Rakas v.
439
After receiving a robbery report, police stopped the
suspected getaway car.� The owner of the
car was driving and the defendants were passengers.� The police searched the car, and found a box
of rifle shells in the glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under the front
passenger seat.� The defendants were
arrested for the robbery and were convicted of armed robbery at a trial in
which the rifle and shells were admitted as evidence.�� Before trial, defendants moved to suppress
the rifle and shells on Fourth Amendment grounds, but the trial court denied
the motion and the appeals court agreed on the ground that petitioners did not
own either the car or the rifle and shells.
Occupants made no showing that they had any
legitimate expectation of privacy in glove compartment or area under the seat
of the vehicle where seized items were found.�
Therefore, they were not entitled to suppression of seized items in
their subsequent robbery prosecution.
The defendant was convicted of placing bets over the
telephone in violation of a federal statute. At trial, the Government was
permitted, over the defendant 's objection, to introduce evidence of the
defendant's end of telephone conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had
attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the
public telephone booth from which he had placed his calls.� In affirming his conviction, the Court of
Appeals rejected the contention that the recordings had been obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, because there was no physical entrance into
the area occupied by the defendant.
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.� What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.� But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.� Therefore, the government's
listening to and recording defendant's words spoken into telephone receiver in
public telephone booth violated the privacy upon which defendant justifiably
relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and
seizure" within Fourth Amendment.
�������� This case addressed the question of
whether a college dorm room is a constitutionally protected area.� A college Dean and security officer gave
police officers access to students� rooms so that they could address �the drug
problem� at the University.�� While the
court acknowledged that college administration has the right to enter a student�s
room for inspection purposes (to conduct a fire safety inspection, for
instance), the Court held that college officials may not enter or admit police
with the sole purpose of gathering evidence of a crime, absent a warrant or the
student�s consent.� Because dorm rooms
are students� dwelling places, the Fifth Circuit held that a college may not
require students to waive their Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable
searches as a condition of occupancy.�
612 F.2d 19 (2nd Cir. 1979)
��������� In this case, the Second Circuit
found that the hallways, stairwell, garage, and lobby of an apartment building
are not constitutionally protected areas.�
With the permission of the building�s doorman and elevator operator,
members of the Drug Enforcement Agency had staked-out several
publicly-accessible areas of the apartment building, waiting for the Penco to
emerge from an apartment.� The court
affirmed Penco�s conviction because it found that society does not recognize a
right to privacy in the stairwell, hallways, or other public areas of an
apartment building.
746
F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1984)
������������ This case addressed the question
of whether society recognizes a legitimate expectation of privacy in the shared
basement of an apartment building.�
McGrane was convicted of conspiring to manufacture a controlled
substance after a Drug Enforcement agent observed containers of chemicals used
to manufacture the drug methaqualone in his storage locker.� The storage locker was constructed of board
slats that were spaced about two inches apart.�
Due to the spacing between the slats, the chemicals were in plain view
once the officer entered the basement.�
Because the basement was shared by all tenants of the apartment
building, the court analogized it to a public walkway or stairwell and found
that the officer�s presence in the basement was lawful.� Based on his lawful presence, the officer�s plain-view
observation of the chemicals was not a �search� that violated McGrane�s Fourth
Amendment rights.
3
F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 1993)
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������
����������� A defendant convicted of
distributing methamphetamine
appealed his conviction, asserting that he had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the hallway of his high-security apartment building.� This apartment building�s security features
included 24-hour security guards, a closed-circuit television system that enabled
residents to monitor each entrance to the building on their own TV sets, and an
elevator that enabled guests to access only their host�s floor and no other
area of the building.� The security guard
admitted Drug Enforcement Agents who proceeded to knock on Nohara�s door.� Nohara answered the door and stepped into the
hallway holding incriminating evidence.�
The court found that the evidence could be admitted since the hallway was
not a constitutionally protected area, irrespective of the building�s security
features.
543
F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976)
����������� Executing a search warrant, police
officers kicked-down a door leading from the street into the corridor where
Fluker�s apartment was located.� In
determining whether the police had the right to kick-down the door, the court
first had to answer the question of whether Fluker had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the corridor leading to his apartment. There was only one other
apartment unit on Fluker�s floor, in addition to his unit.� Only Fluker and the tenant of the other
apartment had access to the corridor.�
The door to the street was always locked.� Because the corridor was only open to those
two tenants, and not to the public, the court recognized Fluker�s expectation
of privacy in the corridor but affirmed his conviction on other grounds.
415
���������� At issue in this case is whether a
third party (such as a roommate, or friend, or spouse) may give police valid
consent to search a suspect�s dwelling.�
The Court found that such consent is valid, as long as the third party
is an apparent �joint occupant� of the premises and the suspect is not present
to object to the search.� Because the
third party in this case was a �joint occupant� with �common authority� over
the premises and voluntarily allowed the police to search the premises, the
search was permissible.
�
State v. Kellam
Court of Appeals of
269
S.E.2d 197 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
����������� A neighbor had a key to the house
in which Kellam was staying.� The
neighbor had instructions to �look after the house� and Kellam was aware of
that fact.� The neighbor gave police her
consent to enter the house.� Police found
evidence implicating Kellam of a robbery in several �common� areas of the
house, such as the linen closet and basement.�
Even though the neighbor did not actually live in the house, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals found that her possession of the key gave her the
requisite �joint access and common authority� over the premises.� Because Kellam was aware that the neighbor
had the key and could enter at any time, the court found his expectation of privacy
diminished by that fact and admitted the evidence.
403
��������� The Supreme Court found that the �plain view doctrine� did not apply to a warrantless seizure and search of the defendant�s car. The police seized and searched the defendant�s car through a warrant the court subsequently determined was invalid.� According to the �plain view doctrine,� the police may seize evidence without a warrant if the incriminating character of the evidence is immediately apparent.� The following factors are required in order to invoke the �plain view� exception to the search warrant requirement: (1) the police must be located lawfully on the premises; (2) their discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent; and (3) the illicit nature of the item must be immediately apparent to police.� The plain view doctrine did not apply to this case because the police were not lawfully located on the premises where they found the car.� The police were not lawfully located because they searched and seized the car under the authority of an invalid warrant.
In a later case, Horton v. California the
Court eliminated the �inadvertence� requirement for the lawful seizures of
illicit items left in plain-view.
496
��������� In this case, the Supreme Court removed the inadvertence requirement to the �plain view doctrine.� The police searched the defendant�s home pursuant to a warrant that authorized the police to search for and seize any stolen property from an armed robbery. In the course of the search, the police discovered the weapons used in the robbery in plain view. The police seized these weapons and used them as evidence against the defendant. The officer who found the evidence testified that while he was searching for the stolen property, he also was interested in finding other evidence connecting the accused to the crime. Although this discovery was not inadvertent, the �plain view doctrine� applied in this case because the police saw the weapons while under the authority of a valid warrant, and it was immediately apparent that the items were seizable items.
Court
of Appeals of
311
S.E.2d 895 (1984)
��������� The police went to the defendant�s home in response to an emergency call.� The police found the defendant with a gunshot wound.� The defendant told police he shot himself, and then the defendant and his wife left for the hospital.� After they left, the police investigated the defendant�s bedroom where the shooting occurred.� During this investigation, the police found marijuana in the defendant�s closet.� The court found that the �plain view doctrine� did not apply to this case because the police were not lawfully on the premises where the items were located.� The police were not lawfully located because they continued to search the defendant�s home after the defendant and his wife left.� Once the defendant and his wife left the premises, the police no longer had a legitimate reason to be on the premises.
453
��������� The police stopped defendant because he was driving erratically. Upon smelling marijuana smoke, they patted down the defendant and searched his car.� While searching the tailgate of the vehicle, the police found marijuana wrapped in green opaque plastic.� This search and seizure did not comply with the �plain view doctrine� because it was not immediately apparent, from the green plastic wrapping, that the bags contained marijuana.
460
��������� During a routine driver�s license check-point, an officer, using a flashlight, saw a green party balloon, knotted near the tip, drop from the hands of a driver of a stopped automobile to his seat.� The officer then shifted his position to obtain a better view and saw several plastic vials, quantities of loose white powder, and an open bag of party balloons in the glove compartment.� The substance in the car was later tested and proved to be heroin.� The officer�s use of a flashlight and shifting of his position complied with the �plain view doctrine.�� Use of a flashlight or shifting positions does not violate a defendant�s expectation of privacy.� Additionally, the officer was lawfully located at the check point and immediately knew, from experience, that the white powder in the car was a controlled substance, satisfying the requirement of the plain view doctrine that the incriminating nature of the substance be immediately apparent.
Supreme
Court of
194
S.E.2d 9 (1973)
��������� Police stopped the defendants� car and
asked the defendants to get out of the car.�
When the defendants stepped out of the vehicle, the police asked the
driver for his license.� The driver gave
the officer his license and stated that the registration card was in the glove
compartment of the car.� After the driver
consented to giving his registration card to the officer, the officer leaned
into the car to get the registration.� In
doing so, the officer observed open paper bags containing money, including a
roll of coins that bore the name of a recently burglarized business.� The discovery of the money was valid without
a warrant because it complied with the �plain view doctrine.� The officer saw
the money while lawfully located in the defendant�s car because the defendant
gave him permission to enter the car.�
Additionally, it was immediately apparent to the officer that the money
was contraband because it bore the name of a recently burglarized business.
Supreme
Court of
187
S.E.2d 706 (1972)
��������� While executing a valid arrest warrant, the police officer saw a marijuana seed approximately three or four feet from where he was standing. He seized the marijuana seed and grabbed a plastic jar to put the seed into. Upon picking up the plastic jar, he saw marijuana inside of it.� He seized these drugs and used them as evidence against the defendant.� This seizure was valid even though the officer did not have a search warrant because it complied with the �plain view doctrine.�� The officer was lawfully located on the premises because he was executing a valid arrest warrant.� It was immediately apparent that the seized items were drugs because the officer did not have to conduct any further exploratory search to discern what they were.� He could see them from where he was standing while executing the arrest warrant.
Supreme
Court of
178
S.E.2d 65 (1970)
��������� Defendant was arrested for murder.� Following the arrest, his wife went to the police station and told police that he husband came home the night of the murder, placed his shotgun in the closet, and then left again. When the police asked her if they could have the gun, she told them they could come by and get it.� The police, then, went to the defendant�s home and asked the wife to get it.� The wife went to the closet, obtained the gun, and gave it to the police.� The defendant claimed that this was an unreasonable search. This, however, was not a search because the officers did not conduct any exploratory investigation, actual or constructive, which resulted in the challenged shotgun being delivered to them.
State
v. Eskridge
Court
of Appeals of
647
N.W.2d 434 (2002)
��������� The defendant in this case was charged
with possession of cocaine. The police found the cocaine during a warrantless
search of the defendant�s apartment building.�
Pursuant to an informant�s tip, police went to the defendant�s apartment
building to search for drugs.� The
officers testified that when they got to the building, the front door was
unlocked.� They also testified that, due
to their past experiences with the building, they expected the front door to be
open and unlocked.� Once in the building,
police went through an open door to the basement.� While in the basement, they heard the
defendant come down the stairs and rip paper.�
When they went to see what the defendant was doing, they found him with
his hand up in the insulation.� When the
police looked into the insulation area where the defendant�s hand had been,
they located a plastic baggie containing a rock of cocaine.� The court found that the warrantless search
was reasonable because the defendant did not have an expectation of privacy in
an unlocked basement of an apartment building.�
Where third parties would have unfettered access to the basement if it
were unlocked, the residents of the apartment building would not have an
expectation of privacy there.
Additionally, the court found that the expectation
of privacy in the basement was not an accepted privacy interest according to
the six part test adopted by
422
F. Supp. 988 (1976)
��������� The Plaintiff in this case was
suspended from the New Hampshire Technical Institute for possession of
marijuana where the evidence was found during an illegal search of his
dormitory.� The Plaintiff claimed that
the evidence should have been excluded from the disciplinary hearing.� The court found that the search, although by
the school, violated the Plaintiff�s Fourth Amendment rights.� The school argued that the Plaintiff waived
his privacy rights by consenting to searches of his dormitory room through a
contract he signed when admitted to the school.�
This argument, however, did not have merit because the school
conditioned attendance at the school on signing the contract. The court held
that a school cannot condition attendance upon waiver of constitutional rights.
State
v. Keadle
Court
of Appeals of
277
S.E.2d 456 (1981)
��������� While a resident advisor at the
Where a search and seizure is conducted by a private
citizen rather than a governmental officer, the admissibility of the fruits of
such a search into evidence may be supported on the ground that no fourth
amendment violations are involved.�
However, where a search is conducted by a private citizen, but only at
the government�s initiation and under its guidance, it is not a private search
but becomes a search by the government.�
Although the police did not have contact with the resident advisor
before he searched the dorm, as a university employee, the resident advisor
himself was a government official.�
However, the resident advisor was not a government agent to the police
because he did not have the status or the authority of a law enforcement
officer.� He was not performing a law
enforcement function because the purpose of his search was to serve the
internal requirements of the university, rather than the police.