Chinese Technology Platforms Operating in the United States

In the fall of 2020, the Trump administration issued dual executive orders designed to effectively ban TikTok and WeChat from operating in the United States, at least in their current forms. In January 2021 it did the same with respect to Alipay and seven other Chinese-owned apps. These actions came against the background of years of executive orders and rules aimed at limiting the reach of China-based technology ?rms. Each of these actions was based, in significant part, on assertions of national security. Going forward, the US government has an urgent need for smart policies and practices to respond to China’s growing tech sector and the spread of China-controlled platforms. The Biden administration will have to decide what to do about TikTok and WeChat. It also will need to develop a broader US strategy for addressing the range of security risks (e.g., economic, national security, cybersecurity) and threats to civil liberties posed by the spread of China-developed and -controlled technologies. This report seeks to contribute to these efforts by suggesting a comprehensive framework for understanding and assessing the risks posed by Chinese technology platforms in the United States. It is the product of a working group convened by the Tech, Law & Security Program at American University Washington College of Law and the National Security, Technology, and Law Working Group at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. The signatories to this report come to this issue with different perspectives and different backgrounds. But we share a common view

This report seeks to contribute to these efforts by suggesting a comprehensive framework for understanding and assessing the risks posed by Chinese technology platforms in the United States. It is the product of a working group convened by the Tech, Law & Security Program at American University Washington College of Law and the National Security, Technology, and Law Working Group at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. The signatories to this report come to this issue with different perspectives and different backgrounds. But we share a common view—one reflected innumerous reports and publicly available threat assessments—that China’s power is growing, that a large part of that power is in the digital sphere, and that China can and will wield that power in ways that adversely affect our national security. And we assess that it will do so in novel ways that implicate numerous interests not traditionally associated with national security, such as data privacy, freedom of speech, and economic competitiveness.

The report is a joint-product by a group of people with diverse backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives on these matters: Jennifer Daskal, Gary CornJack GoldsmithChris Inglis, Paul Rosenzweig, Samm Sacks, Bruce Schneier, Alex Stamos, and Vince Stewart.

Lawfare Summary here.

Full Report here.

In partnership with:

National Security, Technology, and Law Working Group
 
 
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