

# ARAB STEREOTYPING: A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE

By Rachel Saloom\*

A myriad of stereotypes exist about the Middle East. Media is a powerful force that shapes society's views and opinions on many issues. However, media coverage of the Middle East, Arabs, and Islam is a very contentious subject. This article focuses on the images of the Middle East, Arabs, and Islam in the Western media and how those images and stereotypes affect society. First, this article examines how the American media views the Middle East from a thematic perspective. Secondly, it analyzes case studies of two European countries in order to elucidate how the media in these countries deals with the Middle East. Finally, it scrutinizes in detail the portrayal of Middle Eastern women in the Western media.

In many instances, stereotypes have a negative connotation because they assume every member of a group has the same characteristics. Stereotypes homogenize people which results in biased depictions. While a stereotype can be positive, the issue of negative stereotyping is much more problematic. Moreover, cultural stereotypes often lead to various prejudices against the stereotyped group. Edmund Ghareeb, a Middle East media specialist, notes that stereotypes provide a method of "shorthand" for identifying groups.<sup>1</sup> In fact, many different groups have faced stereotyping and the biases associated with it. The stereotyping of Arabs is an important case study in understanding stereotyping and ethnic prejudice as a whole.

Today, in America, the stereotyping of Arabs is very prevalent. A general American view of Arabs is that they are "backward, scheming, fanatic terrorists, who are dirty, dishonest, oversexed, and corrupt."<sup>2</sup> It is extremely important to note, that oftentimes the generic Arab stereotype is one of an Arab male. There is a very different image of the Arab woman that this article also addresses.

Many ideas about Arabs are rooted in Orientalist thought. Edward Said defines Orientalist thought as "an imaginative and yet drastically polarized geography dividing the world into two unequal parts, the larger 'different' one called the Orient, the other, also known as 'our' world called the Occident or the West."<sup>3</sup> The creation of "the other" in this context leads to a binary where the West is privileged over the Orient. Everything that is from the Orient is different and exotic but at the same time savage and unruly. These competing ideas and biases set the framework for how the West views Arabs.

In the American context, Ghareeb outlines five reasons why the media is biased in its coverage of the Middle East.<sup>4</sup> His reasons include the Arab-Israeli conflict, general cultural bias, media ignorance about the history and origin of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the impact of the media's tendency to think alike, and

the power of the Israeli lobbying force.<sup>5</sup> While these are not the only factors that contribute to biased media coverage of the Middle East, they represent many reasons why the imbalance in coverage exists. Cultural bias is embedded throughout many stereotypes of Arabs. In fact, Michael Suleiman, a leading scholar on the Arab-American community, argues that, within American culture, a mindset exists that encompasses negative images of Arabs.<sup>6</sup> He attributes this to an Orientalist frame of reference, whereby negative stereotyping of Arabs is ingrained within American society.<sup>7</sup> This is not to say that all Americans hold these stereotypes, but they are present on a cultural level.

The Arab-Israeli conflict and the ignorance of the context of the conflict also fuels misperceptions and biases. There is a tendency to cast the conflict within terms of "good guys" versus "bad guys," where the Israelis play the role of the good guys and the Arabs are consistently the bad guys.<sup>8</sup> The U.S. operates within this Zionist frame of reference. Beginning with President Wilson, the framework that drove foreign policy in the Middle East was pro-Zionist.<sup>9</sup> Wilson's advisors had a strong effect on his policies.<sup>10</sup> Kathleen Christison notes that following the Balfour Declaration during the peace conference that rearranged colonial alliances after World War I, Wilson's advisors pressured him on behalf of the Zionist cause.<sup>11</sup> Their efforts essentially made him a strong Zionist and led to the U.S. support of a Jewish homeland.<sup>12</sup>

Misperceptions and Orientalist attitudes towards Arabs also perpetuated this Zionist framework. During the Roosevelt administration, public opinion helped sustain the status quo policies toward Palestine.<sup>13</sup> Christison also importantly notes the presence of what she describes as "policy inertia."<sup>14</sup> She explains that the pro-Zionist frame of reference was so entrenched, that by the time Roosevelt started to question some of the policies, it was too late to bring about any real change.

The pro-Zionist frame of reference continued during the Truman administration, culminating in the vote that led to the partition and creation of the state of Israel. While at some points President Truman may have been conflicted about the situation, the framework for continuing current policies was too strong to stop. Truman became a staunch advocate for the creation of Israel, but his advocacy was not based purely on the Zionist frame of reference. During his administration, strategic calculations also played a role.

Furthermore, Christison explains that during the creation of Israel and the time afterwards, the Israel-centered mindset rooted itself in American thinking.<sup>15</sup> This occurred to the extent that American culture began thinking of Israel as part of "the

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being” of the U.S.<sup>16</sup> Thus, part of the foreign policy apparatus also became part of the American psyche. It is important to note that biases also existed against Jews at that time. However, Americans viewed Jewish people as Westerners, while they saw Arabs as non-Westerners and inferior. Therefore, when Jews were compared to Arabs, Americans viewed Jews as superior.

Additionally, stereotyping of Arabs occurs through the stereotyping of the leader of an Arab country. In the 1950s, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leader of Egypt, was portrayed as a communist threat and nicknamed the “Hitler of the Nile.”<sup>17</sup> Meanwhile, Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was often viewed as a crooked-nose terrorist or animal. Regarding depictions of leaders, a couple of issues are worth discussing. For instance, Arafat has been dehumanized in illustrations portraying him as a rat. Although Arafat has rightfully been criticized for many bad acts, this dehumanization often has a spill over effect.

In discussing the stereotyping of Arab leaders, Carol Cohn explains what she calls the “unitary masculine actor problem.”<sup>18</sup> In the context of the first Gulf War, this phrase refers to the American notion that Saddam Hussein represented the entire country of Iraq. She cites President George H. W. Bush’s usage of the word “he,” when President Bush actually was referring to the entire country of Iraq or the Iraqi army.<sup>19</sup> Cohn describes this rhetorical practice as a way of converting the state into a single male actor. In addition to the term “he,” Saddam was consistently used as a replacement for the entire Iraqi military. This diverted attention away from the devastation of the people in the country and placed the focus on one evil man. The actual hardships that the Iraqi people faced were obscured.

This personalization demonstrates another effect of stereotyping Arab leaders — conflation of the leader and the people. Cohn states that, “[a] cartoon image of Saddam being ejected from Kuwait preempts the image of the blackened, charred, decomposing bodies of nineteen-year-old boys tossed in ditches by the side of the road, and the other concrete images of the acts of violence that constitute ‘forcing Hussein [sic] out of Kuwait.’”<sup>20</sup> This personalization of the war obscured real human suffering. It was and is much easier to justify the destruction of a tyrannical leader than the entire Iraqi population.

Additionally, the portrayal of leaders bears evidence of sexual orientation and gender discrimination. Cohn explains how the relationship between gender and national security operated in her analysis of the first Gulf War and discussed the American labeling of leaders or countries in a degrading manner. Specifically, she cites the “fag” discourse that was prevalent during the first Gulf War.<sup>21</sup> Bumper stickers during the war read “Saddam, Bend Over,” while reportedly, American soldiers had “Up Saddam’s Ass” on their uniforms.<sup>22</sup> Many times, portrayals of defeating the Iraqis included “humiliating anal penetration by the more powerful and manly U.S.”<sup>23</sup> Cohn noted the contrast between the feminized enemy and the highly masculinized U.S. In further support of her analysis, she described a cartoon that depicted Saddam praying, with a large missile about to “penetrate”

him.<sup>24</sup> This example of homoerotic imagery in popular culture is yet another method of feminizing the enemy and thereby stripping him of his manhood.

However, perhaps one of the most prominent areas of Arab stereotyping occurs in relation to oil. Americans held Arabs responsible for the oil embargo that was a result of the 1973 war. The prevalent American perception of Arabs was that they were getting rich and using oil as a weapon against the U.S. Melani McAlister, an expert in the field of American perceptions of the Middle East, states that editorial cartoons of this time depicted Arabs as beady-eyed and greedy with long, hooked noses.<sup>25</sup> Ironically, this characterization mirrored previous anti-Jewish sentiment. For example, one cartoon depicted a sheik whose long nose had turned into a gas nozzle.<sup>26</sup> Additionally, the U.S. viewed the Arab oil embargo as “blackmail.” Newspaper advertisements suggested that Arabs were using oil as a means of attack against the U.S.<sup>27</sup> During this time, depictions and stereotypes of Arabs shifted from older images of the harem and camels, to the bloodthirsty rich Arab trying to economically strangle the U.S. A cartoon ran in the *Chicago Tribune* in 1981 that depicted an Arab seated behind a big desk, wearing dark glasses and a malicious grin. In front of him is a sign that spells “OPEC,” while oil rigs are visible through a window. The desk also has a second sign that says, “Buy American.” However, the “n” is scribbled out.<sup>28</sup> This image is illustrative of stories in the media accusing Arabs of using their oil wealth in order to control the American economy by purchasing American real estate and American companies.<sup>29</sup> All of these images reinforce the idea of the wealthy Arab trying to damage the U.S. economy.

Another extremely common stereotype is the Arab “terrorist.” Specifically, starting in the late 1960s and even today, the image of a Palestinian terrorist is pervasive. Palestinian is often synonymous with terrorist. Furthermore, the term *fedayeen* was used often but rarely translated. The failure to translate the term fueled Americans’ tendency to associate Palestinian groups with mystery and deviance. Interestingly, *fedayeen* means “freedom fighter.”<sup>30</sup>

Americans also associated Islam with terrorist rhetoric. Thus, the discourse of terrorism inextricably included Islam. Meanwhile, the conflation of Arabs and Muslims also occurred. For instance, many portrayed Iranians as Arabs, in conjunction with the terrorist threat. This was particularly true during the Iranian hostage crisis which started in November 1979 and lasted 444 days.

In fact, the hostage crisis was viewed as a critical turning point because Islam became the main indicator of the entire region, more so than oil wealth, Christian Holy Land, or Arabs.<sup>31</sup> Through all forms of media, the idea of militant Islam spread. Films such as *Delta Force* in 1986 conflated Iranian and Arab identities. McAlister describes the film as a “virulently racist and patently militarist fantasy of rescue and revenge.”<sup>32</sup> The plot includes a terrorist take-over of a plane in which the very suspicious looking terrorists wreak havoc in the name of their

religion - Shi'a Islam. *Delta Force* is just one of many films that use the Arab terrorist as the key villain.<sup>33</sup>

Relatedly, there is also a bias towards Arabs and the Middle East in the European media. Using the research time frame of 1946 until 1994, Kai Hafez conducted a quantitative study on the German media's coverage of the Middle East.<sup>34</sup> The research focused on the newspapers *Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Suddeutsche Zeitung*, and on the magazines *Der Spiegel* and *Stern*. Hafez drew five conclusions from this quantitative analysis. First, the amount of coverage of the Middle East increased in the 1970s. During that time, an increase in the amount of coverage by more than 60% took place. Yet coverage of the Middle East and North Africa revolved largely around conflict. For example, press coverage increased dramatically during the Suez Crisis in 1956, the Algerian War in 1958, the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War in 1967, the October War and oil crisis in 1973, and the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, the events of the 1970s, such as terrorism and the oil crisis, made the West pay more attention to the Middle East.

Second, the study showed that while coverage singularly concerned the political sphere, it obscured other aspects of society and culture. Approximately 4/5 of the newspaper reports and 2/3 of the magazines reporters that dealt with the region focused on politics.<sup>36</sup> Specifically, at one point, the *Suddeutsche Zeitung* coverage of politics reached 88.5%, even though others in the sample were more evenly balanced. Hafez goes so far as to state that "German press coverage focused almost exclusively on politics and neglected all other parts of life."<sup>37</sup> Therefore, the aspects of day-to-day living did not make it into the German frame of media reference, but Middle East politics did.

Third, the lack of diversification surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict was a major topic. Recurring themes during this time frame were the Arab-Israeli conflict, other conflicts, Islam, pan-Arab nationalism, and German-Oriental relations. About 20% of articles in the German media pertained to the Arab-Israeli conflict and an additional 20% revolved around other regional conflicts.<sup>38</sup> Essentially, the reporting concerned "hot spots" while there was almost no room for topics outside that area.

Fourth, while the majority of coverage was coded as "neutral," the negative news that actually existed focused on conflicts and engaged in negative stereotyping of the Middle East, Arabs, and Islam. Approximately 1/3 of the articles during this time period dealt with violent conflicts. Only 3.1% of the articles were positive, while 48.9% were neutral.<sup>39</sup> Hafez contributes the large amount of negative events and conflict to the authoritarian political culture of the region. He argues, however, that this is an inaccurate explanation of the situation. He

states that Middle Easterners viewed their lives as pretty normal, a perspective contrary to the Western image that 50% of their lives consist of catastrophes, wars, terrorism crises, revolutions, and other tensions. The choice by Western journalism to deliver negative news of the Middle East demonstrated its selective perception under the guise of displaying political developments in the region.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, the selective way the media chose to cover the Middle East played an important role in creating the dominant narrative of the region as consistently revolving around conflict.

Finally, even given that the study focused on the German media, news of non-Arab states was underrepresented in the press. This further demonstrated that culture and political variables of Arab states dominated the motivation for media coverage, instead of economic or social factors in these states.<sup>41</sup> For example, Israel-Palestine, Israel, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq accounted for almost half of the media coverage during the time period of the study. Hafez contributes the focus on Israel-Palestine and Iraq to the media's overall focus on areas of conflict. In contrast, in order to explain the cases of Egypt and Israel, one must look at other factors, such as a phenomenon called "cultural proximity" as causing media attention towards Egypt and Israel. These countries have cultural proximity in that both draw conflict and culture interest because of the

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idea that human civilization began in Egypt and due to the connection between Jewish history and Christian biblical history.<sup>42</sup> Incidentally, economics is not a vital variable because countries with which Germany had a positive trade relationship, such as the Maghreb, were not heavily focused upon in the media.

For a British perspective on the media and Islam, Elizabeth Poole engaged in a quantitative content analysis of the British media from period 1994 until 1996.<sup>43</sup> She focused on the newspapers *The Times*, *The Guardian*, *The Sunday Times*, and *The Observer*. Her research demonstrates four critical themes regarding the coverage of Islam. First, the media portrayed Islam as a threat to British values and society as a whole. The most prevalent image of Muslims in the media was in relation to Islamic fundamentalism. Similarly, the most common topic in articles, rising to 19%, discussed British Islam and asylum seekers attempting to be activist fundamentalists from within Great Britain. Furthermore, statistics from the study demonstrated British sentiment viewed Islam as a threat.<sup>44</sup> The government's role in combating fundamentalists was mentioned in 10% of the articles and specifically, the government serving as a key actor in addressing these issues appeared in 11% of the articles.<sup>45</sup> Poole articulates a fear within Britain of Islamic fundamentalists seeking to create an Islamic theocracy in Britain.

Poole's study also demonstrates that the second most prevalent theme of the articles in this time frame was that Muslims

were “deviant, irrational and different, not fit for British society.”<sup>46</sup> In 11% of the articles, Muslims within Britain were associated with criminal activities.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, there was also an idea that Islamic culture is an alien culture that does not coincide with British values. Muslims living in Britain were viewed as outsiders. Many articles discussed the events of the countries where British Muslims originate. Interestingly, the majority of these articles dealt with British women who married Muslim men and went back to their husband’s country to face a very different social experience.<sup>48</sup> Overall, a total of 223 articles, or 26.6%, highlighted the differences between Muslims and the majority population of Britain.

The third theme of Poole’s research concerns Islam as an antiquated religion.<sup>49</sup> Cultural atrocities that occurred within the Muslim world were mentioned in 7.4% of the articles. This again highlights the notion that Islamic culture is backwards and the West is culturally superior. Poole argues that the media used Islam as a mechanism to explain all the behavior in which Muslims engaged. Lastly, the final theme is that Muslims are treated as undifferentiated. Essentially, all Muslims are homogenized into one group, despite their various backgrounds. Poole explains how Iranian and British Muslims were essentially viewed in the same way, despite their very diverse backgrounds. This and other examples demonstrated how the media obscured the important differences between different types of Muslims and presented a monolithic depiction of all Muslims.

Further, two elements were often omitted from media coverage. Articles obscured common everyday topics relating to Muslim culture, politics, and economy. Muslims only became newsworthy in regards to contentious issues. Articles constantly compared all Muslims to the dominant Western frame of reference. Poole’s research demonstrates that Muslims were much more likely to be shown in positions of little authority than as persons who do not identify with British faiths.<sup>50</sup> Muslim’s position in British society allowed them little control over accessing power that would allow them to establish their own agenda. Instead, Muslims were often cited as a threat to society when, in reality, they had very limited power.<sup>51</sup>

Another element commonly lacking in the British press was the positive portrayal of Middle Eastern women. Instead, articles depicted Arab women as marginalized actors. In Western media, the portrayal of Arab women in both the U.S. and Europe has common themes. The most common theme is that Arab women are terribly oppressed. In fact, the image of the veiled, oppressed Arab woman is prevalent. Moreover, Western discourse is also guilty of deploying stereotypes of Arab women. In essence, the only time Arab women are displayed in media is within the context of their oppression.

Therese Saliba argues that Western representations of Arab women and men during the first Gulf War were neocolonialist. The veiled Arab woman became an “object of imperialist rescue,” while the West played the role of the strong hero.<sup>52</sup> In contrast, media depictions of the Arab man portrayed him as being sex-crazed and power hungry. Saliba goes on to describe an episode of the talk show *Donahue* that tried to expose the sexism inherent in Arab culture. The title of the episode was “American Wife/Saudi Husband: Culture Clash.”<sup>53</sup> The show portrayed the Saudi husband, a man named Dr. El-Yacoubi, as a religious fanatic who “seduced his intelligent wife into the veil.”<sup>54</sup> Here, the inference was that the husband had to manipulate his wife into taking up such an oppressive practice. Thus, images underlying Arab gender stereotypes are the veiled Arab woman who represents the weak Arab countries, while Saddam Hussein “represents the Law of the Father out of control.”<sup>55</sup> These are powerful representations that shape how the American public views the Arab world.<sup>56</sup>

In reality, Dr. El-Yacoubi was never given the opportunity to speak about the books he wrote about Islam. Rather, the show stereotyped him as being the “Arab man,” representing the “Arab mind.”<sup>57</sup> This Orientalist notion of the monolithic Arab mind entrenches negative stereotypes Saliba attempts to expose. Not only was El-Yacoubi portrayed in a negative manner, but there was a complete absence of a voice relaying the feelings of Arab women.

Furthermore, Saliba exposes the problematic occurrence of the American woman who can supposedly speak for and take the place of Arab women. Saliba discusses what she calls “white women saving brown women.”<sup>58</sup> For example, the National Organization for Women (“NOW”) staunchly opposed American involvement in the Gulf War. While NOW outlined five reasons for their opposition to the war, the media focused solely on the organization’s denunciation of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait’s “subjugation and systematic oppression of women.”<sup>59</sup> NOW took the opportunity to make their case against the discrimination of women in the Arab world. Yet, Saliba argues that this demonstrated NOW’s obliviousness to the reality of how the organization’s actions perpetuated the military goals that resulted in the death of Iraqi women and children.

While this characterization may be overstating the issue, this reactionary type of activism against all-encompassing notions of patriarchy usually simplifies a situation that deserves much more attention. Saliba goes so far as to say that NOW represented a form of “colonial feminism” that supported imperialism.<sup>60</sup> While NOW may have had noble intentions, their stance actually increased racist sentiments against Arabs. Saliba suggests that a much better strategy would have been to question

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the American military attempting to liberate Arab women. She also says that NOW could have examined the treatment of women within the U.S. military as well. However, this was not the case, and instead, the Arab woman was once again painted as the passive victim of Arab patriarchy.

Additionally, in Poole's study of British media, she also notes the issue of women as marginalized actors in media coverage of Islam.<sup>61</sup> The following data highlights that women were rarely the principle actors in media coverage. For instance, males served as the principal actor in 58.8% of the articles.<sup>62</sup> However, females were depicted as the principal actors only 14.2% of the time.<sup>63</sup> In 18.3% of the instances mentioned, gender is unclear. Interestingly, portrayal of equal status between men and women occurred only 8.7% of the time.<sup>64</sup> When women were actors, they were viewed only as secondary actors. This occurred in 45.4% of the articles that mainly focused on women as part of the community or *umma*.<sup>65</sup> In the articles, women were only viewed in positions of power 20% of the time, while men in authority positions occurred 80% of the time.<sup>66</sup>

In general, the Western media portrays Middle Eastern and Muslim women in passive roles and as secondary actors to men. Stereotypes prevail and include the idea that Muslim women are all oppressed. Muslim women are rarely depicted as a principal actor. These stereotypes and misperceptions of Islam fuel al-

ready existing negative imagery of Middle Eastern women. Ideas of an oppressive Islamic religion aid in the construction of Arab women as victims of subjugation.

In conclusion, Western media stereotypes Arabs, the Middle East as a region, and Islam. These stereotypes exist in many different forms and through various mediums. However, regardless of the form, it is important to note that all of these stereotypes have wide ranging impacts on society. The bias that exists in media coverage is seen in both the U.S. and European countries. Newspapers, cartoons, magazines, television, and movies are all mediums that disseminate images regarding the Middle East. As this article demonstrates, the media is not neutral when it concerns to the Middle East. The stereotypes and biases that exist in Western media have been deeply ingrained and persist to this day. Additionally, the media's depiction of Middle Eastern women is quite different than its depiction of men. Women are viewed as oppressed actors lacking any agency of their own. The picture of the veiled Arab woman as a victim of patriarchal Islamic practices is pervasive. Although Western media may present occasional balanced stories and depictions of the Middle East, the vast majority of evidence suggests a great bias still exists.

## ENDNOTES

\* Rachel Saloom received her JD from the University of Georgia School of Law in 2006, MA in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Chicago in 2003, and BA in Political Science from State University of West Georgia in 2000.

<sup>1</sup> EDMUND GHAREEB, *SPLIT VISION: THE PORTRAYAL OF ARABS IN THE AMERICAN MEDIA* xv (Middle East Policy Council 1983). See generally JANICE TERRY, *MISTAKEN IDENTITY: ARAB STEREOTYPES IN POPULAR WRITING* (1985) (elucidating the stereotyping of Arabs and the Middle East that occurs in Western media). This Article, however, does not dismiss the threat of international terrorism. I fully understand that terrorism must be seriously addressed. The purpose of this Article is to discuss the often obscured issue of stereotyping.

<sup>2</sup> GHAREEB, *supra* note 1, at 7.

<sup>3</sup> EDWARD SAID, *COVERING ISLAM: HOW THE MEDIA AND THE EXPERTS DETERMINE HOW WE SEE THE REST OF THE WORLD* 4 (Pantheon Books 1981). See generally Edward W. Said, *ORIENTALISM* (2d. ed., Random House 1994).

<sup>4</sup> GHAREEB, *supra* note 1, at 19.

<sup>5</sup> GHAREEB, *supra* note 1, at 19.

<sup>6</sup> MICHAEL SULEIMAN, *THE ARABS IN THE MIND OF AMERICA* 2 (Amana Books 1988).

<sup>7</sup> *Id.*

<sup>8</sup> GHAREEB, *supra* note 1, at 19.

<sup>9</sup> KATHLEEN CHRISTISON, *PERCEPTIONS OF PALESTINE* 33 (University of California Press 1999).

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 30.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.* at 28. See generally WILLIAM L. CLEVELAND, *A HISTORY OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST* (Westview Press 2004); ILAN PAPPE, *A HISTORY OF MODERN PALESTINE* (Cambridge University Press 2003); MARK A. TESSLER, *A HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT* (Indiana University Press 1994).

<sup>12</sup> CHRISTISON, *supra* note 9, at 33.

<sup>13</sup> CHRISTISON, *supra* note 9, at 45.

<sup>14</sup> CHRISTISON, *supra* note 9, at 59.

<sup>15</sup> CHRISTISON, *supra* note 9, at 82.

<sup>16</sup> CHRISTISON, *supra* note 9, at 82.

<sup>17</sup> SULEIMAN, *supra* note 6, at 2.

<sup>18</sup> Carol Cohn, *Wars, Wimps, and Women: Talking Gender and Thinking War*, in *GENDERING WAR TALK*, 239 (Miriam Cooke and Angela Wollacott eds., Princeton University Press 1993); see generally Steve Niva, *Tough and Tender: New World Order Masculinity and the Gulf War*, in *THE "MAN" QUESTION*

(Marysai Zalewski and Jane Parpart eds. 1998).

<sup>19</sup> Cohn, *supra* note 18, at 239.

<sup>20</sup> Cohn, *supra* note 18, at 241.

<sup>21</sup> Cohn, *supra* note 18, at 236.

<sup>22</sup> Cohn, *supra* note 18, at 236.

<sup>23</sup> Cohn, *supra* note 18, at 236.

<sup>24</sup> Cohn, *supra* note 18, at 236.

<sup>25</sup> MELANI MCALISTER, *EPIC ENCOUNTERS: CULTURE MEDIA AND U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1945-2000*, 139 (University of California Press 2001).

<sup>26</sup> *Id.*

<sup>27</sup> GHAREEB, *supra* note 1, at 7.

<sup>28</sup> MCALISTER, *supra* note 25, at 160.

<sup>29</sup> MCALISTER, *supra* note 25, at 160.

<sup>30</sup> R. S. Zaharna, *The Palestinian Leadership and the American Media: Changing Images, Conflicting Results*, in *THE U.S. MEDIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST*, 43 (Kamalipour ed., Princeton University Press 1995). See generally FRED HALLIDAY, *ISLAM AND THE MYTH OF CONFRONTATION: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST* (2d. ed., I.B. Tauris 2003); KAREN ARMSTRONG, *ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY* (Modern Library 2002) (providing a concise history of Islam); JOHN L. ESPOSITO, *ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH* (Oxford University Press 1998); R. STEPHEN HUMPHREYS, *ISLAMIC HISTORY: A FRAMEWORK FOR INQUIRY* (Princeton University Press 1991) (outlining analytical approaches to the study of Islamic history).

<sup>31</sup> MCALISTER, *supra* note 24, at 200.

<sup>32</sup> MCALISTER, *supra* note 24, at 225.

<sup>33</sup> Other similar movies include *True Lies* and *The Siege*.

<sup>34</sup> Kai Hafez, *Imbalances of Middle East Coverage: A Quantitative Analysis of the German Press*, in *ISLAM AND THE WEST IN THE MASS MEDIA* 185 (Hafez ed., Hampton Press 2000).

<sup>35</sup> *Id.*

<sup>36</sup> MCALISTER, *supra* note 24, at 186.

<sup>37</sup> MCALISTER, *supra* note 24, at 186.

<sup>38</sup> MCALISTER, *supra* note 24, at 189.

<sup>39</sup> MCALISTER, *supra* note 24, at 191.

<sup>40</sup> MCALISTER, *supra* note 24, at 191.

<sup>41</sup> MCALISTER, *supra* note 24, at 196-97.

<sup>42</sup> MCALISTER, *supra* note 24, at 193.

## ENDNOTES CONTINUED

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<sup>43</sup> Elizabeth Poole, *Newspaper Coverage of Islam in the British Press*, in ISLAM AND THE WEST IN THE MASS MEDIA 162 (Hafez ed. 2000).

<sup>44</sup> *Id.* at 163-64.

<sup>45</sup> *Id.*

<sup>46</sup> *Id.* at 165.

<sup>47</sup> *Id.*

<sup>48</sup> Poole, *supra* note 43, at 165-66.

<sup>49</sup> Poole, *supra* note 43, at 166.

<sup>50</sup> Poole, *supra* note 43, at 168.

<sup>51</sup> Poole, *supra* note 43, at 169-70.

<sup>52</sup> Therese Saliba, *Military Presences and Absences: Arab Women and the Persian Gulf War*, in SEEING THROUGH THE MEDIA: THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, 272 (Susan Jeffords and Lauren Rabinovitz eds., 1994). *See generally* LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER AND ISLAM (Yale University Press 1992); DENIZ KANDIYOTI, GENDERING THE MIDDLE EAST: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996); SUHA SABBAGH, ARAB WOMEN: BETWEEN DEFIANCE AND RESTRAINT (Olive Branch Press 1996). *See also* JOANNA KADI, FOOD FOR OUR GRANDMOTHERS: WRITINGS BY ARAB-AMERICAN AND ARAB-CANADIAN FEMINISTS (South End Press 1994); EVELYN

SHAKIR, BINT ARAB: ARAB AND ARAB-AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE U.S. (Praeger Publishing Text 1997).

<sup>53</sup> Saliba, *supra* note 52, at 274.

<sup>54</sup> Saliba, *supra* note 52, at 275.

<sup>55</sup> Saliba, *supra* note 52, at 276.

<sup>56</sup> *Id.*

<sup>57</sup> Saliba, *supra* note 52, at 274.

<sup>58</sup> Saliba, *supra* note 52, at 278.

<sup>59</sup> *Id.*

<sup>60</sup> Saliba, *supra* note 52, at 279.

<sup>61</sup> Poole, *supra* note 43, at 172.

<sup>62</sup> Poole, *supra* note 43, at 172-73.

<sup>63</sup> *Id.*

<sup>64</sup> *Id.*

<sup>65</sup> *Umma* can be defined as an Islamic community.

<sup>66</sup> Poole, *supra* note 43, at 172-73.