1. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, Bibliographical Essay: The Influence of U.S. Constitutionalism Abroad, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 405, 407-12 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990) (explaining impact of U.S. Constitution on development of political systems in Canada, Australia, Israel, India, Scandanavia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America).

2. See id. at 406 (stating that "[e]xtensive scholarly research in this area is virtually nonexistent" and offering a bibliography of literature on the influence of the U.S. Constitution). Alan Watson is the only scholar to extensively examine the use of foreign models as a source of authority, and his work focuses entirely in the private law sphere. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 56-57 (2d ed. 1993).

3. See W. ARTHUR LEWIS, GROWTH AND FLUCTUATIONS 1870-1913, at 197 (1978).

4. See CARLOS F. DIAZ ALEJANDRO, ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 3, 421 (1970).

5. See id. at 3.

6. See id. at 52-53.

7. See CARLOS H. WAISMAN, REVERSAL OF DEVELOPMENT IN ARGENTINA: POSTWAR COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY POLICIES AND THEIR STRUCTURAL CONSEQUENCES 7 (1987).

8. See DIAZ ALEJANDRO, supra note 4, at 56.

9. See generally PAUL H. LEWIS, THE CRISIS OF ARGENTINE CAPITALISM 1-7 (1990) (describing and classifying traditional approaches taken by scholars on Argentine political economy); WILLIAM C. SMITH, AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE CRISIS OF THE ARGENTINE POLITICAL ECONOMY 1-10 (1989) (noting that economic causes fail to entirely explain changes in Argentina's political system); WAISMAN, supra note 7, at 3-23 (describing how economic change and crises produced new interest groups and political instability).

10. See infra notes 54-92 and accompanying text (tracing evolution of Argentina's political system from 1820 to 1853).

11. See infra Part V.

12. Rather than a source of regression, these revolts tended to be led by the more democratically oriented forces in Argentine society, or at least by forces presenting themselves as seeking a more open political structure. Former President Bartolom‚ Mitre, who presented himself as the standardbearer of liberal interests seeking a more open political system, led an unsuccessful revolt in 1874 alleging fraud in that year's presidential elections. See DAVID ROCK, ARGENTINA 1516-1987: FROM SPANISH COLONIZATION TO ALFONSIN 130 (1987). In 1880, the Province of Buenos Aires led an unsuccessful revolt which led to the federalization of the City of Buenos Aires and its separation from the Province. See id. at 155. In 1890, a coalition of liberal politicians seeking political reform led an unsuccessful revolt with assistance from segments of the army which, while defeated, ultimately forced President Miguel Ju rez Celman to resign. See id. at 160. In 1893 and 1905, the Union C¡vica Radical led uprisings calling for honest elections and expanded suffrage. See id. at 183, 186. For a succinct discussion of this period, see id. at 118-213.

13. See infra notes 365-69 and accompanying text.

14. Atilio A. Bor¢n, Latin America: Constitutionalism and the Political Traditions of Liberalism and Socialism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 339-40 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993 (quoting GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 286-87, addition to . 274 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1967))); see, e.g., ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 34-36 (1978) (referring to what author calls "The Law of Non-Transferability of Law"); Sa‹d Amir Arjomand, Constitutions and the Struggle for Political Order: A Study in the Modernization of Political Traditions, 33 ARCHIVES EUROP�ENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE 39, 49, 75 (1992) (emphasizing the diversity of historical processes behind constitutions, which produces distinct patterns of constitutional politics and inconsistent results); Alemante G. Selassie, Ethnic Identity and Constitutional Design for Africa, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (1992) (utilizing Seidman's principle of non-transferability to analyze Africa's constitution-making). But see Howard J. Wiarda, Law and Political Development in Latin America: Toward a Framework for Analysis, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 434, 442-443 (1971) (noting that "a great deal of nonsense [has been] written about the inappropriateness . . . of the legal-constitutional models adopted by the Latin American nations in the nineteenth century").

15. See Bor¢n, supra note 14, at 339-40; see also SUSAN CALVERT & PETER CALVERT, ARGENTINA: POLITICAL CULTURE AND INSTABILITY 48 (1989) (stating that social and economic conditions were not ripe in Latin America for the adoption of Western political models); JACQUES LAMBERT, LATIN AMERICA: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 121-22 (Helen Katel trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) (concluding that elite control led to spread of Western ideas in Latin America); James L. Busey, Observations on Latin American Constitutionalism, 24 THE AMERICAS 46, 49, 53 (1967) (stating that Latin American constitutions were artificial because they either were adopted from abroad or were created by "small, unrepresentative elites"); Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and its Failure in Latin America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 9-11, 21-25 (1990) (contrasting American experience with self-government to the lack of such experience in Latin American nations to explain failure of constitutionalism in Latin America).

16. See Bor¢n, supra note 14, at 339-40; see also CALVERT & CALVERT, supra note 15, at 48 (explaining that values and attitudes from colonial period prevented immediate acceptance of adopted political structures in Latin America); Busey, supra note 15, at 49 (stating that Latin American constitutions failed to represent the result of real social forces); Rosenn, supra note 15, at 21-24 (stating that Latin American nations, for the most part, "have never undergone real social revolutions").

17. See Rosenn, supra note 15, at 9-11 (relating conditions in pre-revolutionary America).

18. HEGEL, supra note 14, at 178-79, . 274.

19. See id. at 286-87, addition to . 274.

20. See id. at 178, . 273.

21. See infra Part V (explaining Argentine Supreme Court's reliance on U.S. Supreme Court opinions).

22. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978).

23. Id. at 215.

24. See id.

25. Id.

26. See id.

27. See id. at 216 n.2.

28. See id. at 262-63.

29. See HEGEL, supra note 14, at 178-79, . 274 ("The proposal to give a constitution-even one more or less rational in content-to a nation a priori would be a happy thought overlooking precisely that factor in a constitution which makes it more than an ens rationis.").

30. "Liberal" is used as the nineteenth century use of the term, emphasizing limited government interference with individual conduct and the economy.

31. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY 1-16 (1971) (developing the concept of mutual security as central to the development of democratic government). This Article uses mutual security as a measure for successful constitutionalism. Dahl uses it in similar terms as an element in the growth paths of nascent democracies. However, Dahl's work is not concerned with the development of constitutional rules, but rather with the general sense of security that exists between those in government and their political opposition.

32. DOMINGO FAUSTINO SARMIENTO, RECUERDOS DE PROVINCIA (1850) [hereinafter SARMIENTO, RECUERDOS], in 3 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO 117 (Editorial Luz del D¡a, 1950), quoted and analyzed in NATALIO R. BOTANA, LA TRADICION REPUBLICANA: ALBERDI, SARMIENTO Y LAS IDEAS POLITICAS DE SU TIEMPO 265 (1984).

33. See CHARLES GIBSON, SPAIN IN AMERICA 103-05 (1966); see also C. H. HARING, THE SPANISH EMPIRE IN AMERICA 313-14 (1947).

34. To prevent smuggling and tax evasion, as well as for security, the Crown restricted all trade to two annual fleets, each numbering fifty or more ships, which gathered in Seville and Cadiz and left as a group, with one fleet sailing for Veracruz on the Gulf Coast of Mexico and the other for Panama and Cartagena, see GIBSON, supra note 33, at 101-02. All shipments from Spain were dominated by the Seville merchant guild, which, until 1765, successfully excluded even merchants from other parts of Spain. See id.; HARING, supra note 33, at 316-17.

35. See GIBSON, supra note 33, at 102.

36. See HARING, supra note 33, at 316-17.

37. See id.

38. See RICARDO ZORRAQUIN BECU, LA ORGANIZACION JUDICIAL ARGENTINO EN EL PERIODO HISPANICO 19 (1981).

39. See id.

40. During the residencia, members of the public also received the opportunity to present complaints and to support their complaints with evidence. See HARING, supra note 33, at 148-57; ZORRAQUIN BECU, supra note 38, at 189-94.

41. See ZORRAQUIN BECU, supra note 38, at 144-45.

42. See id.

43. See id. For a description of the gradual narrowing of the functions of the audiencias, see id. at 208; HARING, supra note 33, at 129-37 (describing powers of audiencias vis-...-vis viceroys and captains-general); RICARDO LEVENE, INTRODUCCION A LA HISTORIA DEL DERECHO INDIANO (1924), in 3 OBRAS DE RICARDO LEVENE 99 (Academia Nacional de la Historia 1962).

44. See ZORRAQUIN BECU, supra note 38, at 19. This is not to say that law was not important; it was. The King's power, although theoretically absolute, with both legislation and justice originating from the King, was restricted by a self-imposed obligation to follow the law and to act in accordance with natural justice. See id. at 14-15. Distance obviously weakened the Crown's authority. Colonial officials had the power to stay the execution of orders from the Crown if local application would be inappropriate, and often instructions simply were ignored. See HARING, supra note 33, at 122-24. Legislation establishing monopoly privileges and governing trade was important for ensuring appropriate license and tax payments to the Crown, however. See id. at 314-21. Legislation to protect the Indians was required as part of the official mission of the Spanish Crown to proselytize the Americas-the grounds on which the Crown initially received its grant of control from the Pope. See id. at 43, 48-49. See generally id. at 42-74 (analyzing the legislation governing Indian rights and obligations and its degree of observance). Property and inheritance rights also were central. These rights were interpreted with a goal of furthering Crown policies, particularly its policy in the sixteenth century of curbing the emergence of feudal structures in the Americas that might compete with its authority, see ZORRAQUIN BECU, supra note 38, at 144, although the Crown could not ignore property and inheritance rights without serious risk of revolt, see GIBSON, supra note 33, at 58-62.

45. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 40-45.

46. See id. at 62-63.

47. See id. at 61-62.

48. See id. at 64.

49. See id. at 55-58.

50. See NICOLAS SHUMWAY, THE INVENTION OF ARGENTINA 18 (1991).

51. See generally ROCK, supra note 12, at 73-76 (describing early stages of the Argentine independence movement).

52. See id. at 76.

53. See id. at 92.

54. See id. (analyzing effects of the wars).

55. See id. at 82; JAMES R. SCOBIE, ARGENTINA: A CITY AND A NATION 93-94 (2d ed. 1971).

56. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 114.

57. See John Lynch, From Independence to National Organization, in ARGENTINA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 15-18 (Leslie Bethel ed., 1993) [hereinafter Lynch, From Independence to National Organization]; SCOBIE, supra note 55, at 91-92 (discussing role and influence of local caudillos during first half of nineteenth century in Argentina); see also JOHN LYNCH, CAUDILLOS IN SPANISH AMERICA 1800-1850, at 3-9 (1992) [hereinafter LYNCH, CAUDILLOS] (describing characteristics and historical significance of caudillos in Spanish America).

58. See 1 CARLOS ALBERTO FLORIA & C�SAR A. GARCIA BELSUNCE, HISTORIA DE LOS ARGENTINOS 461-62 (1992).

59. The first battle occurred in early 1820, when federalist cavalry forces from the provinces of Santa F‚, Entre R¡os, and Corrientes, responding in part to Buenos Aires' river blockades, defeated Buenos Aires unitarians and took the city. They agreed to leave in return for 25,000 head of cattle, promises of free river navigation of the River Plate and its tributaries, and non-interference by Buenos Aires in their affairs. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 93-94. However, fighting between federalist caudillos permitted Buenos Aires, under unitarian control, to start blockading river traffic again the following year. See id. at 96-97. From 1825 through 1827, with Buenos Aires unitarian forces in control, Argentina fought an unsuccessful war with Brazil over control of Uruguay, and in 1827, General Manuel Dorrego, a federalist, displaced the then unpopular unitarians and became Governor of Buenos Aires. See id. at 102-03; 1 FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 471-80. But after only a few months in power, Dorrego was overthrown and executed by a unitarian army under General Juan Lavalle, who in turn was defeated in 1829 by General Rosas. See id. at 480-86; JOHN LYNCH, ARGENTINE DICTATOR, JUAN MANUEL DE ROSAS, 1829-1852, at 38-41 (1981); ROCK, supra, at 102-03.

60. See LYNCH, supra note 59, at 154.

61. Id. at 48.

62. See id. at 49.

63. See id. at 49, 162.

64. Id. at 162-63 (translation by Lynch).

65. See id. at 169-71.

66. See id. at 212.

67. See id. at 66-67 (discussing prevalence and impact of land confiscations).

68. See id. at 56-60.

69. See LYNCH, supra note 59, at 56-60.

70. See id. at 158.

71. The formal name was "Sociedad Popular Restauradora" (Popular Society for Restoration). The name "Mazorca" comes from "m s horca," more hanging. See id. at 215. But see WILLIAM HADFIELD, EL BRASIL, EL RIO DE LA PLATA Y EL PARAGUAY 138 (1854) (Betty B. de Cabral trans., 1943) (citing British sources claiming that the name came from a torture technique using corn cobs). The terror reached its peak between 1838 and 1842, during and following a French naval blockade of Buenos Aires from 1838-40. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 109-10.

72. See LYNCH, supra note 59, at 216-46. Perhaps the most striking act of terror was the murder of the President of the Chamber of Deputies at his desk for allegedly sympathizing with unitarian enemies of the regime. See id. at 226. Rosas' victims were selected carefully, and many came from the educated elite. See id. at 209-46; L.S. ROWE, THE FEDERAL SYSTEM OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 37 (1921). The unitarians subsequently claimed that the death toll reached 5884, not counting individuals killed in battle or executed for desertion. On the other hand, the government newspaper Gazeta Mercantil claimed that the number did not exceed 500 during the period from 1829 through 1843. See LYNCH, supra note 59, at 242-43.

73. See id. at 209-10, 220, 223-24, 228, 235, 238-39, 241-46 (describing Rosas' strategic use of terror as mechanism of control).

74. John Pendleton, Despatch No. 1 to the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, Sept. 22, 1851, microformed on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, Microcopy No. 69, reel 9 (National Archives Microfilm Publications).

75. See LYNCH, supra note 59, at 305.

76. See id.; SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 117-19.

77. See generally LYNCH, supra note 59, at 201-46 (describing the nature of Rosas' terror).

78. See 2 FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 66-67.

79. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 112.

80. See BEATRIZ BOSCH, URQUIZA Y SU TIEMPO 167-69 (1971).

81. See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.

82. The text of the 1826 Constitution can be found in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, at 309-23 (Arturo Enrique Sampay ed., 1975).

83. See 1 FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 467-71.

84. See SANTOS PRIMO AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN THE MAINTENANCE OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM AND THE PRESERVATION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 15-18 (1943). The text of the 1819 Constitution can be found in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 269-79.

85. See generally 1 ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS 3-614 (Emilio Ravignani ed., 1937) (containing transcripts of the proceedings of all legislatures from 1813-1820 that had the power to draft a constitution as well as organic statutes and regulations); AMADEO, supra note 84, at 11-18 (describing Argentina's early attempts at writing a constitution).

86. See generally DAVID BUSHNELL, REFORM AND REACTION IN THE PLATINE PROVINCES, 1810-1852 (1983) (offering a study of the rise of liberalism in Argentina in the early years after independence, what the author describes as a conservative reaction under Rosas, and the return of liberalism in 1852).

87. See Decreto de la Asamblea de 1813 (Feb. 4, 1813), in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 126.

88. See Decreto de la Libertad de Imprenta, art. 1 (Oct. 26, 1811), in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 121.

89. See Decreto de Seguridad Individual (Nov. 23, 1811), in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 120 (offering guarantees of due process in criminal proceedings, arts. 1, 2 & 5, and placing restrictions on searches and seizures, arts. 3-4).

90. See Reglamento de la divisi¢n de poderes sancionado por la Primera Junta Conservadora (Oct. 22, 1811), in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 109-13 (placing limits on the Executive); Constituci¢n de las Provincias Unidas en Sud Am‚rica (Apr. 22, 1819), in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 269-79 (establishing separate executive, legislative and judicial branches).

91. See ZORRAQUIN BECU, supra note 38, at 216.

92. See id. at 215.

93. See infra notes 124-60 and accompanying text.

94. See generally SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 126-32 (describing the Generation of '37 literary circle and its activities).

95. See JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI, BASES Y PUNTOS DE PARTIDA PARA LA ORGANIZACION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA (1852) [hereinafter ALBERDI, BASES], in 3 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI 371 (Buenos Aires, La Tribuna Nacional 1886).

96. See id. at 383.

97. See BOSCH, supra note 80, at 259; 1 JORGE M. MAYER, ALBERDI Y SU TIEMPO 529 & n.215 (1973).

98. See BOSCH, supra note 80, at 259; 1 MAYER, supra note 97, at 531.

99. See 1 MAYER, supra note 97, at 541.

100. Id. at 552.

101. See ALBERDI, BASES, supra note 95, at 426.

102. Id. at 405.

103. Id. at 410.

104. See id. at 409.

105. Id.

106. See id. at 451, 456.

107. See id. at 409, 426-38. Reduced to a slogan, his message was "to govern is to populate." Id. at 527.

108. See id. at 430, 449-51, 455.

109. See id. at 440, 451.

110. See id. at 431-32.

111. See id. at 452.

112. See id.

113. See id.

114. See id.

115. See id. at 455.

116. See id. at 440, 441-42.

117. See id. at 440.

118. See id. at 403, 411-13, 453, 457.

119. See id. at 561-63 (arts. 16-20).

120. JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI, SISTEMA ECONOMICO Y RENTISTICO DE LA CONFEDERACION ARGENTINA SEGUN SU CONSTITUCION DE 1853 (1854) [hereinafter ALBERDI, SISTEMA ECONOMICO], in 4 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI 143 (Buenos Aires, La Tribuna Nacional 1886).

121. Id. at 159.

122. See id. at 168.

123. See id. at 148-52, 525, 527.

124. See id. at 175.

125. See NATALIO R. BOTANA, EL ORDEN CONSERVADOR: LA POLITICA ARGENTINA ENTRE 1880 Y 1916, at 50-54 (1977).

126. ALBERDI, BASES, supra note 95, at 523.

127. See ALBERDI, SISTEMA ECONOMICO, supra note 120, at 150.

128. Id. at 188.

129. Id.

130. See infra notes 402-12, 427 and accompanying text.

131. Written in Chile in 1850 when Urquiza was beginning to assert his independence from Rosas, Argir¢polis begins by indicating to Urquiza that he, Urquiza, is the man who can challenge Rosas and establish a national constitution, and therefore, he should pay careful attention to the ideas that follow. See DOMINGO FAUSTINO SARMIENTO, ARGIROPOLIS (1896) [hereinafter SARMIENTO, ARGIROPOLIS], in 13 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO 17-18 (Editorial Luz del D¡a, 1950).

132. See id. at 67-69. He combines this with a recommendation that Paraguay and Uruguay rejoin Argentina, a recommendation that was hardly likely to be acceptable to Paraguay or Uruguay. See id.

133. See id. at 17, 76, 91.

134. See id. at 73, 101.

135. See id. at 103.

136. Id. at 93.

137. See id. at 91.

138. See id. at 93.

139. See id. at 56.

140. See id. at 64-65, 83.

141. See id. at 101-02.

142. See id. at 102.

143. See DOMINGO FAUSTINO SARMIENTO, COMENTARIOS DE LA CONSTITUCION DE LA CONFEDERACION ARGENTINA (1853) [hereinafter SARMIENTO, COMENTARIOS], in 8 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO 101 (Editorial Luz del D¡a, 1950); see also DOMINGO FAUSTINO SARMIENTO, Principios y t ctica de la Prensa, in EL NACIONAL, Mar. 7, 1856, reprinted in 25 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO 142 (Editorial Luz del D¡a, 1950).

144. See SARMIENTO, Principios y t ctica de la Prensa, supra note 143, at 55-58.

145. Id.

146. See SARMIENTO, COMENTARIOS, supra note 143, at 29.

147. See id.

148. Id. Sarmiento's best known book is DOMINGO FAUSTINO SARMIENTO, FACUNDO: CIVILIZACION Y BARBARIE EN LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA (1845) [hereinafter SARMIENTO, FACUNDO], in 7 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO 14 (Editorial Luz del D¡a, 1950). In the book, he describes Argentina's civil wars as a battle between the European culture of Argentina's cities and the gaucho barbarism of the countryside, and recounts the bloody exploits of Juan Facundo Quiroga, a leading federalist caudillo and ally of Rosas who was murdered in 1835. The gaucho, used by Sarmiento as a term to define the mass of the population in the countryside (and accordingly the country), does not work and seeks to live free of all rules and government. See id. at 33, 48. Life in the outdoors "has developed the physical qualities of the gaucho, without any qualities of intelligence." Id. at 33. Even if the unitarians had succeeded in killing Rosas before he came to power, the countryside would have discovered another, equally barbarous leader. See id. at 125. When Rosas returned to the governorship of Buenos Aires in 1835 with a new grant of absolute power, "there never was a government more popular, more sought after, or better supported by [public] opinion." Id. at 192; see SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 118-19. Sarmiento argued that Argentina's useless gaucho population needed to be replaced with European immigrants, see SARMIENTO, FACUNDO, supra, at 238-39, not placed in control of the government, see Nicolas Shumway, Sarmiento and the Narrative of Failure, in SARMIENTO AND HIS ARGENTINA 51, 54-55 (Joseph T. Criscenti ed., 1993).

149. See ALBERDI, BASES, supra note 95, at 470.

150. See id. at 460-61.

151. See id. at 461-62, 463-67.

152. Id. at 462.

153. Id.

154. See id.

155. Id. at 570, art. 67, . 3. This section later became incorporated into the CONST. ARG. OF 1853 art. 64, . 16, and the CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 67, . 16.

156. See BOTANA, supra note 124, at 358-59.

157. See SARMIENTO, ARGIROPOLIS, supra note 131, at 56.

158. See id. at 102.

159. See id. at 101.

160. See SARMIENTO, COMENTARIOS, supra note 143, at 225.

161. See DARDO P�REZ GUILHOU, SARMIENTO Y LA CONSTITUCION 76-79 (1989) (including an excellent summary of Sarmiento's writings on federalism); see also CARLOS OCTAVIO BUNGE, SARMIENTO (ESTUDIO BIOGRAFICO Y CRITICO) 134 (1926); ALLISON WILLIAMS BUNKLEY, THE LIFE OF SARMIENTO 406, 472-76 (1969) (noting Sarmiento's unitarian tendencies when in federal government).

162. See 2 FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 67.

163. See id. at 75-76.

164. See DOMINGO FAUSTINO SARMIENTO, CARTA DE YUNGAY (1852) [hereinafter SARMIENTO, CARTA DE YUNGAY], in 15 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO 21, 28, 34-36, 38 (Editorial Luz del D¡a, 1950). This open letter forms part of a collection known as Las ciento y una. See id.

165. See BOSCH, supra note 80, at 221, 228; JAMES R. SCOBIE, LA LUCHA POR LA CONSOLIDACION DE LA NACIONALIDAD ARGENTINA, 1852-62, at 25-26 (2d ed. 1964); SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 170-71.

166. See SCOBIE, supra note 55, at 53.

167. See id. at 17-23.

168. See Proclamation of General Urquiza to the People of Buenos Aires (Feb. 21, 1852), in BEATRIZ BOSCH, PRESENCIA DE URQUIZA 118-20 (1953); SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 26-27. Sarmiento naturally joined the protests against its use. See SARMIENTO, CARTA DE YUNGAY, supra note 164, at 26.

169. See John Pendleton, Despatch No. 34 to the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, June 24, 1853, microformed on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, supra note 74 (noting that Buenos Aires wanted a Constitution with which it could rule the country); 2 FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 75 (noting that this "nationalist" line was led by Bartolom‚ Mitre). Mitre was one of the most prominent of the exiles who joined Urquiza's army, and led Buenos Aires' military forces in all of its subsequent battles with Urquiza. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 122; SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 188-90.

170. See BOSCH, supra note 80, at 247; SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 34.

171. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 34-35.

172. See id. at 35-37. For a discussion of what occurred at the Congress and its results, see generally id. at 35-39.

173. See Acuerdo de San Nicol s de los Arroyos, arts. 12-18, in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 335, 337-38.

174. See id. art. 12, at 337.

175. See id. art. 6, at 336.

176. See id. art. 5, at 336.

177. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 40-48.

178. See id. at 56-58.

179. See id. at 60.

180. See SCOBIE, supra note 55, at 104.

181. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 56-95 (offering detailed description of relations between Urquiza and Province of Buenos Aires between September 1852 and July 1853).

182. CONST. ARG. [CONSTITUCION DE LA CONFEDERACION ARGENTINA, arts/ 3. 34. 42 [hereinafter CONST. ARG. OF 1853]].

183. CONST. ARG. OF 1853 art. 64(1).

184. For example, during a debate at the Constitutional Convention regarding whether it was appropriate to adopt a constitution when the country was so divided, Juan Segu¡, a delegate from the Province of Santa F‚, argued that a National Constitution was needed to prevent division and to show Buenos Aires what the Confederation was capable of. See Congreso General Constituyente de la Confederaci¢n Argentina [hereinafter Constitutional Convention of 1853], Session of Apr. 20, 1853, in 4 ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS, 1813-1893, at 467, 468-87 (Emilio Ravignani ed., 1937) [hereinafter 4 ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS]; see also SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 104 (offering general observation that the threat from Buenos Aires probably caused the provinces to accept greater federal authority than they would have under other circumstances).

185. Alberdi's draft and the Argentine Constitution of 1853 may be conveniently compared in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 341-53 (Alberdi's draft), 358-72 (Constitution of 1853). An article by article account of similarities and differences among Alberdi's draft, the U.S. Constitution, and the Argentine Constitution of 1853 would be a waste of space. Many scholars have offered comparisons of the three texts. See, e.g., AMADEO, supra note 84, at 28-35; ALBERTO PADILLA, LA CONSTITUCION DE ESTADOS UNIDOS COMO PRECEDENTE ARGENTINO 103-23 (1921); 1 SEGUNDO V. LINARES QUINTANA, TRATADO DE LA CIENCIA DEL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 419, 427-34 (1977); JORGE REINALDO VANOSSI, LA INFLUENCIA DE LA CONSTITUCION DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE NORTEAM�RICA EN LA CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA 10-11, 73, 74-75, 81, 107 (1976).

186. See VANOSSI, supra note 184, at 107. Compare Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 art. 5, with CONST. ARG. OF 1853 art. 19.

187. See CONST. ARG. OF 1853 arts. 1, 5, 101-107.

188. See id. arts. 71-83.

189. See id. arts. 91-100.

190. See id. arts. 32-70.

191. See id. art. 42.

192. See id. arts. 33-35.

193. See id. art. 2.

194. See id. art. 66 (incorporating line item veto); art. 83, . 10 (allowing cabinet ministers to be named without subsequent Senate consent); art. 83, . 19 (granting president power to announce a state of siege, with the consent of the Senate required if in session); art. 83, . 20 (authorizing detention of persons threatening public tranquility).

195. See id. art. 74.

196. See id. art. 6.

197. See id. arts. 23, 83, . 19.

198. See id. art. 83, . 20.

199. See id. arts. 14-19.

200. See id. art. 20.

201. See id. art. 21 (providing that, even if they become citizens, foreigners enjoy a ten-year exemption from military service).

202. See 1 MAYER, supra note 97, at 557.

203. See id. at 557-58. Alberdi's best known defense of Urquiza during the Constitutional Convention was a series of public letters known as the "Cartas quillotanas," written at his home in Quillota, Chile. See JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI, Cartas sobre la prensa y la pol¡tica militante de la Rep£blica Argentina (1853), in 4 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI 5 (Buenos Aires, La Tribuna Nacional 1886); see also BOTANA, supra note 125, at 340; SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 182-86 (offering analysis of the debate).

204. See SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 85.

205. See id. at 129; 1 MAYER, supra note 97, at 214-15.

206. See 1 MAYER, supra note 97, at 355.

207. See JORGE REINALDO A. VANOSSI, LA INFLUENCIA DE JOS� BENJAMIN GOROSTIAGA EN LA CONSTITUCION ARGENTINA Y SU JURISPRUDENCIA 27 (1970).

208. At the Constitutional Convention, he was the first to emphasize the drafting committee's use of the U.S. Constitution as a model. See Constitutional Convention of 1853, Session of Apr. 20, 1853, supra note 184, at 468; see also VANOSSI, supra note 207, at 26 (noting that Gorostiaga was familiar with U.S. constitutional law).

209. See John Pendleton, Despatch No. 8 to the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, Mar., 1852, microformed on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, supra note 74. This letter from the U.S. Charg‚ d' Affaires notes:

Should Genl Urquiza continue at the head of affairs, he will exercise a controlling influence, and will endeavor to conform the work as near as possible to the model of our own government. He says so at any time and to any body, without reserve-and his preference for North Americans is undisguised-expressed in the most open manner.

Id.

210. Urquiza often compared himself to George Washington and was compared to Washington in correspondence that sought to flatter him. See BOSCH, supra note 168, at 286 (quoting letter from Urquiza to Mitre in 1860 which read, "Without pretending in any way to merit the glories of Washington I very much wish and endeavor to imitate his example."); id. at 205, 246, 254, 367, 438, 463 (noting that Washington's portrait hung in Urquiza's living room), 673 (citing correspondence). When the Constitutional Convention of 1853 sent the completed Constitution to Urquiza and wished to praise him, it wrote: "The Congress confers upon you the glory of Washington. You can aspire to no other." Constitutional Convention of 1853, Session of Apr. 20, 1853, supra note 184, at 468.

211. See John Pendleton, Despatch No. 13 to the Secretary of State, (Buenos Aires, July 9, 1852), microformed on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, supra note 74.

212. See John Pendleton, Despatch No. 10 to the Secretary of State, (Buenos Aires, Apr. 28, 1852), microformed on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, supra note 74.

213. See id.

214. See John Pendleton, Despatch No. 11 to the Secretary of State, (Buenos Aires, June 1, 1852), microformed on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, supra note 74.

215. See John Pendleton, Despatch No. 30 to the Secretary of State, (Buenos Aires, June 1, 1853), microformed on Despatches From the United States Ministers to Argentina, 1817-1906, supra note 74.

216. See Constitutional Convention of 1853, Session of Apr. 24, 1853, supra note 184, at 511 (statement of Guti‚rrez).

217. See id. at 512 (statement of Fray Manuel P‚rez). Friar Jos‚ Manuel Perez, a member of the Dominican Order, was a delegate from the Province of Tucum n. See 5 VICENTE OSVALDO CUTOLO, NUEVO DICCIONARIO BIOGRAFICO ARGENTIN 432-33 (1971).

218. See Constitutional Convention of 1853, Session of Apr. 24, 1853, supra note 184, at 511 (statement of Manuel Leiva).

219. Aside from the two references in the text, Alberdi is mentioned by name twice during the Convention-once to imply (incorrectly) that Alberdi did not favor nationalization of customs duties, see id. at 501 (statement of Manuel Leiva), and once to refute that claim, see id. at 504 (statement of Gorostiaga). In fact, Alberdi's draft constitution clearly provided that Congress would create customs offices and establish customs duties. See Juan Bautista Alberdi, Proyecto de Constituci¢n de Juan Bautista Alberdi, art. 68, . 5, in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 341, 344.

220. See Constitutional Convention of 1853, Session of Apr. 20, 1853, supra note 184, at 469-79 (statement of Facundo Zuvir¡a).

221. Id. at 480 (statement of Juan Maria Guti‚rrez).

222. Id.

223. Id. (blaming Argentina's anarchistic and despotic history on lack of good republican citizens).

224. Id. at 483 (statement of Martin Zapata).

225. Id. (statement of Huergo); see id. at 479 (statement of Juan Maria Guti‚rrez) (noting that there are two ways to form a country: (1) to write a constitution considering the customs, values, and character of the country; or (2) to write a constitution hoping to create the required corresponding values).

226. See id. at 488 (voting to proceed with Drafting Committee Report).

227. Id. at 468 (statement of Jos‚ Benjamin Gorostiaga).

228. See id. at 479 (statement of Juan Maria Guti‚rrez).

229. Id. at 539 (statement of Facundo Zuvir¡a).

230. See id. at 502 (statement of Jos‚ Benjamin Gorostiaga).

231. Thus, a provision authorizing Congress to impeach governors in the case of serious crimes was explained as necessary given Argentina's high level of instability. See id. at 521-22 (statement of Zaval¡a). Similarly, a provision authorizing national civil, commercial, penal, and mining codes was justified on grounds that Argentina did not share the common law tradition of the United States in which much of this law was based (an explanation that obviously does not explain why the power to write codes was given to the Congress and not to the provincial legislatures). See id. at 529 (statement of Jos‚ Benjamin Gorostiaga).

232. See generally PADILLA, supra note 185, at 103-07 (describing references to U.S. Constitution at Convention).

233. See SARMIENTO, COMENTARIOS, supra note 143, at 30.

234. See id. at 33.

235. See id.

236. See id. at 33-35.

237. See id. at 83 (discussing the distribution of power under a federal system).

238. See id. at 61 (discussing Justice Story's description of the preamble's purpose).

239. Id. at 60.

240. See id. at 60-61.

241. See id. at 59.

242. See id. at 60 (writing that Constitutional Convention had given Argentina both constitution and case law).

243. Id. at 60.

244. See id. at 62.

245. U.S. CONST. preamble.

246. See, e.g., SARMIENTO COMENTARIOS, supra note 143, at 123-27 (recognizing that Argentina's approach to religion and state is different); id. at 215-16 (recognizing need for national civil, commercial, penal, and mining codes even though U.S. practice leaves these areas to the states).

247. See id. at 29.

248. See id. at 60, 69-70.

249. Id. at 60.

250. See id. at 61; cf. id. at 30 (arguing that revisiting the authority of U.S. system will not inspire confidence).

251. See, e.g., ALBERDI, BASES, supra note 95, at 448 (noting that any constitution must look at Argentine history and reality in developing a federal system of government); see id. at 521 (describing a constitution as a compromise among political interests); see id. at 389-90 (noting that Argentina and United States have different needs in the areas of foreign relations and economic development). Some commentators have described the differences between Alberdi and Sarmiento as depending, at least in part, on differing views of Argentine history. Sarmiento simply discards Argentina's past of barbaric caudillos as offering nothing for Argentina's future. Alberdi never rejects the past as irrelevant and sometimes identifies characteristics that can be used as foundation. See BOTANA, supra note 125, at 263-84; SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 122-23, 132, 135, 181-84.

252. JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI, ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA CONSTITUCION ARGENTINA DE 1853 (1853) [hereinafter ALBERDI, ESTUDIOS], in 5 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI 148 (Buenos Aires, La Tribuna Nacional 1886).

253. See 1 MAYER, supra note 97, at 595 n.476.

254. ALBERDI, ESTUDIOS, supra note 252, at 148.

255. Id.

256. Id.

257. Id. at 149.

258. See id. at 150.

259. See id. at 154.

260. Id. at 151.

261. See id. at 157.

262. See id. at 159.

263. See id.

264. See id. at 155.

265. See id. at 182-83.

266. See id.

267. See id. at 194-96.

268. See id. at 155-60.

269. See supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text.

270. See Michael Aaron Rockland, Sarmiento's Views on the United States, in SARMIENTO AND HIS ARGENTINA, supra note 147, at 45.

271. See SARMIENTO, COMENTARIOS, supra note 143, at 52. The comments of Gorostiaga and Guti‚rrez are discussed supra notes 221-31 and accompanying text.

272. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.

273. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 105-06.

274. See id. at 107-12, 134-38, 142-53, 164-94.

275. See id. at 118-120, 132.

276. See id. at 158-60.

277. See id. at 254-55.

278. See id. at 254-60; 2 FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 88-89.

279. See Pacto de Uni¢n de San Jos‚ de Flores (Nov. 11, 1859), in LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, at 381.

280. See LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE LA ARGENTINA 1810/1972, supra note 82, art. 1, at 382.

281. See id. art. 8, at 382-83.

282. See id. art. 7, at 382.

283. See id. art. 8, at 382-83.

284. See id. art. 5, at 382.

285. See id. arts. 1-5, at 382.

286. See id. art. 2, at 382.

287. See id. art. 5, at 382.

288. See Sesiones de la Convenci¢n del Estado de Buenos Aires, encargada del examen de la Constituci¢n federal [hereinafter Buenos Aires Convention], in 4 ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS, supra note 184, at 705, 938.

289. Compare id. at 705-988 (including not only the floor debates but a summary of sessions of the committee appointed to report to the Convention, and the Committee's report to the Convention), with Constitutional Convention of 1853, supra note 184, at 402-536 (containing debates and reports of the 1853 Convention).

290. Mitre led a political grouping called Club Libertad that won a majority of the seats at the Convention. See SCOBIE, supra note 55, at 262-64, 273-75.

291. See SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 189-90.

292. 2 FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 75.

293. See SCOBIE, supra note 55, at 274-76.

294. See id. at 264, 266. Sarmiento indicated that Mitre was the author of the Examining Committee's Report. See Buenos Aires Convention, Session of Apr. 27, 1860, supra note 288, at 804 (statement of Sarmiento).

295. See, e.g., Buenos Aires Convention, Informe de la Comisi¢n Examinadora de la Constituci¢n Federal [hereinafter Examining Committee Report], Session of Apr. 26, 1860, in 4 ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS, supra note 184, at 768 (on the general approach of making the smallest possible number of changes); id. at 787, 791-92 (statement of V‚lez S rsfield arguing that the Examining Committee properly kept changes to a minimum); id., Session of Apr. 27, 1860, at 804 (statement of Sarmiento arguing that Mitre in drafting the report of the Examining Committee wanted to avoid further tensions with General Urquiza); id. at 868 (statement of Sarmiento noting that the Examining Committee tried to keep changes to a minimum).

296. The reservation of export tariffs for the provinces was proposed initially by Francisco de Elizalde and Rufino Elizalde at a meeting with the Examining Committee and was rejected by the Committee. See id. at 853 (statement of V‚lez S rsfield); id. at 879 (statement of Rufino Elizalde). The issue, however, was then successfully raised and passed on the floor of the Convention. See id. (statement of Rufino Elizalde); see also id., Session of May 9, 1860, at 913 (indicating passage of the amendment).

297. See id., Session of Apr. 27, 1860, at 804 (statement of Sarmiento).

298. Id., Session of Apr. 26, 1860, at 769.

299. Id.

300. See id.

301. Id.

302. Id.

303. Id.

304. Id.

305. Id.

306. Id.

307. See id.

308. Id. at 791 (statement of V‚lez S rsfield).

309. Id. (statement of V‚lez S rsfield).

310. Id., Session of May 1, 1860, at 843 (statement of V‚lez S rsfield). V‚lez S rsfield used his reputation as an expert in U.S. law to try to prevent less informed opponents from debating him. See id. at 853 (statement of V‚lez S rsfield).

311. Id., Session of May 7, 1860, at 872 (statement of Sarmiento).

312. See supra notes 233-50 and accompanying text.

313. See Examining Committee Report, Session of May 7, 1860, supra note 295, at 870-71 (statement of Sarmiento).

314. Id. at 872 (statement of Sarmiento) (emphasis added).

315. See id., Session of May 8, 1860, at 879 (statement of Rufino Elizalde).

316. See id. at 879, 893 (statement of Rufino Elizalde) (rebuking Sarmiento and arguing for export tariff proposal); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, . 9, cl. 5 (forbidding Congress to impose export taxes); id. art. I, . 10, cl. 2 (barring states from imposing export taxes without congressional consent).

317. See Examining Committee Report, Session of May 9, 1860, supra note 295, at 910 (statement of Esteves Segu¡).

318. Id., Session of May 11, 1860, at 921 (statement of Fr¡as).

319. See id. at 916-21.

320. See id. at 930.

321. See id. at 922-27.

322. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 12 & art. 67, . 1.

323. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 26, 1860, supra note 295, at 784 (noting that the change comes from the U.S. Constitution).

324. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 67, . 9.

325. See Buenos Aires Convention, Sesiones de la Comisi¢n del Estado de Buenos Aires, Examinadora de la Constituci¢n Federal [hereinafter Sessions of the Examining Committee], in 4 ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS, supra note 184, at 961; see Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 26, 1860, supra note 295, at 784.

326. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 67, . 1.

327. See supra notes 279-87 and accompanying text.

328. See id.

329. See Examining Committee Report, Session of May 9, 1860, supra note 295, at 907-08 (statements of Sarmiento, Riestra, and Elizalde).

330. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 31.

331. See Examining Committee Report, Session of May 8, 1860, supra note 295, at 875-78 (statements of M rmol and Sarmiento); see SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 269, 291.

332. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 3.

333. See id. art. 38.

334. See id. art. 104.

335. See Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires C/ Naci¢n Argentina, 186 Fallos 170, 222-24 (1940) (analyzing the Bank's status as a provincial institution that was protected under the Pact of San Jos‚ de Flores and accordingly under article 104 of the Constitution, and holding that the Bank could not be subject to federal taxation).

336. See 2 FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 79-80, 100-01.

337. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 270.

338. See infra notes 339-52 and accompanying text (reviewing liberal proposals influenced by American practice).

339. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 5.

340. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 27, 1860, supra note 295, at 809 (statement of V‚lez S rsfield); see also id. at 808 (discussing utility of U.S. practice).

341. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 5 (imposing no requirement upon provinces to provide free education).

342. The issue was important for Buenos Aires, because it had the most extensive system of public education in the country, but it was not free. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 773. The utility of the U.S. practice of not imposing any requirements on the states in this area is discussed at the Session of Apr. 27, 1860, id. at 808 (statement of V‚lez S rsfield).

343. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, . 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence."); see also Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 27, 1860, supra note 295, at 808 (statement of V‚lez S rsfield) (discussing U.S. practice).

344. CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 6; see Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 777; id., Session of Apr. 27, 1860, at 811 (statement of Sarmiento) (discussing need to adopt U.S. practice regarding federal intervention).

345. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 40; id. art. 47; see also Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 775; id., Session of May 1, 1860, at 849 (statement of Sarmiento) (arguing the need to follow the U.S. model).

346. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 34 (restricting rights of federal officials).

347. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 776; Sessions of the Examining Committee, supra note 325, at 978 (discussing adherence to U.S. approach).

348. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 67, . 11, & art. 100 (providing that the national nature of the civil, commercial, criminal and mining codes does not create federal jurisdiction). The effect of the change was to bring Argentine practice closer to that of the United States, requiring that most private law matters be heard in provincial courts, though there is no specific discussion at the Convention of U.S. practice in this area. With regard to family law, Article 97 of the Constitution of 1853 originally gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction over recursos de fuerza, which were appeals from ecclesiastical tribunals that handled most marriage and divorce cases. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 772-73. This jurisdiction was taken away from the Supreme Court in the new article on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, see CONST. ARG. OF 1860, art. 100, with reference to the need to follow U.S. law on Supreme Court jurisdiction. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 772-73.

349. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 100. This change also reflected U.S. practice. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 781; Sessions of the Examining Committee, supra note 325, at 871-72 (acknowledging the centrality of U.S. jurisdictional law).

350. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 772-73 (citing liberties granted by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); id., Session of May 1, 1860, at 840-41.

351. CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 32.

352. This change corresponds to the U.S. Constitution, but no explanation for the change is offered. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 778; id., Session of May 7, 1860, at 857-58; Sessions of the Examining Committee, supra note 325, at 980-83.

353. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 33.

354. See Examining Committee Report, Session of May 1, 1860, supra note 295, at 841 (statement of Sarmiento).

355. CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 45 (setting forth grounds for impeachment and removal).

356. Sessions of the Examining Committee, supra note 325, at 981-83 (translating "misdemeanor" in British and U.S. practice as "mala conducta" or "bad conduct," and therefore not requiring commission of a crime for impeachment and removal from office).

357. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 83, . 22; Examining Committee Report, Session of May 7, 1860, supra note 295, at 869 (statement of Sarmiento) (emphasizing that the change was taken literally from U.S. Constitution and reflected common international practice).

358. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 94 (altering responsibilities of Supreme Court judges); Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 25, 1860, supra note 295, at 775; id., Session of May 7, 1860, at 870-71 (statement of Sarmiento) (arguing that the change would enhance the judiciary).

359. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 15. The primary concern of the convention that prompted the change was an unratified treaty between the Confederation and Brazil promising to return runaway slaves. See Examining Committee Report, Session of Apr. 30, 1860, supra note 295, at 829-30.

360. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 (deleting article 83, section 20, of the Constitution of 1853); Examining Committee Report, Session of May 7, 1860, supra note 295, at 868 (statement of Sarmiento) (introducing change on behalf of Examining Committee and arguing that 1853 Constitution gave too much power to President and circumvented proper congressional authority).

361. Compare CONST. ARG. OF 1853 art. 86, with CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 89 (the new version eliminating the possibility of Cabinet Ministers issuing resolutions outside the area of their departments even if specially authorized to do so by the President).

362. See Examining Committee Report, supra note 295, at 780-81.

363. See id.

364. A Committee appointed to review the reforms proposed by the Buenos Aires Convention accepted those reforms virtually unchanged. See Actas de las Sesiones de la Convenci¢n Nacional "ad hoc," Reunida en Santa Fe en 1860, para examinar las reformas propuestas a la Constituci¢n de 1853 [hereinafter Convention of 1860], in 4 ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS, supra note 184, at 1048-50; see SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 290-91; 1 MAYER, supra note 97, at 525-26.

365. See Convention of 1860, supra note 364, at 1049.

366. See JOS� NICOLAS MATIENZO, EL GOBIERNO REPRESENTATIVO FEDERAL EN LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA 93 (2d ed. 1917).

367. See Convention of 1860, supra note 364, at 1049. Compare CONST. ARG. OF 1853 art. 97 (allowing federal jurisdiction over disputes between a citizen of a province and his provincial government), with CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 100 (providing only for federal jurisdiction when dispute is between a province and a citizen of another province). In addition, while the Convention accepted the Buenos Aires Convention's proposal to free the Supreme Court from permanent installation in the federal capital so that its members might ride circuit, it also, without explanation, eliminated any reference to a set number of Supreme Court judges, following the U.S. practice of leaving this determination to the legislature. See Convention of 1860, supra note 364, at 1048.

368. See id. at 1049.

369. See CONST. ARG. OF 1853 art. 30 (providing that the Constitution could not be amended during its first ten years); see also Convention of 1860, supra note 364, at 1037-59 (making no reference of any kind to the issue).

370. See Sessions of the Examining Committee, supra note 325, at 968-69.

371. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 290 (noting that Mitre and Urquiza's forces were united at the Convention, somewhat to the exclusion of Derqui).

372. See id. at 318-19, 321-29.

373. See id. at 293, 302-03.

374. See BOSCH, supra note 80, at 508.

375. See 2 MAYER, supra note 97, at 779-81; SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 273, 295, 305-17.

376. See SCOBIE, supra note 165, at 333-34.

377. See id. at 336.

378. See id. at 354.

379. See id. at 356-76; BOSCH, supra note 80, at 563-77 (describing negotiations between Mitre and Urquiza that lead to Urquiza's semi-withdrawal from national politics).

380. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 126, 129; 2 FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 103-04, 144-45.

381. See 2 FLORIA & GARCIA BELSUNCE, supra note 58, at 106.

382. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 131.

383. From 1901 to 1904, during the second presidency of Roca, Joaqu¡n V. Gonz lez served as Minister of the Interior, Minister of Justice and Public Education, and Minister of Foreign Relations. For a time, he held more than one post simultaneously. From 1904 to 1906, he served as Minister of Justice and Public Education for President Manuel Quintana. See 5 CUTOLO, supra note 217, at 372. His chief constitutional law work was MANUAL DE LA CONSTITUTION ARGENTINA (1897).

384. JOAQUIN V. GONZALEZ, JUICIO DEL SIGLO O CIEN A¥OS DE HISTORIA ARGENTINA (1910), in 21 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE JOAQUIN V. GONZALEZ 190 (1936).

385. See id. at 191-93.

386. See id. at 190-92.

387. Id. at 168.

388. ROBERT ANDREWS, THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 938 (1993) (quoting President Calvin Coolidge).

389. JAMES BRYCE, SOUTH AMERICA, OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS 315 (MacMillan 2d ed. 1917).

390. See LEWIS, supra note 9, at 13, 16, 18-20, 58-65; LUCAS AYARRAGARAY, SOCIALISMO ARGENTINO Y LEGISLACION OBRERA 12-22 (1912); A. STUART PENNINGTON, THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 323-24 (1910).

391. See MATIENZO, supra note 366, at 320.

392. See id. at 57.

393. The construction of railroads and ports increased opportunities for selling agricultural products and fueled land speculation in Argentina toward the end of the nineteenth century. See ROCK, supra note 12, at 139-40.

394. See LEWIS, supra note 9, at 20-22.

395. See GONZALEZ, supra note 384, at 171, 177-78; see also WAISMAN, supra note 7, at 44-45 (observing that foreign writers, influential Argentinian scholars, and others hailed social and economic progress of state).

396. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 18.

397. See DARDO DE LA VEGA DIAZ, MITRE Y EL CHACHO 245-46, 317-23 (1939).

398. See BUNKLEY, supra note 161, at 410-11 (noting that Mitre's government censured Sarmiento for his counterrevolutionary measures); SHUMWAY, supra note 50, at 228-31 (recounting that intellectuals praised Pe¤aloza and denounced Sarmiento for his death); DE LA VEGA DIAZ, supra note 397, at 330-31 (noting that Sarmiento denied responsibility for the execution and that President Mitre condemned the execution as illegal). Sarmiento subsequently wrote a book to justify the campaign against Pe¤aloza and his execution. See DOMINGO FAUSTINO SARMIENTO, EL CHACHO (circa 1864) [hereinafter SARMIENTO, EL CHACHO], in 7 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO, supra note 148, at 285 (presenting text of book). He claimed that under U.S. practice, the execution was justified under martial law. See id. at 376-78.

399. See 2 ROBERT A. POTASH, THE ARMY & POLITICS IN ARGENTINA 1945-1962, at 232-33 (1980) (noting that no political executions occurred in the twentieth century until 1955). There are partial exceptions to this statement, however. In 1921, dozens of strikers in the Patagonia were executed illegally by Lieutenant Colonel H‚ctor Varela, see 2 OSVALDO BAYER, LOS VENGADORES DE LA PATAGONIA TRAGICA 206-09 (1972), and in 1930 several anarchists were punished for common crimes and terrorist acts that they committed, but their executions also bore a political tinge. See generally OSVALDO BAYER, ANARCHISM AND VIOLENCE: SEVERINO DI GIOVANNI IN ARGENTINA 1923-1931, at 52-222 (Paul Sharkley, trans., Elephant ed. 1986) (recounting the crimes and trial of several violent anarchists of the period).

400. See Law No. 714, July 26, 1875, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 996; Law No. 843, June 29, 1877, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 1144; Law No. 2310, Sept. 1, 1888, [1881-1888] A.D.L.A. 438; Law No. 2713, Sept. 1, 1890, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 207; Law No. 3223, Jan. 25, 1895, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 336; Law No. 4939, June 13, 1906, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 703 (establishing general amnesties for political and military crimes related to prior uprisings, with slight variations).

401. A typical illustration is the case of Colonel Mariano Espina, who provoked the torpedo boat "Murature" to mutiny during the Radical revolt of 1893 and who subsequently was condemned to death by a court martial. The Press lobbied heavily for commutation of the penalty, which President S enz Pe¤a commuted to twenty years in prison and loss of rank. In 1898, President Uriburu ordered his release and reincorporation into the army. See 2 CUTOLO, supra note 217, at 695.

402. See MATIENZO, supra note 366, at 196-99, 214, 221-38.

403. See id. at 221-22.

404. See BOTANA, supra note 125, at 180.

405. See id. at 178.

406. See id. at 180.

407. See MATIENZO, supra note 366, at 200.

408. See id. at 222-23.

409. See BOTANA, supra note 125, at 178-79, 181.

410. See id. at 181-82.

411. See MATIENZO, supra note 366, at 224-26; see also BOTANA, supra note 125, at 183-84.

412. GONZALEZ, supra note 384, at 13, 150.

413. See PENNINGTON, supra note 390, at 7.

414. Id. at 322.

415. See BRYCE, supra note 389, at 342-43.

416. See Armando Braun Men‚ndez, Primera Presidencia de Roca (1880-1886), in 1(1) ACADEMIA NACIONAL DE HISTORIA 269, 319-20 (1964); ROCK, supra note 12, at 55.

417. See GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, NOTAS DE VIAJE POR AM�RICA DEL SUR (Hyspam‚rica 1986) (Miguel Ruiz trans., 1911); see also BRYCE, supra note 389, at 342.

418. See CLEMENCEAU, supra note 417, at 105, 114-18; see also BRYCE, supra note 389, at 344; WILLIAM H. KOEBEL, MODERN ARGENTINA, THE EL DORADO OF TO-DAY 78 (1907); PENNINGTON, supra note 390, at 281-89; ADOLFO POSADA, LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA: IMPRESIONES Y COMENTARIOS 46-48 (Hyspam‚rica 1987) (1912); THOMAS A. TURNER, ARGENTINA AND THE ARGENTINES 35-36, 240-41 (1892). See generally C. GALVAN MORENO, EL PERIODISMO ARGENTINO 212-45, 297-353 (1944) (describing the variety of newspapers existing in Buenos Aires and rest of country, focusing mainly on second half of the nineteenth century).

419. See TURNER, supra note 418, at 35-36.

420. See JACINTO ODDONE, HISTORIA DEL SOCIALISMO ARGENTINO 24-41 (1983) (describing formation of Socialist Party), 18-23, 265-268 (describing Socialist press), 240-41 (describing election of Alfredo Palacios to Congress), 273-81 (describing organization of workers' co-operatives); ROCK, supra note 12, at 187-88.

421. See Law No. 7029, art. 7, June 30, 1910, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 787, 787-88 (barring associations and meetings of persons with object of spreading anarchist doctrine).

422. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 5 & art. 67, . 16.

423. See ALBERDI, BASES, supra note 95, at 416-20.

424. Sarmiento wrote extensively on education, his principal works being EDUCACION POPULAR (1848), in 11 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO (Editorial Luz del Dia, 1950); EDUCACION COMUN (1855), in 12 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE SARMIENTO (Editorial Luz del Dia, 1950); LAS ESCUELAS: BASES DE LA PROSPERIDAD DE LA REPUBLICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS (1866), in 30 OBRAS COMPLETAS E SARMIENTO (Editorial Luz del Dia, 1950); see also BOTANA, supra note 125, at 320-23; Georgette Magassy Dorn, Sarmiento, the United States, and Public Education, in SARMIENTO AND HIS ARGENTINA, supra note 148, at 77.

425. See Leoncio Gianello, La ense¤anza primaria y secundaria, in 3(2) ACADEMIA NACIONAL DE LA HISTORIA 115, 123-30 (1964). See generally Dorn, supra note 424, at 80-86 (describing Sarmiento's efforts, first as director of the Department of Education of the Province of Buenos Aires, and later as President).

426. See TURNER, supra note 418, at 39 (detailing how much better the Argentinian school system was compared to European schools); see also POSADA, supra note 418, at 120-23.

427. See JUAN CARLOS VEDOYA, COMO FUE LA ENSE¥ANZA POPULAR EN LA ARGENTINA 61, 71, 121 (1973). See generally Gianello, supra note 425, at 115, 132-47 (offering history of public education between 1882 and 1916).

428. See GINO GERMANI, ESTRUCTURA SOCIAL DE LA ARGENTINA 231 (1955).

429. See Law No. 1420, art. 8, July 8, 1884, [1881-1888] A.D.L.A. 126, 127.

430. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 18.

431. See CLEMENCEAU, supra note 417, at 81-86, esp. 84.

432. See JULES HURET, LA ARGENTINA DE BUENOS AIRES AL GRAN CHACO 131-36 (G¢mez Carrillo trans., 1913) (1911); see also POSADA, supra note 418, at 113-16.

433. See CLEMENCEAU, supra note 417, at 77-81.

434. See PENNINGTON, supra note 390, at 64 (explaining how government often took control of small provinces); see also DOUGLAS W. RICHMOND, CARLOS PELLEGRINI AND THE CRISIS OF THE ARGENTINE ELITES, 1880-1916, at 104-05 (1989) (describing British government's frustration with mistreatment of a British citizen by government of the Province of Entre R¡os and with provincial courts); ROWE, supra note 72, at 12.

435. Two pieces of legislation provided legal authority for government repression of anarchists. See Law No. 4144, art. 1, Nov. 23, 1902, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 560, 560 (authorizing Executive to expel any foreigner whose conduct makes him a threat to national security or public order); Ley de Defensa Social, Law No. 7029, June 30, 1910, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 787 (barring anarchist meetings and propaganda, allowing expulsion of anarchists, and prohibiting possession of explosives and terrorist acts).

436. See Argentine Civil Code of 1869, Law No. 340, Sept. 29, 1869, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 496, art. 186 (husband administers all marital property in absence of prenuptial contract), art. 188 (husband's authorization required to bring law suit), art. 189 (husband's authorization required to enter into contract to buy or sell goods). This legislation was not liberalized substantially until Law No. 11.357, Sept. 23, 1926, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 199. See 1 EDUARDO A. ZANNONI, DERECHO CIVIL 343-44, . 269 (2d ed. 1989).

437. See generally DONNA J. GUY, SEX AND DANGER IN BUENOS AIRES: PROSTITUTION, FAMILY AND NATION IN ARGENTINA (1991) (providing an account of female prostitution and white slavery in Argentina).

438. See ODDONE, supra note 420, at 80-124 (offering description of clashes between labor and government between 1902 and 1910).

439. The 4.5% figure is calculated using the starting and ending dates for each state of siege, with the relevant laws and decrees provided by the Legislative Reference Office of the Argentine Congress. The data used was essentially the same as that provided in 3 REPUBLICA ARGENTINA, COMISION DE ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES, MATERIALES PARA LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL 26a (1957). The calculation for total time between 1870 and 1930 spent under state of siege rises to slightly more than nine percent if one includes partial states of siege that included only a single province or a small group of provinces facing local disturbances.

440. See id. at 26.

441. See PENNINGTON, supra note 390, at 68 (explaining effect of declaration of state of siege).

442. See GERMANI, supra note 428, at 82.

443. See id. at 81.

444. See id. at 88.

445. See id. at 81.

446. See id. at 21.

447. See generally DIAZ ALEJANDRO, supra note 4, at 141-59 (detailing tremendous growth of rural production and land tenure characteristics).

448. See id. at 35-40.

449. See GERMANI, supra note 428, at 84 (describing the tendency of immigrants to settle in urban areas).

450. See DIAZ ALEJANDRO, supra note 4, at 28 (explaining the connections between the Argentine capital market and world markets).

451. See id. at 2-3, 29-39; WINTHROP R. WRIGHT, BRITISH OWNED RAILWAYS IN ARGENTINA: THEIR EFFECT ON ECONOMIC NATIONALISM 87 (1974).

452. See WAISMAN, supra note 7, at 51-58.

453. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.

454. ROCK, supra note 12, at 143.

455. See Roberto Cort‚s Conde, Sarmiento and Economic Progress: From Facundo to the Presidency, in SARMIENTO, AUTHOR OF A NATION 114, 121-22 (Tulio Halper¡n Donghi et al. eds., 1994) (maintaining that immigrants were attracted to Argentina because of individual liberties).

456. The electoral reforms, often referred to as the S enz Pe¤a Law, consisted of two enactments: Law No. 8130, July 27, 1911, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 815 (creating a secure system of electoral registers based on military conscription rolls); and Law No. 8871, Feb. 13, 1912, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 844 (establishing nearly universal male suffrage for all citizens over age 18, mechanisms to eliminate fraud, and voting by lists of candidates, but awarding a portion of the seats to the party placing second).

457. See Manifiesto de la junta revolucionaria de la uni¢n c¡vica radical al pueblo (1893), in 3(2) HIPOLITO YRIGOYEN, PUEBLO Y GOBIERNO 290, 291 (2d ed. 1956) (giving the text of the declaration issued by rebels on July 30, 1893, in Santa Fe, after taking over the city); Manifiesto de la Uni¢n C¡vica Radical al Pueblo de la Rep£blica Argentina (1905), in 3(2) PUEBLO Y GOBIERNO at 298, 300 (declaration issued at the start of 1905 revolt); Informe elevado a la Convenci¢n Nacional de la Uni¢n C¡vica Radical (Dec. 1909) in 3(2) PUEBLO Y GOBIERNO at 270, 274-75 (report by Yrigoyen on his two meetings with President Figueroa Alcorta in 1907 and 1908).

458. See supra note 457 and accompanying text; see also PETER SMITH, ARGENTINA AND THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY 91 (1974) (explaining that the problem the Radicals had with system was not with the Constitution or its protections, but rather with government violation of these protections).

459. See DAVID ROCK, POLITICS IN ARGENTINA, 1890-1930: THE RISE AND FALL OF RADICALISM 58, 60-61, 95 (1977); see also WAISMAN, supra note 7, at 83-84 (noting that all social and political forces in Argentina, with the exception of the anarchists, supported the basic characteristics of Argentine society).

460. See ROCK, supra note 459, at 271-72. To the elite's distress, the Radical Party may have shown greater sympathy toward striking workers than previous governments. See generally id. at 125-56. It also allowed the army to violently quash several strikes, most notably in January 1919, in the City of Buenos Aires. See id. at 157-79.

461. The first time that Alberdi is cited by the Argentine Supreme Court is probably in Hileret c/Provincia de Tucum n, 98 Fallos 20, 48-49 (1903), a leading case on the protection of economic liberties from state regulation.

462. Letter from John Pitkin, U.S. Ambassador to Argentina, to U.S. Secretary of State (May 16, 1891) (on file with The American University Law Review).

463. There were only two books on Argentine constitutional law published in the nineteenth century that offered a treatise-like study, both written by professors at the University of Buenos Aires. Florentino Gonz lez, the first person to hold the new Constitutional Law chair established in 1868, wrote LECCIONES DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL to accompany his course, and by 1889 the book entered into its fourth edition. Jos‚ Manuel Estrada was the second person to hold the chair, and his lectures were published as CURSO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL FEDERAL Y ADMINISTRATIVO (1895). Lucio L¢pez, the third person to hold the chair, published a less significant book, CURSO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL (1891), a short compilation of lectures. See generally H�CTOR P. LANFRANCO, La c tedra de historia y de derecho constitucional en la facultad de derecho de Buenos Aires y sus primeros maestros, in 8 REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO 63 (1957); Hector Jos‚ Tanzi, La ense¤anza del derecho constitucional en la Universidad de Buenos Aires, 31 Revista de Historia del Derecho "Ricardo Levene" 91, 92-104 (1995) (both articles offering a history of the constitutional law chair of the University of Buenos Aires under Gonz lez, Estrada, and L¢pez). Except for the above three books, only two other Argentine works offered some guidance on a limited number of substantive constitutional questions: JULIAN BARRAQUERO, ESPIRITU Y PRACTICA DE LA CONSTITUCION ARGENTINA (2d ed. 1889) (this book was originally a thesis and the original edition, published in 1879, was only a limited edition); and AMANCIO ALCORTA, LAS GARANTIAS CONSTITUCIONALES (1881). By contrast, a search of the stacks of the Argentine Supreme Court Library yielded the following important U.S. works translated and published by Argentine authors (or foreigners living in Argentina): THOMAS M. COOLEY, PRINCIPIOS GENERALES DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AM�RICA (Julio Carri‚ trans., 2d ed. 1898); LUTHER STEARNS CUSHING, ELEMENTOS DE LA LEY Y PRACTICA DE LAS ASAMBLEAS LEGISLATIVAS EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AM�RICA, 3 vols., (Nicol s Antonio Calvo trans., 1886); ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON AND JOHN JAY, EL FEDERALISTA (J. M. Cantilo trans., 1868); JAMES KENT, DEL GOBIERNO Y JURISPRUDENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS (Alejandro Carrasco Albano trans., 1865); FRANCISCO LIEBER, SOBRE LA LIBERTAD CIVIL Y EL PROPIO GOBIERNO (Juana Manso trans., 1869); FRANCISCO LIEBER, LA LIBERTAD CIVIL Y EL GOBIERNO PROPIO, 2 vols., (Florentino Gonz lez trans., 1872) (published in Paris, but while the translator was living in Buenos Aires); G.W. PASCHAL, ANOTACIONES A LA CONSTITUCION DE ESTADOS UNIDOS, 2 vols., (Nicol s Antonio Calvo trans., vol. 1 in 1888, vol. 2 in 1890) (includes annotations referring to the Argentine Constitution); JOS� STORY, COMENTARIO SOBRE LA CONSTITUCION FEDERAL DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS, 2 vols., (Nicol s Antonio Calvo trans., 1888) (translating fourth edition of Story's treatise); JOEL TIFFANY, GOBIERNO Y DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL (Clodomiro Quiroga trans., 1874); see also NICOLAS ANTONIO CALVO, DECISIONES CONSTITUCIONALES DE LOS TRIBUNALES FEDERALES DE ESTADOS UNIDOS DESDE 1789 (2d ed. 1886) (translating a digest of U.S. case law compiled by Orlando Bump); JORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, HISTORIA DEL ORIGEN, LA FORMACION Y ADOPCION DE LA CONSTITUCION DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS (J.M. Cantilo trans., 1866) (providing a history of the origins of the U.S. Constitution). A substantial amount also was published in Argentina on the history of the adoption of the Argentine Constitution. See, e.g., ARISTOBULO DEL VALLE, NOCIONES DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL (1897); ADOLFO SALDIAS, ENSAYO SOBRE LA CONSTITUCION ARGENTINA (1878). However, these books rarely help resolve concrete cases.

464. One tendency of the Argentine Supreme Court which can be noted in all periods of the Court's history has been to avoid citation to living Argentine authors, probably to avoid giving the appearance that any national author enjoys special authority. This unwritten rule never has applied to foreign authors, however.

465. See Congreso Nacional, C mara de Senadores, Diario de sesiones de 1869, Sess. of Sept. 11, 1869, at 691 (statement of Mitre).

466. Id.

467. The debate occurred on September 11, 14, and 16, 1869. See id., Sessions of Sept. 11, 14, & 16, 1869, at 668-755.

468. See id., Sessions of Sept. 11 & 14, 1869, at 689-721 (discussing U.S. practices); id., Session of Sept. 16, 1869, at 754-755 (voting to return government's bill to Committee to be analyzed along with a proposal from the Province of Buenos Aires). Ultimately construction of the port was authorized, but on the basis of an agreement with the Province. See Law No. 383, July 15, 1870, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 911 (authorizing Executive to engage in engineering studies jointly with the Province and to enter negotiations with Provincial government); Law No. 496, Oct. 14, 1871, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 940 (providing for joint participation in construction of the port); Law No. 585, art. 4, Nov. 5, 1872, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 964, 965 (authorizing construction on the basis of a bidding process established by the Province); Law No. 755, Oct. 11, 1875, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 1016 (revising some of the terms of construction).

469. See de la Torre, 19 Fallos 231, 236 (1877).

470. 19 Fallos 231 (1877).

471. 28 Fallos 406 (1885).

472. 32 Fallos 120 (1887).

473. See Acevedo, 19 Fallos 231, 241 (1877). A case was brought by de la Torre several weeks earlier, after the order for his detention but before he was detained, was dismissed by the Supreme Court on grounds that habeas corpus could be granted only to persons actually in detention. See id. at 191.

474. Acevedo, 28 Fallos at 408.

475. Sojo, 32 Fallos 120, 136 (1887).

476. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

477. Compare CONST. ARG. of 1860, with U.S. CONST. art. III. With regard to Supreme Court and lower federal court jurisdiction, compare Law No. 48, Sept. 14, 1863, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 364, with U.S. Judiciary Act of 1789; 1 N‚stor Pedro Sag�‚s, DERECHO PROCESAL CONSTITUCIONAL: RECURSO EXTRAORDINARIO 245, 256-57, 257 n.23 (3d ed. 1992).

478. See Law No. 27, art. 6, Oct. 16, 1862, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 354, 354 (establishing a Supreme Court of five judges and a Procurador General). This Court continued in force until Law No. 15.271, art. 1, Feb. 9, 1960, [XX-A] A.D.L.A. 9, 9-10, which increased the number of judges on the Supreme Court to seven.

479. See Fueron destitu¡dos los ministros de la Corte y el Procurador General, LA NACION, May 2, 1947, at 1.

480. See Law No. 27, art. 6, Oct. 16, 1862, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 354, 354 (treating the Procurador General as a member of Supreme Court, which implies the same life tenure). This practice eroded in 1989, when President Meneur forced the resignation of the person then serving as Procurador General, insisting that regardless of prior practice, the Procurador General served at the discretion of the President.

481. See Law No. 2372, art. 116, Oct. 17, 1877, [1881-1888] A.D.L.A. 444, 451 (establishing Procurador General's role as supervisor of all federal prosecutors and as the government's representative before the Supreme Court in all cases of original jurisdiction and appeals by federal prosecutors). The other functions of the office never were spelled out in legislation. See 4 RAFAEL BIELSA, DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO . 991 (4th ed. 1947).

482. For example, in the late 1880s and early 1890s, the Court included Benjam¡n Victorica, who in addition to past experience as a jurist was a prominent general and had served as Secretary of War on three separate occasions, once during the Confederation, once under President Roca, and once after leaving the Court, under President Luis S enz Pe¤a. See generally BEATRIZ BOSCH, BENJAMIN VICTORICA, DOCTOR Y GENERAL, 1831-1913 (1994) (providing biography with detailed description of Victorica's varied political career). Luis S enz Pe¤a, a former President of the House of Deputies, served on the Court between 1890 and 1892 and was elected President of the Nation while serving on the Court. His place on the Court was taken by Benjam¡n Paz, a former Governor and Senator from the province of Salta, who had served as President Roca's Minister of the Interior in 1882-83. See 5 CUTOLO, supra note 217, at 338; Men‚ndez, supra note 416, at 269, 279. From 1915 to 1931, the Court even included a former President, Jos‚ Figueroa Alcorta.

483. See generally DARDO P�REZ GUILHOU, PRIMER DEBATE SOBRE EL CONTROL JURISDICCIONAL DE CONSTITUCIONALIDAD (1857-1858); 10 REVISTA DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO 147 (1982) (offering an analysis of the debate on judicial review that took place when the Argentine Confederation passed legislation to establish Supreme Court).

484. See MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES, 3 MEMORIA DEL MINISTERIO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES PRESENTADA AL HONORABLE CONGRESO NACIONAL EN EL A¥O 1877, at 1-12 (1877) (providing text of letter to the Chilean government by Bernardo de Irigoyen, Minister of Foreign Relations, complaining of the incursions). This entire volume of the Ministry of Justice's annual report to Congress is devoted to the question of Argentina's border with Chile. The disputes eventually were settled through negotiations. See generally MARIO BARROS, HISTORIA DIPLOMATICA DE CHILE, 1541-1938, at 295-325 (1970) (describing the dispute and subsequent negotiations from the Chilean perspective); Carlos Heras, Presidencia de Avellaneda, in 1(1) ACADEMIA NACIONAL DE HISTORIA, supra note 416, at 149, 225-29 (briefly describing the dispute and negotiations from an Argentine perspective).

485. See La cuesti¢n internacional, LA PRENSA, July 19, 1877, at 1.

486. See La sesi¢n secreta de la C mara de Diputados, EL PORTE¥O, July 19, 1877, at 2. This newspaper is very difficult to locate, but the relevant pages may be found in the Case Dossier to de la Torre, Don Lino, stored in Legajo No. 237, Divisi¢n Archivo de la Corte Suprema, Archivo General del Poder Judicial [hereinafter de la Torre Dossier].

487. See Desacatos de la C mara de Diputados, LA PRENSA, July 21, 1877, at 1; Las sesiones secretas, EL PORTE¥O, July 20, 1877, at 2, available in de la Torre Dossier, supra note 485.

488. See Despacho telegr fico especial para El Porte¤o, Una sesi¢n secreta en la China, Brillantes Discursos del Ministro de R.E. y de Non-nan Friaj, EL PORTE¥O, July 20, 1877, at 2, available in de la Torre Dossier, supra note 486.

489. El Porte¤o appears to have supported the Autonomist Party of Adolfo Alsina. See Club Libertad, EL PORTE¥O, July 19, 1877, at 1, available in de la Torre Dossier, supra note 486 (trumpeting a meeting of Club Libertad, a political club led by H‚ctor Varela, an Autonomist). The Autonomist Party was one of the two main parties of Buenos Aires politics, and at the time supported the government. Adolfo Alsina, the Minister of War, and Bernardo de Irigoyen, the Minister of Foreign Relations, also were Autonomists.

490. See supra notes 486, 459 and accompanying text.

491. See Congreso Nacional, C mara de Diputados, Diario de sesiones de 1877, Session of Aug. 22, 1877, at 566 (voting in favor of de la Torre's release).

Interestingly, de la Torre's arrest was incredibly clumsy. The Vice President of the House of Deputies gave the Buenos Aires Police Chief a controversial search warrant authorizing him to enter uninvited into any home anywhere in search of de la Torre. See Los Porte¤os sin garant¡as, EL PORTE¥O, July 23, 1877, at 1. In spite of this broad authorization, de la Torre managed to escape when twenty policemen burst into the house of a friend where he was hiding. See Violaci¢n del domicilio y de la ley, LA PRENSA, July 24, 1877, at 1. De la Torre's capture/surrender may well have been negotiated in order to have his case heard by the Supreme Court, because the Court refused to hear the case while he remained out of custody. See de la Torre, 19 Fallos 190 (1877). La Prensa makes no mention of de la Torre's capture.

492. See de la Torre, 19 Fallos at 231 (1877).

493. Id. at 236. This is not to say that all members of the Court understood U.S. case law as binding in exactly the same way. Benjam¡n Gorostiaga, in a dissent in D vila c/Valdes, 23 Fallos 726 (1881), describes his dissent on a jurisdictional issue as looking at the letter and spirit of the jurisdictional statute, the legislative history, the Court's own precedents, U.S. Supreme Court precedents, and U.S. commentators and legislation. See id. at 739. Although he does not explicitly rank these sources of authority, because he offers these sources in a list, it certainly could be understood as a ranking. See VANOSSI, supra note 207, at 89 (describing list as ranking of sources).

494. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).

495. See de la Torre, 19 Fallos at 237, 238 (citing Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 204).

496. See id. at 237.

497. See id.

498. See id. at 239.

499. See id.

500. See id. at 246-47.

501. See id. at 247-49.

502. See id. at 244-48.

503. See id. at 249-51 (citing art. 18 of the 1860 Argentine Constitution, regarding ex post facto laws).

504. See Acevedo, 28 Fallos 406, 408 (1885).

505. See de la Torre, 19 Fallos at 240-41.

506. See Acevedo, 28 Fallos at 408.

507. See id. at 472-73.

508. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).

509. See Acevedo, 28 Fallos at 472-73 (opinion of the Procurador General) (citing Kilbourne v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880) and Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821)).

510. See Kilbourne, 103 U.S. at 196-97 (denying Congress power to fine or imprison a person merely by asserting that person's guilt or contempt).

511. See id. at 194-96 (questioning propriety of congressional interference with suit pending in court with proper jurisdiction).

512. See Sojo, 32 Fallos 120, 121 (1887); Acevedo, 28 Fallos at 406-08.

513. See Acevedo, 28 Fallos at 407. The full text of the El Debate article may be found in C mara de Diputados, Diario de sesiones de 1885, Session of July 14, 1885, at 73 (statement of Zapata).

514. See Prisi¢n del se¤or Sojo, LA PRENSA, Sept. 6, 1887, at 5.

515. See C mara de Diputados, Diario de sesiones de 1887, Session of Sept. 5, 1887, at 826-827 (statement of Mansilla). The Deputy's abusive remarks were criticized by the press, see Prisi¢n del se¤or Sojo, LA PRENSA, Sept. 6, 1887, at 5.

516. While Lucio Mansilla, the Deputy defamed by Sojo, was an ally of the President, Carlos Ju rez C‚lman and the leader of the pro-Ju rez C‚lman majority in the House, Senator Jos‚ Vicente Zapata, the Senator defamed by Acevedo two years earlier, was a rising star in Argentine politics. Only thirty-four years old at the time, Zapata already had served as President of the Supreme Court of Mendoza and in the House of Deputies. Before his death in 1897, at age forty-six, he would serve as Minister of the Interior under President Pellegrini and as Minister of Justice, Religion, and Public Instruction under President Luis S enz Pe¤a. See 4 CUTOLO, supra note 217, at 374-78 (describing Mansilla's career); id. at 775-76 (describing Zapata's career). Nothing occurred politically between 1885 and 1887 that indicates that Sojo was decided under less favorable political circumstances for the Court than Acevedo.

517. See Sojo, 32 Fallos at 121.

518. Case Dossier to Sojo, Don Eduardo, interpone el recurso de h beas corpus [hereinafter Sojo Dossier], stored in Legajo No. 327, Divisi¢n Archivo de la Corte Suprema, Archivo General del Poder Judicial (order by Benjam¡n Victorica, the President of the Court, instructing the Procurador General to brief the issue of jurisdiction).

519. The Argentine Constitution of 1860 provides:

Art. 100-The Supreme Court and the lower courts of the Nation shall hear and decide all cases that deal with points governed by the Constitution, and by the laws of the Nation, with the limitation established in part 11 of article 67 [for matters governed by the civil, commercial penal and mining codes], and by treaties with foreign nations, of cases concerning foreign ambassadors, ministers and consuls, of cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, of the matters in which the Nation is a party, of cases that arise between two or more provinces, between a province and the residents of another, between residents of different provinces, and between a province or its residents against a foreign state or citizen.

Art. 101-In these [above] cases the Supreme Court will exercise appellate jurisdiction according to the rules and exceptions prescribed by Congress, but in matters concerning foreign ambassadors, ministers and consuls and those in which a province is a party it will exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.

CONST. ARG. OF 1860 arts. 100, 101.

The U.S. Constitution reads:

The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States,-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

U.S. CONST. art. III, . 2.

520. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-75 (1803).

521. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-75 (1803) (holding that the list of situations where Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in Constitution is exclusive and that Congress may not add to it).

522. U.S. CONST. art. III, . 2; Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-75 (interpreting article III, section 2).

523. See infra note 531 and accompanying text.

524. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 153-54.

525. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 25-27 (2d ed. 1994) (describing how Marshall established doctrine of judicial review while limiting the Court's clash with the Jefferson administration); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 2 (Yale University Press 2d ed. 1962); George L. Haskins & Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-15, in THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, 2 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 203-04 (1981).

526. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-80.

527. It was not necessary for Marshall to read the provision on writs of mandamus as referring to situations other than those constitutionally within the Court's original jurisdiction. Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 actually uses much of the same language as article III, section 2 of the Constitution and only authorizes writs of mandamus "in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, . 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81. There is nothing in section 13 of the Judiciary Act to indicate that Congress intended the Supreme Court to exercise original jurisdiction in cases like Marbury's, where a citizen brings an action against an officer of the federal government. Likewise, the statute, by referring to the "principles and usages of law" hardly could be reasonably read as providing for the issuance of writs of mandamus when these were not warranted under the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. See id.

528. See U.S. CONST. art. III, . 1 ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court.").

529. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-76 (declaring Marbury's claim as outside the competence of the Court).

530. See supra note 519 (providing text of Article III).

531. See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 341 (1879) (noting that writ of habeus corpus could not be granted if it were an exercise of original jurisdiction); Ex Parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 252 (1863) (restating rule of construction that affirmative grant of original jurisdiction in the Constitution as to some cases must be construed as denial of original jurisdiction in all other cases); In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 119 (1852) (Curtis, J., concurring) (stating that the Court may issue a writ of habeus corpus only as an exercise of its appellate, not original jurisdiction); see also Ex Parte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 705 (Marshall, C.J.) (requiring appellant to show that habeas corpus relief sought was being sought from the Supreme Court only in an appellate capacity provided in the Constitution). 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES . 1697 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833) (stating general rule that Congress cannot expand the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction beyond the list provided in Article III).

532. See supra notes 514-18 and accompanying text (providing factual backround of Sojo case).

533. See Libertad del se¤or Sojo, LA PRENSA, Sept. 28, 1887, at 5.

534. See Sojo, 32 Fallos at 120, 137 (Calixto de la Torre dissenting); see also id. at 123 (Procurador General's opinion) (taking as "a given" the fact that Law No. 48 seeks to provide the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over habeas corpus).

535. Law No. 48, art. 20, Sept. 14, 1863, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 364, 369.

536. See Sojo, 32 Fallos at 138-39 (de la Torre, J., dissenting).

537. The Supreme Court itself wrote the original draft of the law governing federal jurisdiction, and the provisions on the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction do not appear to have been modified by Congress. See Congreso Nacional, C mara de Senadores, Diario de sesiones de 1863, Session of June 27, 1863, at 203 (statement by Minister of Justice Eduardo Costa); Congreso Nacional, C mara de Diputados, Diario de sesiones de 1863, Session of Aug. 3, 1863, at 321 (statement of Ruiz Moreno); CLODOMIRO ZAVALIA, HISTORIA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE LA REPUBLICA ARGENTINA EN RELACION CON SU MODELO AMERICANO 61-62, 78 (1920).

538. See CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 101.

539. CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 101.

540. See Sojo, 32 Fallos at 139-40 (de la Torre, J., dissenting); id. at 124-125 (Procurador General's opinion).

541. See id. at 140-41 (de la Torre, J., dissenting); see also id. at 125 (Procurador General's opinion) (emphasizing that Congress has reasonably interpreted the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction as subject to expansion).

542. See id. at 123.

543. Id.

544. See id. at 130-34.

545. See id. at 132.

546. See id. at 126-29.

547. See Sojo's Brief on Jurisdiction, in Sojo Dossier, supra note 518, at 64-68; see also Sojo, 32 Fallos at 124 (Procurador General's opinion).

548. See Sojo Dossier, supra note 518, at 64-68; see also Sojo, 32 Fallos at 124-45 (construing U.S. Supreme Court decisions in favor of finding original jurisdiction).

549. See Sojo, 32 Fallos at 129-30.

550. Id. at 141 (Calixto de la Torre dissenting).

551. See id.

552. For examples of lower court judges treating Argentine Supreme Court case law as binding, see Watteau c/Serpa, 81 Fallos 311, 314 (1899); Videla c/Garc¡a Aguilera, 9 Fallos 53, 54 (1870); and Balmaceda y C¡a c/Fisco Nacional, 6 Fallos 159, 160 (1868).

553. See supra note 552 and accompanying text.

554. See Pastorino c/Ronill¢n, Marini y C¡a, 25 Fallos 364, 368 (1883).

555. See generally 1 Sag�‚s, supra note 477, .. 81-82 (reviewing treatment of Supreme Court precedent during Court's early years); JUAN CARLOS HITTERS, T�CNICA DE LOS RECURSOS EXTRAORDINARIOS Y DE LA CASACION .. 73-74 (1991) (same).

556. Dozens of examples of the Argentine Supreme Court following its own case law during the nineteenth and early twentieth century exist. One example is the Supreme Court's refusal to allow federal jurisdiction in defamation actions against the press, with the Supreme Court repeatedly citing its initial precedent of Fiscal General de la Naci¢n c/Argerich, 1 Fallos 130 (1864), as authority. See, e.g., M‚ndez c/Valdez, 127 Fallos 429, 440 (1918); Salva, 114 Fallos 60, 68 (1910); Procurador Fiscal c/Correa, 85 Fallos 246, 251 (1900); Procurador Fiscal c/Moreno, 10 Fallos 361, 363 (1871); Procurador Fiscal c/Laforest, 3 Fallos 371, 372 (1866). But see Procurador Fiscal c/Diario "La Provincia," 167 Fallos 121 (1932) (shifting the Court's case law to allow federal jurisdiction over press). A second example is the Court's insistence on permitting original jurisdiction when a province is sued by a non-resident. In Mendoza y Hermano c/Provincia de San Luis, 1 Fallos 485, 495-96 (1865), and Avengo c/Provincia de Buenos Aires, 14 Fallos 425, 437-448 (1874), the Court reasoned that Argentina's Constitution did not include the eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and therefore the pre-eleventh Amendment case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), supplied the appropriate law. Carrega c/Provincia de Buenos Aires, 61 Fallos 409, 410 (1895), notes that the Court has maintained consistent case law on this issue.

557. See C‚sar c/Guzm n y Compa¤¡a, 51 Fallos 39, 42 (1893); Municipalidad de la Capital c/Sociedad Laurak Bact, 48 Fallos 71, 81 (1892); see also Procurador Fiscal c/Correa, 85 Fallos at 254-55 (showing the Procurador General obliged to recommend consistency with the Supreme Court's case law, but voicing his personal disagreement with it in the case at hand).

558. See Municipalidad de la Capital c/Elortondo, 33 Fallos 162, 196 (1888) (distinguishing prior case permitting expropriation from present case where more property than necessary for public undertaking would be expropriated); see also Pastorino c/Ronill¢n, Marini y C¡a, 25 Fallos 364, 368-69 (1883) (examining and distinguishing a Supreme Court precedent in order to decide case at hand differently); Acevedo, 28 Fallos 406, 409 (1885). The Court in Acevedo emphasized that its decision was not inconsistent with the precedent of de la Torre, because unlike publication of secret session, as in de la Torre, Acevedo involved defamation, a codified criminal act within judicial jurisdiction. See id.

559. See Sojo, 32 Fallos 120, 126 (1887).

560. For example, in Fiscal General de la Naci¢n c/Argerich, 1 Fallos 130 (1864), the Supreme Court blocked federal prosecution of the author of a letter in a newspaper attacking the Chief of Police of the City of Buenos Aires. The Court also handed down a series of decisions against the government in the aftermath of rebellions in Argentina's northwest provinces in the late 1860s. See, e.g., Urruti, 5 Fallos 384 (1968) (insisting on release of rebels on bail while their cases were pending); Competencia entre el Juez Nacional de Salta y el General Jefe del Ej‚rcito del Norte, 7 Fallos 205 (1869) (blocking military jurisdiction over rebel fighters); Fiscal Nacional c/Varios comerciantes de Mendoza, 5 Fallos 74 (1868) (holding that the national government could not require merchants to pay customs duties that they paid earlier to rebel authorities controlling Province).

561. See Municipalidad de la Capital c/Elortondo, 33 Fallos at 162.

562. See supra notes 93-160 (discussing Alberdian vision); see also infra notes 575-85 and accompanying text (discussing development of Argentine federalism and its divergence from U.S. federalism).

563. See Cullen c/Llerena, 53 Fallos 420, 432 (1893) (citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)).

564. See Law No. 340, Sept. 29, 1869, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 505.

565. See VICTOR TAU ANZOATEGUI, LA CODIFICACION EN LA ARGENTINA 29-30 (1977); Bernardino Bravo Lira, Arbitro judicial y legalismo. Juez y derecho en Europa Continental y en Iberoam‚rica antes y despu‚s de la Codificaci¢n, 28 REVISTA DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO "RICARDO LEVENE" 7, 14-17 (1991); 2 ABEL CHANETON, HISTORIA DE VELEZ SARSFIELD, 412-16, 418 (1937).

566. Perhaps most striking, aside from Sojo, 32 Fallos 120 (1887), and the Court's classic statement on the importance of U.S. practice in de la Torre, 19 Fallos 231 (1877), is the Court's repetition of its de la Torre statement on the binding nature of U.S. law in Alem, 54 Fallos 432, 459 (1893), one of the most politically delicate cases ever handled by the Court, in which the Court clearly needed to maximize its authority. In Alem, the Court held unconstitutional the detention by the Executive of a leading opposition figure who had led an unsuccessful rebellion. See id. Various Argentine decisions contain discussions that focus almost entirely on U.S. practice. See D vila c/Valdez, 23 Fallos 726 (1880) (containing dispute between majority and dissent as to whether U.S. law allows federal diversity jurisdiction when jurisdiction would have existed between the original parties but subsequently was lost through assignment of the claim and then subsequently regained through a new assignment); Banco Nacional c/Villanueva, 18 Fallos 162 (1876) (establishing the right of a Nacional Bank established by Congress to enjoy federal jurisdiction in all litigation).

567. The clearest statement of a rationalist approach in the Argentine Supreme Court's case law comes in Hileret c/Provincia de Tucum n, 98 Fallos 20 (1903), where the Court derides constitutional arguments that fail to focus on the text of the Constitution, the needs and desires of the Framers, and historical documents such as the debates at the conventions and writings by publicists like Alberdi. See id. at 47-48.

568. Although there were two occasions in the 1860s and 1870s when the Court held that it had no obligation to follow U.S. case law on issues for which the Argentine Constitution diverged from the U.S. Constitution, neither case involved significant deviations. In one case the Court held that a province could require a provincial bank to pay its depositors in gold instead of silver, a decision that it based on the lack of a clause in the Argentine Constitution on ex post facto civil legislation. See Caffarena c/Banco Argentino del Rosario de Santa F‚, 10 Fallos 427, 435 (1871). However, because the U.S. Constitution also has been interpreted to permit ex post facto civil legislation, see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389-90, 393 (1798) (Chase, J.), 396-97 (Patterson, J.), 399 (Iredell, J.); see also Cummings v. State of Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 326-32 (1866) (treating a law with the effect of inflicting a civil penalty as an unconstitutional ex post facto law), this really was a case of misunderstanding U.S. practice and reaching the same conclusion anyway. The other case involved Supreme Court original jurisdiction in actions against a Province by non-residents and emphasized that the Argentine Constitution had adopted the pre-eleventh amendment version of the U.S. Constitution in establishing federal jurisdiction. See Mendoza y Hermano c/Provincia de San Luis, 1 Fallos 485, 495-96 (1865).

569. 68 Fallos 227, 227 (1897).

570. See Ferrocarril Central Argentino c/Provincia de Santa F‚, 68 Fallos 227, 228-29 (1897).

571. See id.

572. See id. at 229.

573. See id. at 238.

574. CONST. ARG. OF 1860 art. 67, . 13 (emphasis added).

575. See Constitutional Convention of 1853, Session of May 3, 1853, supra note 184, at 539 (statement of Zuvir¡a); id., Session of Apr. 20, 1853, at 468 (statement of Gorostiaga); id. at 479 (statement of Guti‚rrez).

576. See Constitutional Convention of 1853, Session of Apr. 28, 1853, supra note 184, at 529-30 (debating Constitution of 1853, article 64-which becomes Constitution of 1860, article 67-and including no discussion of limits on congressional authority vis ... vis the provinces, but rather discussion of whether certain activities, such as seeking the conversion of the Indians, should be encouraged specifically with a constitutional provision directed at Congress). Moreover, the 1860 reforms, although addressing what would be short-lived federalism concerns of the Province of Buenos Aires, likewise made no attempt to restrict the ability of the federal government to legislate for the general welfare. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).

577. ALBERDI, BASES, supra note 95, at 371 app. at 570 (Constituci¢n de la Confederaci¢n Argentina art. 67, . 3 (1852)).

578. U.S. CONST. art. I, . 1.

579. James Madison argued that the General Welfare Clause allowed taxation and spending only in the situations specifically enumerated in the Constitution as within the authority of Congress. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison). Alexander Hamilton, however, argued that the Clause generally authorized any type of taxation or spending for the general welfare. See id. No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton). See Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-67; C. Perry Patterson, The General Welfare Clause, 30 MINN. L. REV. 43, 48-51, 60-61 (1946). Hamilton never argued that the General Welfare Clause was a source of general legislative authority, however, but merely that it was the authority to tax and spend. As a practical matter, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed Congress to use the General Welfare Clause to expand almost the same legislative possibilities for the U.S. federal government as the Argentine Supreme Court has in Argentina by allowing Congress to condition grants of funds to the states on their enactment of legislation and programs that otherwise might fall beyond congressional authority. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-08 (1987).

580. In Company v. Peniston, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 5, 30-33 (1873), the U.S. Supreme Court held that federally chartered railroads could be subjected to state property taxes so long as those taxes did not hinder them in the exercise of their functions, even though the railroad was admitted to be agent of federal government. Congress had not explicitly granted an exemption from state taxes, but the Court found that the situation would have been no different if it had, holding that nothing in the Constitution contemplated abridgment by the federal government of the power of states to levy taxes, the only limitation being that the states may not levy taxes with the direct effect of hindering the exercise of powers belonging to the federal government. See id. at 30; see also Thompson v. Union Pacific, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 579, 590-91 (1867) (holding essentially the same as Peniston, but in a case in which the railroad, while granted a concession by the federal government, was organized under state law and not by an act of Congress).

581. Ferrocarril Central Argentino c/Provincia de Santa F‚, 68 Fallos 227, 235-36 (1897).

582. Id. at 236.

583. See id. at 237.

584. See ALBERDI, Bases, supra note 95, at 478 (emphasizing that federal government is the central figure in achieving major national goals, from encouraging immigration to building public works).

585. See Compa¤¡a Entrerriana de Tel‚fonos c/Provincia de Entre R¡os, 189 Fallos 272, 282-83 (1941) (holding that Congress could exempt an interprovincial telephone company from provincial taxes on the basis of its general authority under Constitution of 1860, article 67, section 16 to legislate in the general interest, and offering an extensive citation to Ferrocarril Central Argentino c/Provincia de Santa F‚ as authority); see also Roca Hermanos y C¡a. c/Provincia de Santa F‚, 188 Fallos 247, 257 (1940) (holding that a radio station authorized by the federal government was exempt from provincial taxes and noting the general welfare clause as one of the sources of Congress' legislative authority); Ferrocarril Central Argentino c/Municipalidad de La Banda, 183 Fallos 181, 185-86 (blocking municipality from collecting taxes and fees from a railroad that the federal government had exempted from taxes, and offering extensive discussion of Ferrocarril Central Argentino c/Provincia de Santa F‚ and the general welfare clause); Ferrocarril del Sud c/Municipalidad de Ju rez, 183 Fallos 190, 193-197 (1939) (blocking municipality from collecting taxes and fees from a railroad that the federal government had exempted from taxes, and offering extensive discussion of Ferrocarril Central Argentino c/Provincia de Santa F‚ and the general welfare clause); 3 FELIPE S. P�REZ, LA CONSTITUCION NACIONAL Y LA CORTE SUPREMA 80 (1962) (noting that article 67, section 16, has no parallel in U.S. Constitution, and that there are no limits on the legislative jurisdiction of the Argentine Congress unless a power is reserved specifically for the province, the only limit being that any concessions granted be temporary). The only occasions on which the Argentine Supreme Court ever has blocked an assertion of federal legislative authority on federalism grounds have been rare situations when a constitutional provision specifically protects a provincial institution under attack; see C¡a. Dock Sud de Buenos Aires Ltda., 204 Fallos 23 (1946) (declaring unconstitutional a measure that merged provincial national labor relations boards into a national body and gave it authority to resolve labor litigation); or where the Constitution specifically bars the federal government from a determined type of activity, an issue that arose in the context of federal attempts to assert jurisdiction unconstitutionally in defamation actions in spite of a bar on such jurisdiction; see Argentine Constitution of 1860, article 32; see also supra note 554 and accompanying text; Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires c/Naci¢n Argentina, 201 Fallos 142, 149-150 (1945) (involving federal measures that attempted to tax the Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires in violation of 1859 pact that led to ratification by the Province of Buenos Aires of the Constitution); Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires c/Naci¢n Argentina, 186 Fallos 170, 222-25 (1940).

586. For discussions emphasizing the U.S. model, see PADILLA, supra note 185 (examining Argentine history and constitutional conventions to examine degree of U.S. influence); 1 JUAN A. GONZALEZ CALDERON, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL ARGENTINO 320-21 (1930) (citing Constitutional Convention of 1853 to support argument that the U.S. Constitution remained an important model for Argentina); ZAVALIA, supra note 537 (offering history of Argentine Supreme Court with underlying theme of how its case law and authority has compared to that of U.S. Supreme Court). For discussions deemphasizing the U.S. model, see RODOLFO RIVAROLA, LA CONSTITUCION ARGENTINA Y SUS PRINCIPIOS DE �TICA POLITICA xvi-xxvi (1944) (examining Alberdi-Sarmiento debate on authority of U.S. Constitution and criticizing attitude that Argentine Constitution is merely a copy of the U.S. Constitution and may be interpreted by looking at U.S. practices); DANIEL ANTOKOLETZ, ELEMENTOS DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL Y ADMINISTRATIVO ARGENTINOS 16 (1926) (same); TOMAS CULLEN, Diferencias entre la Constituci¢n argentina y la norteamericana, in UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES, FACULTAD DE DERECHO Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES, 2 DISCURSOS ACAD�MICOS 939, 940-41 (1936) (same); RAIMUNDO WILMART, DIFERENCIAS DE ATRIBUCIONES ENTRE EL EJECUTIVO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS Y EL NUESTRO, 2 Revista Argentina de Ciencias Pol¡ticas 314 (1911) (examining the many ways the Argentine Constitution varies from that of the United States in its establishment of authority and limitations of Executive).

587. See generally DAVID ROCK, AUTHORITARIAN ARGENTINA 55-124 (1993) (describing growth of extremist Argentine nationalism from World War I through 1930s).

588. See RIVAROLA, supra note 586, at xvi-xxvi.

589. Id. at xxvi.

590. ZAVALIA, supra note 537, at 342.

591. See Melo de Can‚, 115 Fallos 111 (1911) (citing U.S. case law and holding estate tax unconstitutional); see also Drysdale, 149 Fallos 417 (1927) (citing U.S. law and holding later Buenos Aires tax unconstitutional).

592. See Pereyra Iraola c/Provincia de Buenos Aires, 138 Fallos 161 (1923) (holding special tax on roadside properties unconstitutional when owners' benefits were disproportionate to payment and benefit enjoyed by entire populace); see also Vi¤edos y Bodegas Ariz£ c/Provincia de Mendoza, 157 Fallos 359 (1930) (citing U.S. law and finding unconstitutional provincial tax that targets specific high income groups and businesses to pay for pension system).

593. See Horta c/Harguindeguy, 137 Fallos 47 (1922) (finding that rent freeze could not constitutionally modify terms of an already executed lease); see also Bourdieu c/Municipalidad de la Capital, 145 Fallos 307 (1925) (holding that municipal ordinance designed to eliminate all profits from sale of cemetery lots through 100% tax on profits unconstitutional).

594. 136 Fallos 161 (1922).

595. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).

596. Ercolano c/Lanteri de Renshaw, 136 Fallos 161, 178 (1922) (citing Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921)).

597. The rent freeze initially was enacted in Law No. 11.157, Sept. 19, 1921, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 79, to apply for a period of two years, was extended for one more year by Law No. 11.231, Oct. 4, 1923, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 115, and then extended for an additional year by Law No. 11.318, Dec. 5, 1924, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 193 after a two month gap. The positions of a number of Argentine constitutional law and civil law professors are noted in RAYMUNDO WILMART, Las leyes nuevas sobre alquileres, in 22 REVISTA ARGENTINA DE CIENCIAS POLITICAS 440, 440-42 (1921) (opposing rent freeze); see also La ley de alquileres, el derecho de propiedad y la Constituci¢n Nacional, in 14 JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 25 (1924) (offering an interpretation of Constitution in support of rent freeze). The issue and the Supreme Court's decisions were reported on exhaustively in the Argentine press. See J.A. Gonz lez Calder¢n, Inconstitucionalidad de las leyes sobre alquileres, LA PRENSA, Sept. 22, 1921, at 6 (containing lengthy explanation of why rent control law was unconstitutional); La cuesti¢n de los alquileres, LA PRENSA, Apr. 29, 1922, at 9 (discussing Ercolano decision in detail); Aplicaci¢n de la Ley sobre alquileres, LA PRENSA, May 6, 1922, at 15 (discussing lower court decision that cited Ercolano); Las leyes de alquileres, LA PRENSA, Aug. 22, 1922, at 12 (discussing decision holding rent control law unconstitutional when applied retroactively to contracts already signed at higher prices); La Suprema Corte declar¢ que es contraria a la Constituci¢n y afecta el dominio la pr¢rroga de la ley de alquileres, LA PRENSA, Aug. 27, 1925, at 15 (providing extensive analysis of Mango c/Traba, 144 Fallos 219, 224-25 (1925), which declared the law unconstitutional); La pr¢rroga de los alquileres, LA PRENSA, Aug. 28, 1925, at 9 (providing editorial supporting Supreme Court's position that rent control law is unconstitutional).

598. See 7 Jurisprudencia Argentina, Secci¢n Legislaci¢n 1 (1921).

599. See Mango, 144 Fallos at 224-25.

600. 264 U.S. 543 (1924).

601. See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 543 (1924). In Chastleton, Justice Holmes reversed the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in a decision allowing the continuation of a rent freeze instituted during a housing shortage in the District during World War I. Holmes indicated that the District Court should analyze whether the emergency conditions originally justifying the rent freeze continued to exist, to determine whether the freeze should continue. See id. at 547-49.

602. See Avico, 172 Fallos 21 (1934) (citing U.S. law extensively and holding constitutional legislation suspending mortgage payments and evictions).

603. The Argentine Supreme Court continues to cite U.S. law today, but since the late 1940s, unlike in the 1920s and 1930s, little intellectual integrity has accompanied its use. The Court cited U.S. case law in the 1920s and 1930s in order to change Argentinian practice, but its use of U.S. law was accurate, and in cases with similar factual scenarios. In the late 1940s, however, the court began to interpret U.S. law out of context in order to reach a desired result. See S.A. Merk Qu¡mica Argentina c/Naci¢n Argentina, 211 Fallos 162, 198-209 (1948) (using extensive citations to U.S. practice to justify seizure of German property based on executive war powers, despite seizure of property occurring after German World War II surrender); Rodr¡guez, 254 Fallos 116, 134-37 (1962) (using extensive citations to U.S. authors to justify presidential emergency powers that incorporated striking railroad workers into Army and subjected them to military discipline); Peralta c/Naci¢n Argentina, 313 Fallos 1513, 1547-49 (1990) (citing U.S. case law on economic emergencies to justify constitutionality of presidential decree that turned ordinary bank accounts into long-term government bonds).

604. HEGEL, supra note 14, at 178, . 273.

605. See CONST. ARG. art. 75, . 22.

606. It is striking that in recent years Argentina probably has given more deference to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights than any other major country in the Americas. Argentina is the only country to have reached friendly settlements with petitioners before the Inter-American Commission, and it did so on two different occasions. See Report No. 1/93, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, Annual Report: 1992-1993 35 (1993) (settling claims for compensation for detentions, physical injuries and murders by military government in power from 1976-1983); Report No 22/94, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States, Annual Report: 1994 35 (1993) (eliminating special criminal provisions on defamation of a public official from the criminal code).

607. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY IN CONSTITUTIONALISSM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 223, 225 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994) (citing Judgment of Oct. 24, 1990, ALKOTMANYBIROSAG, 1990 Magyar K"zl"ny Hungarian Gazette 107 (describing Hungarian Constitutional Court decision as lacking convincing argument, and based on a need to adopt values now dominant in Western Europe)); see also A.E. Dick Howard, The Indeterminacy of Constitutions, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 383, 386-87 (1996) (offering similar observation, noting that international human rights instruments were influential in drafting of new constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe). Howard, however, attributes the tendency to borrow to a desire to achieve international acceptance, without noting the possibility that borrowing also helps achieve internal acceptance because of the authority of the source. See id. at 386-87.

608. Cf. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 482, 484-85 (1995) (noting similarity between transplant of international human rights and elements of western legal culture and pointing out that individuals who critique shifts of western legal models as ethnocentric rarely make similar charge regarding international human rights transfers).

609. Dependency theory-a leftist critique of development economics that was especially popular in the 1970s-describes social and economic development in Latin America as a product of the domination of the economically advanced nations, and views economic and social developments in Argentina, as in other Latin American countries, in terms of the needs and opportunities offered by foreign capitalism. See FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO & ENZO FALETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 35, 82-84, 88 (Marjory Mattingly Urquidi trans., Univ. California Press 1979) (1971).

610. H.S. FERNS, BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 1-2 (1960) (discussing trends of British investment in Argentina during late nineteenth and early twentieth century).

611. See id. at 487-89.

612. See ROBERT A. POTASH, THE ARMY & POLITICS IN ARGENTINA, 1928-1945, at 183 (1969).

613. See generally ROCK, supra note 12, at 214-61 (summarizing political forces at work from 1930-1946).

614. The author of this Article is presently engaged in research in this area.

615. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881) (stating that "the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience").