem justified if, at the conclusion of the process, the charges were settled and the case could move quickly to trial, neither of these benefits actually accrue to an accused. Rather, the Court’s repeated use of Regulation 55 to re-characterize the facts underlying the charges and change the mode of liability, coupled with the fact that the Prosecution is not required to rely on the same evidence at trial that was used to confirm charges, means that the Court is spending on average more than fourteen months to confirm charges that may be dramatically altered over the course of trial. Thus, for instance, Germain Katanga was ultimately convicted based on a re-characterization that, according to one judge, “fundamentally change[d] the narrative of the charges in order to reach a conviction on the basis of a crime or form of criminal responsibility that was not originally charged by the prosecution.” More recently, in the Gbagbo case, the Trial Chamber invoked Regulation 55 to alert the parties that it may re-characterize the charges to include a mode of liability that the Pre-Trial Chamber expressly refused to confirm. Indeed, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated in its confirmation decision that charging Mr. Gbagbo under Article 28 of the Rome Statute “would require the Chamber to depart significantly from its understanding of how events unfolded in Cote d’Ivoire during the post-electoral crisis and [his] involvement therein.” Nevertheless, the Gbagbo Defense team must now prepare to defend against such charge at trial. Even

---

446 See Mettraux, et al., supra n. 438, at 94 (explaining that “existence of a confirmation process has the overall effect of prolonging the proceedings”); Safferling, supra n. 424, at 343 (“[E]ven if the purpose of confirmation is to protect the suspect from unfounded allegations, the procedure is far too lengthy, especially where the person concerned is in pre-trial detention.”).

447 See supra n. 81 et seq. and accompanying text.

448 See supra n. 436 et seq. and accompanying text.

449 See supra Figure One.


451 See generally Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, Decision Giving Notice Pursuant to Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, supra n. 387.

452 Gbagbo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Against Laurent Gbagbo, supra n. 343, ¶ 265 (emphasis added).

453 Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, Decision giving notice pursuant to Regulation 55(2) of the Regulations of the Court, supra n. 387.
the relatively minor example of the *Lubanga* Trial Chamber instructing the accused to prepare to defend against charges of crimes committed in both international and non-international conflict, despite the fact that the Prosecution had only brought charges in non-international armed conflict,\(^\text{454}\) suggests that the accused is gaining little benefit from the extremely lengthy confirmation process.

Nor has the confirmation process guaranteed the suspect rapid access to the details of the Prosecution’s case. On this point, Karim Khan, a prominent defense attorney who has represented clients before both the ICTY, which has no confirmation process, and the ICC, has explained as follows:

> At the first modern international criminal tribunal, the ICTY, the prosecution provides the disclosure it relied upon to obtain the indictment against the accused to the defense at or shortly after the initial appearance of the accused. At the ICC this does not occur. Instead, a “final” deadline for prosecution disclosure at the confirmation stage is set at thirty days prior to the start of the confirmation hearing, with the general disclosure process and other timelines at the confirmation and trial stages governed by decisions of the pre-trial and trial chambers.\(^\text{455}\)

Khan clearly feels this approach is detrimental to the suspect. For instance, he cites to the *Abu Garda* case, in which the Defense “did not receive a single item of disclosure from the [P]rosecution until more than three months” after the initial appearance of the suspect.\(^\text{456}\)

\(^{454}\) *See supra* n. 76 *et seq.* and accompanying text.

\(^{455}\) Karim A. A. Khan & Anand A. Shah, *Defensive Practices: Representing Clients Before the International Criminal Court*, 76 Law and Contemporary Problems 191, 201 (2014). See also V.C. Lindsay, A Review of International Criminal Court Proceedings under Part V of the Rome Statute (Investigation and Prosecution) and Proposals for Amendments, Revue Québécoise de Droit International 193-95 (2010) (“At the [ICTY], the Prosecution discloses the evidence which supports the application for the indictment (the charging document), redacted to protect the identities of witnesses, to Defence Counsel in hard copy and on CD, either at the initial appearance or as soon as permanent Counsel is identified. This system works smoothly, even in cases involving a massive quantity of documents… In contrast, at the ICC there is no guarantee that evidence will be disclosed until months after the initial appearance.”).

\(^{456}\) Khan & Shah, *supra* n. 455, at 201.
Furthermore, the “final substantive” disclosure in the Abu Garda case, which included “core evidence in the case,” such as the “revised versions of summaries of interview transcripts of six prosecution witnesses,” did not take place until “a few days prior to the thirty-day deadline.”\footnote{Id.} Significantly, Khan describes this case as “emblematic” of the general practice at the ICC in terms of pre-confirmation disclosure.\footnote{Id.} Perhaps even more dramatically, in the Kenyatta, et al. case, the Prosecution disclosed its Document Containing the Charges, a more than 6,600 page “in-depth analysis chart,” and “an additional 1,300 pages of incriminatory disclosure, including more than 1,200 pages of transcripts of witness interviews” “exactly at the thirty-day deadline,” leaving the Defense teams very little time to review the vast amount of information prior to confirmation.\footnote{Id. at 202-03.} Lastly, Khan notes that pre-confirmation disclosure is often of little value to the Defense when it is eventually turned over, as Article 61(5) of the Rome Statute permits the Prosecutor to rely on summary evidence for confirmation purposes, meaning “there is hardly any meat for the defense to sink its investigative teeth into.”\footnote{Id. at 205.} In fact, even when documents are disclosed as opposed to summaries, heavy redactions can render the documents incomprehensible.\footnote{See id. at 206 (explaining that the fact that the ICC Appeals Chamber has upheld the use of redactions not only for witnesses and their family members, but also “others at risk on account of the activities of the Court,” has “resulted in a sweeping and resource-intensive redaction regime that is highly prejudicial to the ability of the defense to analyze prosecution disclosure and conduct investigations.”).}

Finally, while the confirmation process may be viewed as Defense-friendly because it permits a suspect to challenge the charges before being committed to what is likely to be a multi-year trial, choosing to contest the case at this stage also means that the Prosecution is allowed a preview of the Defense’s strategy and evidence. Such a preview is particularly significant in light of the fact that the Prosecution is permitted to continue its investigation and gather new evidence following confirmation,\footnote{See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision Establishing General Principles Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,” ICC-01/04-} meaning it can effectively “adapt its case

\footnote{Id.}
strategy and continue its investigations within the framework of the confirmed case with a view to countering the defense’s expected case at trial.”463

3. Judicial Economy

Several of the problems discussed above also demonstrate that the confirmation of charges fails to meet the goal of confirmation identified by several ICC judges themselves, namely: judicial economy.464 First, the significant delays in the confirmation proceedings brought about by litigation over disclosure, victims’ participation, and the extent of the charges waste time and resources during the confirmation process itself. Such inefficiency is exacerbated by the fact that these issues are not considered “settled” for the purposes of trial once a case is confirmed.465 Indeed, as one author who has written extensively on the ICC has observed, the Trial Chambers have “understandably” found it necessary “to take charge of the preparations of the case for the trial that the Chamber is to conduct,” meaning that “extensive and time-consuming preparations have taken place twice, albeit for different procedural purposes.”466

Nor does the confirmation process necessarily narrow the issues that need to be litigated at trial. As explained by a group of experts that recently convened to study ways to promote efficiency at the Court:

Pre-trial decisions should and could be more precise and more narrowly focused on making clear which

01/06-568, ¶ 2 (ICC Appeals Chamber, 13 October 2006) (“The Prosecutor’s investigation may be continued beyond the confirmation hearing. Such investigations may relate to alleged new crimes as well as to alleged crimes that are encompassed by the confirmation hearing.”).
465 Khan & Shah, supra n. 455, at 220.
464 See supra n. 36 et seq. and accompanying text.
466 See, e.g., International Criminal Court, Study Group on Governance, Lessons Learnt: First Report of the Court to the Assembly of States Parties, ICC-ASP/11/31/Add.1, Annex ¶ B.2 (23 October 2012) (noting that “Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers have applied different rules with regard to the relevance and admissibility of evidence” and concluding that “[t]his practice is time consuming”: Mettraux, et al., supra n. 438, ¶ 38 (noting the “duplication of resources generated by the repetition of [redactions] at pre-trial and trial).
466 Håkan Friman, Trial Procedures – With a Particular Focus on the Relationship between the Proceedings of the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers, in The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court 915 (Carsten Stahn, ed. 2015).
factual allegations have been confirmed and, as the case may be, to what precise extent. For instance, Article 61(7) decisions sometimes remain vague as regards the time of the alleged crimes, the place where they are alleged to have occurred, the identity of the perpetrators, the exact nature of the alleged contribution of the [suspect] and the identity of the alleged victims… Lack of a clear indication of what factual allegations have been confirmed at the confirmation stage means that the confirmation process contributes little to providing notice of charges to the accused and to making trials fairer and faster, leaner and more focused on core factual issues relevant to the case.467

Finally, the fact that the Prosecution need not rely on the same factual allegations or evidence at trial as at the confirmation hearing468 detracts from the argument that the confirmation process enhances judicial efficiency. There is simply no point to spending roughly one year to confirm charges based on one set of factual allegations as established by particular evidence if the Trial Chamber will ultimately be deciding on the basis of different factual allegations and different evidence.

B. Alternatives

1. Changes Currently Under Consideration Are Either Insufficient to Align the Confirmation Process with Its Intended Goals or Inappropriately Expand the Process

Given the disconnect between the drafters’ and the Court’s intentions regarding the confirmation process and the way that process has played out in practice, it is clear that changes to the system are in order. Notably, in 2014, two separate expert working groups issued recommendations aimed at improving the confirmation process. The first came from the Working Group on Lessons Learnt, which was

467 Mettraux, et al., supra n. 438, at 83-84. While the Pre-Trial Chambers have attempted to respond to this criticism in recent cases, as discussed below, there is no evidence that the reformatted decisions have settled the charges for purposes of trial or expedited post-confirmation, pre-trial preparations. See infra n. 475 et seq. and accompanying text.

468 See supra n. 436 et seq. and accompanying text.
created by the Assembly of States Parties’ Study Group on Governance and is made up of ICC judges. The second came from an independent group of experts in the field of international criminal law who conducted a study on means to promote effectiveness at the ICC. These groups, respectively, identified the confirmation process as a subject “that need[s] discussion with the view to expediting proceedings and enhancing their quality” and an “area of concern.”

However, the changes proposed by each of these initiatives are insufficient to render the confirmation process consistent with the goals of the drafters and the Court itself. For instance, the Working Group on Lessons Learnt recommended the adoption of “a streamlined, consistent disclosure system applicable at all stages of a case,” the use of hyperlinks to evidence in the Document Containing the Charges, and encouraging parties to stipulate to agreed facts early in the proceedings. For its part, the independent panel of experts’ report recommended that the Pre-Trial Chambers make “clear what material facts have been confirmed and what they consist of exactly,” confirm charges or modes of liability in the alternative where evidence supports multiple possible legal characterizations, enforce disclosure deadlines more strictly, and limit the number of live witnesses presented at the confirmation hearing. While these recommendations may improve the problems with the confirmation phase at the margins, ultimately, they are not going to bring the process in line with the goals identified above. In fact, the Ntaganda and Gbagbo Pre-Trial Chambers applied several of these changes.

469 See ICC Study Group on Governance, Lessons Learnt: First Report of the Court to the Assembly of States Parties, supra n. 465, ¶ 13 (“A Working Group on Lessons Learnt (‘Working Group’) will be established in October 2012 which will be open to all interested judges in order to commence work on the issues identified in the current report and to determine whether amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are required.”).

470 See generally Mettraux, et al., supra n. 438, at 83-84.


474 Mettraux, et al., supra n. 438, ¶¶ 34, 35, 38, 56.

but the confirmation processes were still lengthy and there is no indication that the trial preparations in those cases are progressing more quickly than seen in other cases.476

The fact is that a fundamental restructuring of the confirmation process is in order. Indeed, in its most recent report to the Assembly of States Parties, the Working Group on Lessons Learnt acknowledged that “it is increasingly clear that the shortening and streamlining of pre-trial and trial proceedings cannot be achieved by individual amendments and a piecemeal approach to the legal framework.”477 One way to bring about such a dramatic restructuring – albeit not the one we recommend – is to significantly expand the confirmation process in a manner that would result in a case being much more “trial ready” than is currently the case. Notably, Pre-Trial Chambers appear to be increasingly moving towards this approach. This is evidenced, first, in the trend toward requiring that all exculpatory evidence be disclosed prior to confirmation and that all evidence disclosed between the parties be shared with the Pre-Trial Chamber in order to assist that Chamber in its “truth seeking” function.478 Second, the move toward...
an ever more expansive confirmation process is evidenced by the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision to adjourn the proceedings in the Gbagbo case to demand more evidence from the Prosecution.\textsuperscript{479} As discussed above, the Chamber in that decision insisted that the Prosecution present its “strongest possible evidence based on a largely completed investigation,”\textsuperscript{480} as opposed to evaluating whether the Prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe the charged crimes had been committed. The Chamber’s rationale – that the Defense “should not be presented with a wholly different case at trial”\textsuperscript{481} – is understandable and indeed addresses one of the problems identified above with respect to the disconnect between the confirmation process in practice and the goals of the drafters.\textsuperscript{482} However, the Chamber’s approach is completely at odds with the low standard required at the confirmation stage\textsuperscript{483} and the fact that the Rome Statute expressly authorizes the Prosecution to rely on “summary” evidence at confirmation.\textsuperscript{484} Furthermore, even if a
prolonged confirmation process reduces the amount of preparation required at the trial stage, there will undoubtedly be issues that need to be resolved by the Chamber that will ultimately be deciding on the guilt of the accused, in particular evidentiary issues that will need to be re-litigated in light of the different standards applied at confirmation and trial, meaning the overall time savings are likely to be insignificant in terms of protecting the suspect’s right to a speedy trial and judicial efficiency. A prolonged confirmation stage would be even more problematic for suspects whose cases are ultimately not confirmed, as it will mean such suspects will be deprived of liberty for a substantial period of time before a determination is made that the charges against them were “wholly unfounded.”

2. A Fundamental Scaling Back of the Confirmation Process Is In Order

The other option for a fundamental change in the confirmation process is to significantly scale back the proceedings in a way that realigns the confirmation process with the intent of the drafters and leaves “the trial preparations in the hands of the Chamber that is responsible for the trial.” Specifically, we recommend requiring that the confirmation process be conducted solely on the basis of written submissions and that it be completed within ninety days of a suspect’s first appearance before the Court, absent exceptional circumstances. This could be achieved through a series of amendments to the ICC’s

---

485 See supra n. 190 and accompanying text (explaining that the ICC Appeals Chamber overturned the Bemba Trial Chamber’s decision to prima facie admit all evidence that was used at confirmation for purposes of trial in light of the fact that different standards apply at the two stages).

486 As noted above, the Pre-Trial Chambers have stated that the purpose of confirmation is to protect suspects from “wrongful and wholly unfounded charges.” See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/06-803, ¶ 37 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 January 2007); The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, ¶ 63 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 30 Sept 2008).


488 The ninety-day time frame may also need to be extended in the event that the Pre-Trial Chamber grants one or both parties leave to appeal its decision on whether to confirm the charges. However, as discussed in Section III above, such leave is rarely granted. For further discussion on this issue, see infra n. 530 et seq. and accompanying text.
Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Regulations of the Court, coupled with a basic shift in the approach of the Pre-Trial Chambers themselves regarding their role in the confirmation process.

a) Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence

Scaling back the confirmation process as recommended above will require amendments to three areas of the ICC’s Rules: one relating to the oral confirmation hearing, one setting timelines for the submission of documents from the parties, and one relating to disclosure.

First, the Rules would need to be revised to provide that the “hearing” referred to in Article 61 would be limited to a non-evidentiary, non-testimonial hearing. This would mean that, although the parties would be given a brief opportunity to present their arguments for and against confirmation and the Chamber would be able to pose clarifying questions to the parties, the Chamber would primarily base its

---

489 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence may be amended by a proposal offered by any State Party, the judges acting by an absolute majority, or the Prosecutor and must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly of States Parties to enter into force. Rome Statute, supra n. 2, Art. 51(2). Any amendment must be consistent with the Rome Statute and the Rules of Evidence and Procedure, and the Statute is authoritative on any conflict between the Rules and the Statute. Id. Arts. 51(5), 52(1).

490 The Regulations of the Court are established and amended by the judges’ absolute majority adoption. Rome Statute, supra n. 2, Art. 52(1). The Prosecutor and Registrar must be consulted regarding any elaboration or amendment to the Regulations. Id. Art. 52(2). Amendments to the Regulations take effect upon adoption unless otherwise decided by the judges. Additionally, amendments shall be circulated to States Parties for comments. If there are no objections from a majority of States Parties within six months, then the amendment shall remain in force. Id. Art. 52(3).

491 While Article 61 does not specify the nature of the “hearing” for purposes of confirmation, it should be noted that the Pre-Trial Chambers themselves have already rejected a “literal” interpretation of the term “hearing” in Article 61, which would have encompassed only “oral sessions taking place before judges.” Bemba, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 165, ¶ 32. Specifically, for purposes of interpreting the provision in Article 61(7) permitting the Chamber to “adjourn the hearing,” the Bemba Chamber held that “the word ‘hearing’ must be subject to a contextual and a teleological or effective interpretation” that would allow the Chamber to adjourn “the hearing” subsequent to “the oral sessions.” Id. ¶¶ 34-37. In reaching this conclusion, the Chamber stressed that a “teleological interpretation which is mirrored in the principle of effectiveness and based on the object and purpose of a treaty means that the provisions of the treaty are to be interpreted so as to give it its full meaning and
confirmation decision on written submissions. Importantly, limiting the oral confirmation hearing will save time and resources because, as one review has summarized, “[t]he [confirmation] hearings themselves can take days or weeks, involving opening and closing statements, the calling of evidence, and the submission of post-hearing briefs.” At the same time, as another commentator observed with regard to the confirmation hearings in the Lubanga and Katanga & Ngudjolo cases, “[t]he hearings… involved weeks of opening statements and closing arguments and discussions of evidence from the parties and participating victims, all of which generated enormous publicity but which arguably had little but symbolic value, given the non-specificity of the argumentation and the amount of evidence supporting the charges.” Thus, while proceeding primarily on written submissions to enable the system to attain its appropriate effects.” Id. ¶ 36 (internal citations and punctuation omitted). Furthermore, Rule 165 of the ICC Rules allows a Pre-Trial Chamber to do away with the oral hearing altogether for purposes of confirming cases involving alleged offenses against the administration of justice. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra n. 29, R. 165(3) (“For purposes of article 61, the Pre-Trial Chamber may make any of the determinations set forth in that article on the basis of written submissions, without a hearing, unless the interests of justice otherwise require.”). See also supra n. 391 et seq. and accompanying text (describing the Bemba, et al. confirmation proceedings, which took place entirely on the basis of written submissions). Presumably, if Rule 165 is consistent with Article 61 of the Rome Statute, a rule strictly limiting the scope of the Article 61 “hearing” would be similarly permissible.

492 Antonio Cassese & Paola Gaeta, CASSESE’S INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 369 (2013). It should be noted that, although the proceedings in the Bemba, et al. confirmation process were lengthy, despite being conducted on the basis of written submissions, the delays in the case were largely due to the fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber appointed an independent counsel to listen to the recordings of all phone calls conducted between Mr. Bemba and his counsel and then to transmit relevant information to the Prosecution for investigation, meaning that the investigation was largely conducted in the midst of the confirmation process. See supra n. 401 et seq. and accompanying text.

493 Lindsay, supra n. 455, at 188 (emphasis added). A similar argument was made by Defense counsel at the close of the Katanga & Ngudjolo confirmation hearing. See The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Confirmation of Charges Hearing Transcript, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-50, at 6-7 (16 July 2008) (“[Y]ou have made every effort, Madam President, throughout this hearing to – to remind us and the parties that this is not a trial, nor is it a mini trial, but a procedure which has as its objective the assessment of the evidence with a view to confirming or not confirming charges. We feel that your advice, daily advice, has from time to time perhaps been lost sight of in the course of this hearing... This may largely be a product, we feel and reflect, on the public nature of this hearing, but perhaps this is an issue that deserves revisiting by the States Parties. One of the problems, of course,
is likely to increase efficiency, little will be lost by forgoing public proceedings at this stage.

In lieu of oral hearings, the Chamber’s confirmation decision should be based on the Document Containing the Charges, together with supporting evidence, and a written response from the Defense. Limiting the Prosecution to presenting the DCC with supporting evidence is consistent with the notion that the confirmation process is not intended to be a “mini-trial,” which is a theme that dates back to the drafting of the Rome Statute and has been consistently espoused, at least in theory, by the Court.494 At the same time, an evaluation of the DCC with supporting evidence will permit the Pre-Trial Chamber to evaluate whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe each charge. Furthermore, allowing the Defense to file a written submission in response to the DCC will give the suspect the opportunity to exercise his or her rights under Article 61(6) of the Rome Statute to “(a) [o]bject to the charges; (b) [c]hallenge the evidence presented by the Prosecutor; and (c) [p]resent evidence.”495

In addition, where warranted and possible within the limited time frame recommended below, the Pre-Trial Chamber may permit one or more written briefs from the legal representative(s) of victims.496

The second recommended amendment to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence would entail the adoption of strict time limits governing the written submissions upon which the Pre-Trial Chamber will render its confirmation decision. Consistent with the Prosecution’s stated strategy of “being as trial-ready as possible from the earliest phases of proceedings,”497 we recommend requiring the submission of the

---

494 See supra n. 420 et seq. and accompanying text.
495 Rome Statute, supra n. 2, Art. 61(6).
496 Given the shortened time period recommended for the confirmation process, victim representatives may have insufficient time to present their views and concerns at this stage of proceedings. Importantly, however, there is no requirement in the Rome Statute that victims be granted the opportunity to participate at the confirmation phase, and it may be more efficient for the Court to postpone decisions regarding victim participation until after a decision has been made to send a case to trial.
Document Containing the Charges, including hyperlinks to the evidence relied upon in support of the charges for purposes of confirmation,\(^{498}\) within thirty days of the suspect’s first appearance. Of course, the rule could allow for an extension of this time period in exceptional circumstances, such as where the Prosecution sought an arrest warrant prior to being trial-ready in light of a unique and fleeting “arrest opportunity” or because witnesses were “only willing to cooperate after an arrest.”\(^{499}\) However, even in such circumstances, the Office of the Prosecutor has stated it will only seek a warrant or summons where “there are sufficient prospects to further collect evidence to be trial-ready within a reasonable timeframe,”\(^{500}\) suggesting any exceptional extension of time for purposes of preparing the DCC should be minimal. We would then recommend that the Defense be given thirty days to prepare a written response, which is consistent with the current framework requiring that the Defense receive the DCC thirty days prior to the hearing.\(^{501}\)

Finally, in order to ensure that these documents are submitted within the recommended time frame, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence should be amended to strictly limit pre-confirmation disclosure between the parties, which has been one of the primary causes of delay at the confirmation stage, as discussed throughout Section III of this report. Specifically, we recommend that the Rules provide that the parties disclose only that evidence upon which they directly rely in

\(^{498}\) The Prosecution adopted this approach in the Gbagbo and Blé Goudé cases, providing footnotes in the DCC that hyperlinked “to individual items of evidence, to allow the reader to navigate directly to the location of an item of evidence in the electronic record of the case.” According to the report of the Working Group on Lessons Learnt, the “judges of Pre-Trial Chamber I considered that the inclusion of hyperlinked footnotes in the DCC… was extremely useful in reaching the determination with respect to the charges.” Report of the Bureau on Study Group on Governance, Appendix II: Report of the Working Group on Lessons Learnt to the Study Group on Governance Cluster I: Expediting the Criminal Process Progress Report on Cluster B: “Pre-Trial and Trial Relationship and Common Issues,” supra n. 475, ¶ 24.


\(^{500}\) Id. at 15-16.

\(^{501}\) ICC Rules, supra n. 29, R. 121(3) (“The Prosecutor shall provide to the Pre-Trial Chamber and the person, no later than 30 days before the date of the confirmation hearing, a detailed description of the charges together with a list of the evidence which he or she intends to present at the hearing.”). To the extent victims are granted the opportunity to file written submissions, these should be required prior to the Defense’s submission.
their written submissions (i.e., the Document Containing the Charges and response thereto) and postpone the disclosure of exculpatory evidence until after confirmation. Further, the amended Rules should eliminate the availability of redactions to evidence at the pre-confirmation stage, thereby leaving it to the Prosecution to disclose summaries of evidence containing sensitive information, as expressly contemplated under Article 61(5) of the Rome Statute. Such changes would save substantial time and resources, as they will result in a significant decrease in the number of documents disclosed, circumventing delays related to missed disclosure deadlines, time-consuming translations and redactions of disclosed documents, and the

502 The Defense will also be entitled to the evidence relied upon by the Prosecution in support of the warrant of arrest or summons to appear so that it may challenge the validity of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision under Article 58, as well as any documents necessary for an application for interim release and/or to challenge the jurisdiction or admissibility of the case. See The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision on the Defence Request for Disclosure, ICC-01/04-01/10-47, ¶¶ 17-18 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 27 January 2011) (ordering the disclosure of information necessary for purposes of an admissibility or jurisdictional challenge); The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber III entitled ‘Decision on application for interim release,’ ICC-01/05-01/08-323, ¶ 32 (Appeals Chamber, 16 December 2008) (holding that “the defence must, to the largest extent possible, be granted access to documents that are essential in order effectively to challenge the lawfulness of detention, bearing in mind the circumstances of the case,” and specifically that the arrested person will “ideally” have “all such information at the time of his or her initial appearance before the Court”).

503 As described above, this was the approach during the Katanga & Ngudjolo confirmation proceedings, in which the Single Judge declared that she would reject any requests for redactions from the Prosecution. See supra n. 128 and accompanying text. However, no subsequent Pre-Trial Chamber adopted this approach, suggesting that it should be mandated by the ICC’s Rules.

504 As explained above, recent Chambers have required that the Prosecution disclose all potentially exculpatory evidence prior to confirmation, as well as all evidence upon which the Prosecution intends to rely at the hearing. This has resulted in massive amounts of documents disclosed for purposes of what is emphatically not a “mini-trial.” See, e.g., Muthaura, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 33, ¶ 10 (noting that some 14,640 pages of evidence were disclosed by the Prosecution for the purposes of the decision whether to confirm the charges); Ruto, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, supra n. 33, ¶ 10 (explaining that, over the course of the period leading up to the confirmation hearing, “several thousand pages” of evidence was disclosed and communicated to the Chamber).
need to allow the Defense time to review many thousands of pages of documents in advance of the hearing.

Although it may seem detrimental to the Defense to delay the disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence until after charges have been confirmed, there is a strong argument to be made that the right to such evidence does not attach until post-confirmation, as the right to exculpatory evidence is found under Article 67, which is entitled “rights of the accused.”\(^505\) By contrast, Article 61 refers strictly to “the person” or “the person charged”\(^506\) until sub-paragraph (9), which states: “[a]fter the charges are confirmed and before the trial has begun, the Prosecutor may, with the permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber and after notice to the accused, amend the charges.”\(^507\) Indeed, during the *Lubanga* confirmation hearing, Presiding Judge Claude Jorda reprimanded the Registry for referring to Mr. Lubanga as “the accused” in an ICC newsletter and ordered the Registrar to “draft an explanatory note as soon as possible to inform the public that the

\(^{505}\) Rome Statute, *supra* n. 2, Art. 67 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the very description of exculpatory evidence used in Article 67(2) seems to presume charges have been confirmed, as it refers to “evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession or control which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused…” *Id.* Art. 67(2) (emphasis added).

\(^{506}\) See, e.g., *id.* Art. 61(1) (“[W]ithin a reasonable time after the person’s surrender or voluntary appearance before the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall hold a hearing to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial. The hearing shall be held in the presence of the Prosecutor and the person charged, as well as his or her counsel.”) (emphasis added); *id.* Art. 61(3) (“Within a reasonable time before the hearing, the person shall: (a) Be provided with a copy of the document containing the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to bring the person to trial…”) (emphasis added); *id.* Art. 61(4) (“Before the hearing, the Prosecutor may continue the investigation and may amend or withdraw any charges. The person shall be given reasonable notice before the hearing of any amendment to or withdrawal of charges…”) (emphasis added).

\(^{507}\) *See id.* Art. 61(9) (emphasis added). *See also* Jo Stigen, *The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity* 155 (2008) (explaining that “most national penal systems (at least those of common and civil law) use the two terms ‘suspect’ and ‘accused’, referring to two different stages of the proceedings” and noting that “[i]n these systems, the person’s rights become more substantial as his or her status change from a suspect to an accused”) (emphasis in original).
status of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is... a suspect, not an accused person.”

In any event, Article 67(2) requires only that exculpatory material be shared with the Defense “as soon as practicable,” and a rapid confirmation process may actually ensure that the Defense start receiving such evidence earlier than it has in many of the cases to date. For instance, as already mentioned, the Defense in the Abu Garda case did not receive a “single item of disclosure,” incriminating or exonerating, until more than three months after the initial appearance of the suspect. The Defense teams in the Banda & Jerbo, Kenyatta, et al., and Gbagbo cases similarly had to wait more than three months to receive potentially exculpatory evidence, whereas Mssrs. Katanga and Mbarushimana each had to wait more than four months after his initial appearance to receive such evidence. Indeed, other than Mr. Lubanga, the only suspects that have received potentially exonerating evidence within less than two months of their initial appearances have been Mssrs. Ngudjolo, Arido, and Blé Goudé, each of whom made his appearance well after another suspect who was already or would eventually be joined in the same case.

Figure Four summarizes the amount of time between each suspect’s initial appearance and the first disclosure of exonerating evidence, based on the publicly available court records.

---

508 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Open Session Hearing, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-32-EN, at 36: 15-22 (Transcript, 10 November 2006).
509 Rome Statute, supra n. 2, Art. 67(2).
510 See supra n. 456 et seq. and accompanying text.
511 See Annex Four.
512 Id.
513 Id. It is also worth noting that, even in those cases in which the Pre-Trial Chamber ordered the Prosecution to disclose all exculpatory evidence prior to confirmation, such as the Ruto, et al. case, the Prosecution continues to make disclosures of such information well after confirmation. See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Ruto Defence Request for the Appointment of a Disclosure Officer and/or the Imposition of Other Remedies for Disclosure Breaches of 9 January 2015 (ICC-01/09-01/11-1774-Conf), ICC-01/09-01/11-1774-Red (Trial Chamber V(a), 16 February 2016).
FIGURE FOUR: Suspect’s Wait Time for Potentially Exculpatory Evidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Time Between Suspect’s First Appearance and First Disclosure of Potentially Exculpatory Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lubanga</td>
<td>&lt; 1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga &amp; Ngudjolo</td>
<td>&gt; 4 months&lt;br&gt; &gt; 1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemba</td>
<td>&gt; 2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Garda</td>
<td>&gt; 3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banda &amp; Jerbo</td>
<td>&gt; 3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbarushimana</td>
<td>&gt; 4 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruto, et al.</td>
<td>&gt; 2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyatta, et al.</td>
<td>&gt; 3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntaganda</td>
<td>&gt; 2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gbagbo</td>
<td>&gt; 3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemba, et al.</td>
<td>Between &gt; 3 months and &lt; 1 month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blé Goudé</td>
<td>1 month</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is also worth noting that no case to date has failed to pass the confirmation stage due to one or more pieces of *exculpatory* evidence. Rather, each case that has been dismissed at the confirmation stage has

---

514 For the dates of each suspect’s first appearance before the ICC and the first disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence to that suspect, together with relevant citations, *see* Annex Four.
failed due to the insufficiency of *inculpatory* evidence presented by the Prosecution.\(^{515}\)

Lastly, even under the recommended scenario, persons charged with crimes by the ICC will remain in a better position than suspects at other international criminal bodies, as they will have the opportunity very early in the process to put forward evidence gathered through their own investigations which may exonerate them. Thus, a suspect subjected to truly “unfounded”\(^{516}\) charges – such as one with an unimpeachable alibi or one who has been the victim of mistaken identity\(^{517}\) – has a built-in procedural opportunity to establish his or her innocence at the outset. Furthermore, as recently established by the decision of the *Ruto & Sang* Trial Chamber, an individual who is committed to trial will also have the opportunity to contest the Prosecution’s case during the trial pursuant to a “no case to answer” motion, which may be filed following the close of the Prosecution’s evidence.\(^{518}\)

**b) Amendments to the Regulations of the Court**

As discussed above, the Regulations of the Court currently require that the Pre-Trial Chamber issue its decision whether to confirm charges against a suspect within sixty days “from the date the confirmation hearing ends.”\(^{519}\) We recommend that this regulation be amended to require a decision within thirty days of the Defense’s written submission responding to the Document Containing the Charges.

---

\(^{515}\) See supra Sections III.E, III.G, III.H, III.I.

\(^{516}\) See supra n. 486 *et seq.* and accompanying text.

\(^{517}\) This in fact happened in one case before the ICTY. Specifically, in the *Limaj, et al.* case, an arrested individual named Agim Murtezi claimed at his initial appearance that he was not the individual named in the indictment. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Press Release, *Statement on behalf of Agim Murtezi*, P.I.S/733e (25 February 2003), http://www.icty.org/sid/8295. In that case, the Prosecution moved quickly to withdraw the indictment against Mr. Murtezi and the individual was released. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Press Release, *The Prosecutor v. Limaj et al.: Agim Murtezi Released Following the Withdrawal of the Indictment Against Him*, CC/ P.I.S./ 736 (28 February 2003), http://www.icty.org/sid/8288. In the event that a similar situation occurred at the ICC and the Prosecution was for some reason not willing to act on its own to secure the release of the wrongly accused individual, that person could present evidence establishing the wrongful arrest during the confirmation process.

\(^{518}\) See supra n. 286 *et seq.* and accompanying text.

\(^{519}\) ICC Regulations of the Court, *supra* n. 81, Reg. 53.
Although this represents a substantial reduction in the time afforded to the judges to write a decision, the Chambers will be in a position to deliver more timely decisions because they will be limited to reviewing only that evidence directly relied upon by the parties in their written submissions. Importantly, this limited review of evidence, which stands in stark contrast to the approach taken by some Chambers to date,\(^{520}\) is consistent with the process envisioned by the drafters of the provisions governing the confirmation process.\(^{521}\) Indeed, one of the lawyers intimately involved in the Rome Statute negotiations, David Scheffer, has observed that the Pre-Trial Chamber “should have access only to those documents that are required to satisfy the threshold requirement of providing sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds,” stressing that the Pre-Trial Chamber “was never intended to be the trial chamber, where all relevant evidence is examined.”\(^{522}\)

Furthermore, Pre-Trial Chambers will be able to work within the thirty-day time limit by writing shorter decisions dedicated solely to establishing whether the charges are “wholly unfounded.”\(^{523}\) This is important because, although the Chambers often stress at the outset of their confirmation decisions that the Article 61 standard is low,\(^{524}\) the extensive review of evidence and elaborate decisions produced by

\(^{520}\) See, e.g., supra n. 171 et seq. and accompanying text (explaining that the Bemba Pre-Trial Chamber required extensive pre-confirmation disclosure between the parties and that all evidence disclosed by shared with the Chamber to assist in its determination of “the truth”); supra n. 361 et seq. and accompanying text (explaining that the Gbagbo Pre-Trial Chamber adjourned the confirmation proceedings to request that the Prosecution supplement the evidence it submitted in support of the charges, insisting that the Prosecution present its “strongest possible case,” as opposed to simply sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe the charges).

\(^{521}\) See supra n. 27 et seq. and accompanying text (explaining that a proposal that would have mandated that all disclosure be complete by confirmation was rejected by the drafters of the ICC’s Rules based on the view that “it is unnecessary for the Pre-Trial Chamber to undertake the more detailed disclosure exercise that will be necessary before the trial,” as “such a process is likely to be time-consuming and may delay the straightforward task of determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support the prosecution charges”).


\(^{523}\) See supra n. 486 et seq. and accompanying text.

\(^{524}\) See, e.g., Lubanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 33, ¶ 37; Katanga & Ngudjolo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 35, ¶ 63.
these Chambers suggest otherwise.\textsuperscript{525} Again, the practice to date is inconsistent with the intentions of the drafters. As Scheffer explains:

\begin{quote}
[The] negotiators… in Rome did not seek a [Pre-Trial Chamber] that itself would become the investigatory engine of the Court. That would have… tilted the ICC too far in the direction of the type of civil law court that relies heavily on the role of an investigating judge and minimizes the [P]rosecutor’s functions. The balance was critical; the Prosecutor has to meet evidentiary standards and thresholds for warrants of arrest and indictments while the [Pre-Trial Chamber] stands as the reasoned gatekeeper, ensuring that the Prosecutor is not a zealot, that he or she proves reasonable or substantial grounds based on the evidence (depending on what is being sought), and that he or she stands on solid legal reasoning before the gate is opened by the [Pre-Trial Chamber] judges…. The [Pre-Trial Chamber] has a limited but vital purpose that demands professional due diligence by the Prosecutor…. The best-case scenario would have the Prosecutor using his or her discretion cautiously and responsibly and within the parameters set by the [Pre-Trial Chamber], which itself acts within its statutory boundaries.\textsuperscript{526}
\end{quote}

In sum, the role of the Pre-Trial Chambers is to “focus the Prosecutor on the requirement of minimal evidence to meet the sufficiency standard for the remaining charges.”\textsuperscript{527} If this role is in fact adopted by the Pre-Trial Chambers, issuing a decision within thirty days will not be problematic. At the same time, shorter confirmation decisions are more likely to make clear exactly which facts and circumstances have

\textsuperscript{525} See, e.g., Cassese & Gaeta, supra n. 492, at 369 (“The thorough review of evidence reflected in the confirmation decisions demonstrate… that the ‘substantial grounds to believe’ standard is anything but a trifle.”); Safferling, supra n. 424, at 337-38 (“Does [the confirmation hearing] consist of a ‘mini-trial,’ with a full in-depth evaluation of the evidence? The Pre-Trial Chambers have acted as though this was indeed intended… The in-depth analysis of the evidence carried out by the Pre-Trial Chambers… equals that of a Trial Chamber’s judgment concerning the guilt of the accused.”).

\textsuperscript{526} Scheffer, supra n. 24, at 153 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{527} Id. at 155.
been confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber,\(^{528}\) while minimizing the risk of inappropriately influencing the Trial Chamber ultimately charged with determining the guilt of the accused.\(^{529}\) Finally, if the Pre-Trial Chambers truly apply the minimal standard they often espouse in theory, the parties could adjust their own approach to the confirmation process, rather than using the confirmation stage as a means of testing the cases they plan to litigate at trial.

In addition to shortening the time within which the Pre-Trial Chamber must issue its decision under Article 61(7), we recommend that a new regulation be adopted setting time limits in the event that one or both parties seek leave to appeal the decision. Specifically, limits should be established regarding the amount of time within which the Pre-Trial Chamber must respond to any requests for leave to appeal\(^{530}\) and, in the event leave is granted, the timing for the parties to submit briefs to the Appeals Chamber and the issuance of a decision by that chamber. Ideally, the process could be complete within a brief period of time,\(^{531}\)

\(^{528}\) *See supra* n. 474 and accompanying text (explaining that one of the recommendations of the independent panel of experts regarding the confirmation process was that the Pre-Trial Chambers make “clear what material facts have been confirmed and what they consist of exactly”).

\(^{529}\) *See, e.g.*, Saferling, *supra* n. 424, at 337 (“Neither the Statute nor the Rules oblige the Pre-Trial Chamber to give a reasoned decision when confirming the charges, much less a decision of more than one hundred pages… Such extensive reasoning could… negatively influence the perception of the trial judges.”); Gauthier de Beco, *The Confirmation of Charges before the International Criminal Court: Evaluation and First Application*, 7 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 469, 476 (2007) (“It can even be said that Pre-Trial Chamber I by examining the history of the war in Ituri as well as numerous official reports and witness statements, as can be seen from its Decision to confirm the charges, largely exceeded the threshold required to confirm the charges brought by the Prosecutor. As a result, it somewhat contributed to the feeling that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is already guilty. Doing so might have undermined his right to the presumption of innocence protected by Article 66(1).”).

\(^{530}\) As discussed in Section III of this report, and highlighted in the War Crimes Research Office’s report entitled *Expediting Proceedings at the International Criminal Court*, the Pre-Trial Chambers have regularly taken months to simply respond to a request from a party for leave to appeal an Article 61(7) decision. *See* War Crimes Research Office, *Expediting Proceedings at the International Criminal Court*, at 47 (June 2011), https://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/1106report.pdf.

\(^{531}\) In the *Mbarushimana* case, an Appeals Chamber decision upholding the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision declining to confirm any charges was issued two months after leave to appeal was granted. *See supra* n. 262 *et seq.* and accompanying text. While this was a relatively rapid time-frame for an Appeals Chamber judgment in the larger
although allowance may need to be made in the event other issues are pending before the Appeals Chamber at the time of the confirmation appeal.

context of the ICC, the summary confirmation process recommended elsewhere in this report should also lead to a quicker process in the event of an appeal.
V. CONCLUSION

As extensively documented in this report, the confirmation process as it has been practiced at the ICC to date has failed to conform with either the nature or the goals of the process as envisioned by the Rome Statute’s drafters. While minor tweaks to the system have been recommended, it is clear that fundamental changes are required. At the same time, there is no justification for expanding the process, which is the approach that the Pre-Trial Chambers increasingly appear to be adopting. We therefore recommend significantly scaling back the confirmation process by requiring that it be conducted largely on the basis of written submissions and that it be completed within ninety days of a suspect’s first appearance before the Court, absent exceptional circumstances. This could be achieved through a series of amendments to the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Regulations of the Court, coupled with a basic shift in the approach of the Pre-Trial Chambers themselves regarding their role in the confirmation process. These changes will ensure that a decision by the Pre-Trial Chamber on whether to confirm charges is issued promptly after a suspect’s initial appearance and, in the event charges are confirmed, that trial preparations may begin before the Trial Chamber in a timely manner.
ANNEX ONE: Dates Relevant to the Confirmation of Charges Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>First Appearance</th>
<th>Confirmation Decision</th>
<th>Constitution of Trial Chamber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Lubanga</em></td>
<td>20 March 2006&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>29 January 2007&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6 March 2007&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Katanga &amp; Ngudjolo</em></td>
<td>22 October 2007&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt; 11 February 2008&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>30 September 2008&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24 October 2008&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bemba</em></td>
<td>4 July 2008&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>15 June 2009&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18 September 2009&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Abu Garda</em></td>
<td>18 May 2009&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>8 February 2010&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Banda &amp; Jerbo</em></td>
<td>17 June 2010&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>7 March 2011&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>16 March 2011&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mbarushimana</em></td>
<td>28 January 2011&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>16 December 2011&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ruto, et al.</em></td>
<td>7 April 2011&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>23 January 2012&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>29 March 2012&lt;sup&gt;20&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Kenyatta, et al.</em></td>
<td>8 April 2011&lt;sup&gt;21&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>23 January 2012&lt;sup&gt;22&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>29 March 2012&lt;sup&gt;23&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ntaganda</em></td>
<td>26 March 2013&lt;sup&gt;24&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9 June 2014&lt;sup&gt;25&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>18 July 2014&lt;sup&gt;26&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Gbagbo</em></td>
<td>5 December 2011&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>12 June 2014&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>17 September 2014&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bemba, Kilolo, Babala</em></td>
<td>27 November 2013&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>11 November 2014&lt;sup&gt;31&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>30 January 2015&lt;sup&gt;32&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mangenda</em></td>
<td>5 December 2013&lt;sup&gt;33&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>11 November 2014&lt;sup&gt;34&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>30 January 2015&lt;sup&gt;35&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Arido</em></td>
<td>20 March 2014&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>11 November 2014&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>30 January 2015&lt;sup&gt;38&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Blé Goudé</em></td>
<td>27 March 2014&lt;sup&gt;39&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>11 December 2014&lt;sup&gt;40&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>20 December 2014&lt;sup&gt;41&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

<sup>1</sup> *The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Order Scheduling the First Appearance of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-38 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 17 March 2006).

<sup>2</sup> See generally *The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/06-803 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 January 2007).
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Constituting Trial Chamber I and Referring to It the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01-06-842 (Presidency, 6 March 2007).


The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision of the Joinder of the Cases Against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01-07-257, at 3 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10 March 2008) (discussing Ngudjolo’s first appearance).

See generally The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01-07-717, ICC-01/04-01-07-611 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 1 October 2008).

The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision Constituting Trial Chamber II and referring to it the case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01-07-729 (Presidency, 24 October 2008).

The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01-08-424, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15 June 2009).

See generally id.

The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Constituting Trial Chamber III and referring to it the Case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Presidency, 18 September 2009).


See generally id.


See generally id.


The Prosecutor v. Ruto, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012).

The Prosecutor v. Ruto, et al, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, ¶ 14 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012).

The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision
Constituting Trial Chamber V and Referring to it the Case of The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, ICC-01/09-01/11-406 (Presidency, 29 March 2012).

The Prosecutor v. Muthaura, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012).

The Prosecutor v. Muthaura, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, ¶ 428 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012).


The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, ¶ 2 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 9 June 2014).

The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, ¶ 97 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 9 June 2014).

The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Constituting Trial Chamber VI and Referring to it the Case of The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-337 (Presidency, 18 July 2014).

The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Against Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01-11-656-Red, ¶ 266 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 June 2014).

The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Against Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01-11-656-Red (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 June 2014).

The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Decision re-constituting Trial Chamber I and referring to it the case of The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01-11-682 (Presidency, 17 September 2014).

The Prosecutor v. Bemba, et al., Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01-05-01-13-749, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 November 2014).

The Prosecutor v. Bemba, et al., Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01-05-01-13-749 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 November 2014).


The Prosecutor v. Bemba, et al., Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01-05-01-13-805, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 November 2014).

The Prosecutor v. Bemba, et al., Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01-05-01-13-749 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 November 2014).

36 *The Prosecutor v. Bemba, et al.*, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/05-01/13-749, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 November 2014).

37 *The Prosecutor v. Bemba, et al.*, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/05-01/13-749 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 November 2014).


ANNEX TWO: Dates Relevant to the Post-Confirmation, Pre-Trial Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Constitution of Trial Chamber</th>
<th>First Day of Trial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lubanga</td>
<td>6 March 2007&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>26 January 2009&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga &amp; Ngudjolo</td>
<td>24 October 2008&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24 November 2009&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemba</td>
<td>18 September 2009&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>22 November 2010&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruto, et al.</td>
<td>29 March 2012&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10 September 2013&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntaganda</td>
<td>18 July 2014&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2 September 2015&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup> *The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Decision Constituting Trial Chamber I and Referring to It the Case of *The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, ICC-01-04-01-06-842 (Presidency, 6 March 2007).
<sup>2</sup> *The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01-04-01-06-2842, ¶ 10 (Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012).


ANNEX THREE: Dates Relevant to the Entire Pre-Trial Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>First Appearance</th>
<th>First Day of Trial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lubanga</td>
<td>20 March 2006¹</td>
<td>26 January 2009²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga &amp; Ngudjolo</td>
<td>22 October 2007³</td>
<td>24 November 2009⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11 February 2008⁴</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemba</td>
<td>4 July 2008⁶</td>
<td>22 November 2010⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruto, et al.</td>
<td>7 April 2011⁸</td>
<td>10 September 2013⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntaganda</td>
<td>26 March 2013¹⁰</td>
<td>2 September 2015¹¹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ *The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Order Scheduling the First Appearance of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-38 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 17 March 2006).
² *The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, ¶ 10 (Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012).
⁵ *The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui*, Decision Postponing the Date of the Commencement of the Trial (Rule 132(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), ICC-01/04-01/07-1442-tENG, ¶ 1 (Trial Chamber II, 31 August 2009).
⁶ *The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo*, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15 June 2009).
⁸ *The Prosecutor v. Ruto, et al.*, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012).
10 *The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda*, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, ¶ 2 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 9 June 2014).

ANNEX FOUR: Dates Relevant to the Suspect’s Wait Time for Potentially Exculpatory Evidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>First Appearance</th>
<th>First Disclosure of Potentially Exculpatory Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lubanga</td>
<td>20 March 2006&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>31 March 2006&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga &amp; Ngudjolo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katanga</td>
<td>22 October 2007&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>28 February 2008&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ngudjolo</td>
<td>11 February 2008&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>19 March 2008&lt;sup&gt;6&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemba</td>
<td>4 July 2008&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1 October 2008&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Garda</td>
<td>18 May 2009&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24 August 2009&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banda &amp; Jerbo</td>
<td>17 June 2010&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>22 October 2010&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbarushimana</td>
<td>28 January 2011&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>14 June 2011&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruto, et al.</td>
<td>7 April 2011&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>28 June 2011&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyatta, et al.</td>
<td>8 April 2011&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>19 July 2011&lt;sup&gt;18&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ntaganda</td>
<td>26 March 2013&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>27 May 2013&lt;sup&gt;20&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gbagbo</td>
<td>5 December 2011&lt;sup&gt;21&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3 April 2012&lt;sup&gt;22&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemba, et al.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bemba, Kilolo, Babala</td>
<td>27 November 2013&lt;sup&gt;23&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>28 February 2014&lt;sup&gt;24&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangenda</td>
<td>5 December 2013&lt;sup&gt;25&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>28 February 2014&lt;sup&gt;26&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arido</td>
<td>20 March 2014&lt;sup&gt;27&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24 March 2014&lt;sup&gt;28&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blé Goudé</td>
<td>27 March 2014&lt;sup&gt;29&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>25 April 2014&lt;sup&gt;30&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup> *The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Order Scheduling the First Appearance of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-38 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 17 March 2006).

<sup>2</sup> *The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo*, Filing of Incriminating Evidence and Potentially Exculpatory Evidence, ICC-01/04-01/06-64, ¶4 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 3 April 2006).
3 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Decision Scheduling the First Appearance of Germain Katanga and Authorizing Photographs at Hearing of 22 October 2007, ICC-01/04-01/07-26, at 3 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 18 October 2007).


5 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision of the Joinder of the Cases Against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-257, at 3 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10 March 2008) (discussing Ngudjolo’s first appearance).


7 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15 June 2009).

8 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Prosecution’s Communication of Potentially Exonerating Evidence Disclosed to the Defence on 1 October 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-133 (Pre-Trial Chamber III, 1 October 2008).


12 The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Prosecution’s Communication of Incriminating and Potentially Exculpatory Evidence Disclosed to the Defence on 12 and 22 October and 5 November 2010, ICC-02/05-03/09-94 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 9 November 2010).


14 The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Prosecution’s First Communication of a Disclosure Note, ICC-01/04-01/10-233 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, 14 June 2011).

15 The Prosecutor v. Ruto, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012).


17 The Prosecutor v. Muthaura, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 23 January 2012).

18 The Prosecutor v. Muthaura, et al., Prosecution’s First Communication to the Defence of Redacted Incriminating Evidence Pursuant to Article 61(3)(b),
Potentially Exculpatory Evidence Pursuant to Article 67(2) and Material Subject to Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 77, ICC-01/09-02/11-179-Conf (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 19 July 2011).

19 *The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda*, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-309, ¶ 2 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 9 June 2014).

20 *The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda*, Prosecution’s communication of the disclosure of evidence, ICC-01/04-02/06-68, ¶ 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 28 May 2013).


23 *The Prosecutor v. Bemba, et al.*, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/05-01/13-749, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 November 2014).


25 *The Prosecutor v. Bemba, et al.*, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/05-01/13-749, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 November 2014).


27 *The Prosecutor v. Bemba, et al.*, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, ICC-01/05-01/13-749, ¶ 4 (Pre-Trial Chamber II, 11 November 2014).


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Susana SáCouto, War Crimes Research Office (WCRO) Director, and Katherine Cleary Thompson, WCRO Assistant Director, prepared this report. The WCRO also received research assistance from Washington College of Law (WCL) J.D. students Thomas Martal, Robert Carter Paréx, and Richard Varries, as well as additional assistance from WCL J.D. students Alexandra Brown, Alanna Kennedy, M. Braxton Marcela, Kendall Niles, Doran Shemin, and Calvine Tiengwe and WCRO Staff Assistant Matthew Bowers. We are grateful for the generous support of the Open Society Foundations, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, and the WCL, without which this report would not have been possible. We also wish to thank all those who gave generously of their time to this project, including Robert Goldman, Commissioner and Member of the Executive Committee of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and WCL Professor, and the members of the WCRO's ICC Advisory Committee: Unity Dow, Commissioner of the ICJ, Member of the ICJ's Executive Committee, and former Judge of the Botswana High Court; Siri Frigaard, Chief Public Prosecutor for the Norwegian National Authority for Prosecution of Organized and Other Serious Crimes and former Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes in East Timor; Justice Richard Goldstone, former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR); Chief Justice Phillip Rupaza of the Massachusetts Appeals Court and Reserve Judge of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) Supreme Court Chamber and former Chief International Judge serving as Coordinator of the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor; and Juan Mendez, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment and former Special Advisor on Prevention to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

ABOUT THE WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE

The core mandate of the WCRO is to promote the development and enforcement of international criminal and humanitarian law, primarily through the provision of specialized legal assistance to international criminal courts and tribunals. The Office was established by the Washington College of Law in 1995 in response to a request for assistance from the Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, established by the United Nations Security Council in 1993 and 1994 respectively. Since then, several new internationalized or “hybrid” war crimes tribunals have been established under the auspices or with the support of the United Nations, each raising novel legal issues. This, in turn, has generated growing demands for the expert assistance of the WCRO. As a result, in addition to the ICTY and ICTR, the WCRO has provided in-depth research support to the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East Timor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. It has also provided similar assistance to mechanisms and institutions involved in accountability efforts for serious international crimes at the domestic level, including the War Crimes Section of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Argentina's Assistance Unit for Cases of Human Rights Violations Committed under State Terrorism, Peru's Instituto de Defensa Legal (dedicated to representing victims in serious crimes cases before Peru's National Criminal Court), and the U.S. Department of State's Office of Global Criminal Justice.

The WCRO has also conducted legal research projects on behalf of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, in view of how significant the impact of the Court's early decisions are likely to be on the ICC's future and in recognition of the urgent need for analytical critique at early stages of the Court's development, in 2007 the WCRO launched a new initiative, the ICC Legal Analysis and Education Project, aimed at producing public, impartial, legal analyses of critical issues raised by the Court's early decisions. With this initiative, the WCRO took on a new role in relation to the ICC. While past projects were carried out in support of the OTP, the WCRO is committed to analyzing and commenting on the ICC's early activities in an impartial and independent manner. In order to avoid any conflict of interest, the WCRO did not engage in legal research for any organ of the ICC while producing this report, nor will the WCRO conduct research for any organ of the ICC prior to the conclusion of the ICC Legal Analysis and Education Project. Additionally, in order to ensure the objectivity of its analyses, the WCRO created an Advisory Committee comprised of the experts in international criminal and humanitarian law named in the acknowledgments above.

ORDERING INFORMATION

All our reports are available in PDF online at:

Inquiries about obtaining print copies of reports may be sent to:
War Crimes Research Office
Washington College of Law
4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016

Tel.: 202 274-4067
Fax: 202 274-4458

E-mail: warcrimes@wcl.american.edu
Website: www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes
Article 61 of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) creates a process unique among international criminal bodies: the confirmation of charges process. Specifically, the article provides that, prior to committing a suspect to trial before the Court, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC shall hold a hearing to assess whether the Prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the suspect bears responsibility for the charged crime or crimes. In theory, the confirmation process is intended to achieve several goals, including ensuring prosecutorial fairness and efficiency, protecting the rights of the suspect, and promoting judicial economy. However, as evidenced in the review in this report of the twelve confirmation hearings held at the ICC to date, in practice, the process has fallen far short of achieving these goals.

Given the disconnect between the intended goals of the confirmation process and the way the process has played out in practice, it is clear that changes to the system are in order. While some attempts have been made both from within and outside of the Court to improve the Article 61 process in recent years, these initiatives have either been too minor in scope or have tended towards an expansion of the confirmation process, which would likely exacerbate several of the problems identified in this report. We therefore recommend a fundamental change in the approach to the confirmation process by significantly scaling back the proceedings in a way that realigns the confirmation process with the intent of the Rome Statute’s drafters. Specifically, we recommend requiring that the confirmation process be conducted primarily on the basis of written submissions and that it be completed within ninety days of a suspect’s first appearance before the Court, absent exceptional circumstances. As detailed in the report, this could be achieved through a series of amendments to the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Regulations of the Court, coupled with a basic shift in the approach of the Pre-Trial Chambers regarding their role in the confirmation process.