2.As Timothy Terrell and James Wildman observed, "[L]awyers have sought a cure for a disease before agreeing on its nature, symptoms, and causes. We want to be happy in our professional lives without investigating seriously why many of us are unhappy. We want, in short, to moralize without examining our morals." Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism," 41 EMORY L.J. 403, 403 (1992). Terrell and Wildman, however, propose to examine the historical context for the problems, not the empirical or psychological bases. See id. at 404 (proposing to examine "the profession's past and its present"); see also Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 271 (1995) (arguing that researchers must adequately define "profession" and its derivatives before they can develop an accepted definition of "professionalism") (citing Terrell & Wildman, supra, at 403); Connie J.A. Beck et al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Problems and Other Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 45, 57-58 (1995-96) (noting that newly practicing lawyers report "significant psychological distress symptoms well beyond that expected in a normal population").

3.See infra Part II.

4.See infra Part II.A.5.

5.If these qualities are indeed causally related to the current crises, however, it is unclear why they have become problematic now. It is possible that the external stresses being placed on the legal profession have simply exacerbated pre-existing problems to the extent that they are now evident. A dysfunctional system may function reasonably well in a state of equilibrium, but introducing external stressors that severely tax the system may cause it to break down and cease to function. See JOSEPH H. BROWN & DANA H. CHRISTENSEN, FAMILY THERAPY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 21 (1986) (stating that when a certain amount of environmental and external stressors reach a critical mass a crisis in the "system" often results); see also JOHN BRADSHAW, THE FAMILY (1988) (characterizing family as a "system").

6.Many of the proposed solutions to the problems are likely to fail because they have been proposed without an understanding and respect for these inherent "lawyer" attributes, for the precise impact of legal education, or for the psychological mechanisms necessary for lasting personality change. A critical evaluation of these proposed solutions is beyond the scope of this Article.

7.Additional research is also proposed. As discussed throughout this Article, there is a lack of consistency in the empirical research on attorneys and law students. There have also been dramatic changes in the demographic makeup of the lawyer population in the last twenty years (specifically, the inclusion of women and minorities) which as yet have not been properly addressed.

8.See generally Don J. Young & Louise L. Hill, Professionalism: The Necessity for Internal Control, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 205, 205 (1988) (discussing increased focus of legal community on ethics and professional conduct, evidenced by rules of conduct approved by American Bar Association); Ronald D. Rotunda, Professionalism, Legal Advertising, and Free Speech in the Wake of Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 49 ARK. L. REV. 703, 703 (1997) (noting that legal advertising casts bad light on lawyers resulting in move away from professionalism); Daniel L. Zelenko, Note, Do You Need A Lawyer? You May Have to Wait 30 Days: The Supreme Court Went Too Far in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1996); Justice O'Connor Criticizes Lawyers for 'Rambo' Tactics, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1993, at A27.

9.See ABA Comm. on Professionalism, ". . . In the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 261 (1986) [hereinafter "ABA Blueprint"] (describing professionalism as "an elastic concept the meaning and application of which are hard to pin down"). The president of The Florida Bar simply defined professionalism as the opposite of "eat or be eaten." John W. Frost, II, "You Should Never Take More Than You Give," FLA. B.J., July-Aug. 1996, at 6. Mr. Frost stated further that professionalism "includes being civil; being honorable; showing respect for, and expecting respectability from, our fellow lawyers; and cooperating in professional relationships whenever possible without compromising the maximum benefit of our clients, those people who make our professional lives possible." Id.

10.See Atkinson, supra note 2, at 271 (describing ABA's attempt to define boundaries of conduct that fit into particularized concepts of "professional" behavior).

11.For example, professionalism has been defined as "'pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service-no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood.'" ABA Blueprint, supra note 9, at 261 (quoting Roscoe Pound, former dean of Harvard Law School); see Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., Professionalism: What Lies Ahead, 30 TENN. B.J. 12, 14 (1994) (quoting Dean Pound and explaining that professionalism means that public service is primary to the endeavor, and earning a living is secondary); Ellen S. Podgor, Form 8300: The Demise of Law as a Profession, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 485, 530 n.319 (1992) ("A new professionalism is emerging complete with the adoption of creeds and standards designed to restore public confidence in attorneys and to reinstate positive feelings among lawyers about the profession.").

12.See Atkinson, supra note 2, at 275. Atkinson describes this definition of professionalism as a "focus of [a]spiration," entailing "voluntary conformity with legally unenforceable standards," and "the hope of transcending, or at least supplementing, law with gospel," in a reference to the religiosity he perceives in the current professionalism movement. See id. at 263-64, 275.

13.486 U.S. 466 (1988).

14.Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 488-89 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

15.See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 2, at 268 (arguing that economic and sociological changes, including increased competition in the practice of law, have led to "efforts to uphold professional standards"); Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 950 (1995) ("As a result of the marked increased in attorney misconduct . . . the standing of the legal profession is perhaps at its lowest ebb in this century-and perhaps in its history."); Louis P. DiLorenzo, Civility and Professionalism, 68 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8, 8 (1992) (noting that 40% of lawyers and judges report lack of civility and professionalism as a significant problem); William H. Gates, Lawyers' Malpractice: Some Recent Data About a Growing Problem, 37 MERCER L. REV. 559, 567 (1986) (recognizing increasing number of attorney malpractice claims resulting from intentional wrongs and fraud); Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657, 657-59 (1994) (noting various symptoms evidencing decline in professionalism, including lack of civility and overly aggressive litigation style, and arguing that lawyer conduct codes inculcate majority, elite values); Paula A. Franzese, Back to the Future: Reclaiming Our Noble Profession, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 488, 488 (1994) (book review) (listing partner and associate defections motivated by personal profit interests as one example of the deterioration of professional and ethical standards within legal community); David B. Wilkins, Practical Wisdom For Practicing Lawyers: Separating Ideals From Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 458, 460-61 (1994) (reviewing ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING ETHICAL IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1994)) (discussing Kronman's arguments that nineteenth-century lawyer ideals have declined in the legal profession); Jeff Dionise, Lawyers' Perspective, A.B.A. J., May 1991, at 40 chart (showing that 62.9% of attorneys believe attorneys inadequately police attorney misconduct); see also William H. Rehnquist, The State of the Legal Profession, LEGAL ECONOMIST, Mar. 1988, at 44 (suggesting that shift to make practice of law more like business should be subject of careful examination by law schools).

16.See, e.g., John C. Buchanan, The Demise of Legal Professionalism: Accepting Responsibility and Implementing Change, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 567 (1994) (arguing that lawyers excuse deceptive, hyperaggressive, and other reprehensible behavior as doing their utmost for their clients); Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1993); Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE WES. RES. L. REV. 531, 610-11 (1994) (blaming "an extreme model of adversarial advocacy" or "Rambo Litigation" for the erosion of professionalism); Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism As Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657 (1994); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 385, 401-02 (1992) (acknowledging problems of zealous advocacy); Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85, 86-99 (1994); Seth Rosner, A Decade of Professionalism, 6(4) PROF. LAW. 2, 2 (1995) (stating that the practice of law is "no longer fun").

17.See SOL M. LINOWITZ, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 245 (1994) (stating that lawyering has become too profit-driven); Louise A. LaMothe, Opening Statement, Where Are We Going Anyway?, 19 LIT. 1, 1-2 (1992) (commenting on discontent among attorneys); Re, supra note 16, at 98 (suggesting that law has become too commercialized); Rehnquist, supra note 15, at 44-46 (1988) (noting that, as number of U.S. lawyers doubled between 1970 and 1985, lawyers became focused on income maximization); Rosner, supra note 16, at 2 (explosion in number of lawyers, coupled with dramatic decrease in demand for them, is problematic for profession).

18.See Cramton, supra note 16, at 611 (observing that scrutiny of clients and consumer demands for responsive service reduce autonomy of individual lawyer, especially those in large firms); Rehnquist, supra note 15, at 44 (noting decline in loyalty to firms, including increased mobility of partners and lateral moves).

19. See Franzese, supra note 15, at 488-89 ("Well-established [law] firms are disintegrating, the victims of vanishing client loyalties and the attendant (as well as troubling) view of lawyers as mere vendors selling a commodity . . . .").

20. See Buchanan, supra note 16, at 567 ("Advertising by certain lawyers . . . is unintelligent, inflammatory, and often outright misleading . . . . [A]dvertisements blatantly cater to negative emotions such as fear, anger, and greed."); Burger, supra note 16, at 5 (criticizing so-called 'huckster' or 'shyster' advertising as an "outrageous breach of professional conduct"); Podgor, supra note 11, at 485-86 (marketing of legal services denigrates the profession).

21. As explained by David B. Wilkins, Anthony T. Kronman takes this position. See Wilkins, supra note 15, at 460-61. Wilkins explains that Kronman's position is that the central virtue of lawyers, practical wisdom and prudence, which formerly gave lawyers a sense of self-esteem and moral satisfaction in their careers, has disappeared from the ideals and the practice of the profession. See id. Thus, the legal profession is no longer intrinsically satisfying to those who practice law. See id.

22. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 3-4 & nn.8-9 (1986) (noting decline in public opinion of lawyers based on 1978 Harris poll).

23. See Buchanan, supra note 16, at 563 ("[T]he public perception problems lawyers face today are deeper and more widespread than any the profession has faced before."); Jeff Barge, Fewer Consider Law School: Schools Reporting Applications Declining, A.B.A. J., June 1995, at 24 (citing recent decline in applications to law schools as further evidence of poor public opinion of legal profession); see also Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi: The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60, 62-63 (reporting results of survey in which the public, especially minorities, the uneducated, and the poor, expressed significant dissatisfaction with American legal profession); Raquel A. Rodriguez, Uncivil Litigation, BARRISTER MAG., Summer 1996, at 2 (citing John Marks, The American Uncivil Wars, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 22, 1996, at 66 (stating that attorneys are "symbols of everything crass and dishonorable in American public life")). A proliferation of "anti-lawyer" jokes and joke books also punctuates this sentiment. See, e.g., BILL ADLER, FIRST, KILL ALL THE LAWYERS: LEGAL PROVERBS, EPITAPHS, JOKES, AND ANECDOTES (1994); JESS BRALLIER, LAWYERS AND OTHER REPTILES (1992); ARNOLD CANTOR & JODY CANTOR, LAWYER'S BIG BOOK OF FUN (1995). In contrast, however, law continues to be a high prestige occupation. See Faye Crosby & Gregory M. Herek, Male Sympathy with the Situation of Women: Does Personal Experience Make a Difference?, 42 J. SOC. ISSUES 55, 58 (1986) (discussing empirical study in which lawyers and doctors were defined as "high prestige occupations" while sales clerks and truck drivers were not); Ronald H. Frederickson et al., Social Status Ranking of Occupations in the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, and the United States, 40 CAREER DEV. Q. 351 (1992) (noting that occupations of lawyer and physician consistently rank highest in social status and esteem among all occupations by college students from all three countries); Michael D. Goodman & Karen C. Gareis, The Influence of Status on Decisions to Help, 133 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 23, 27-30 (1993) (analyzing results of study finding strangers more likely to assist lawyers and requesters of unspecified occupational status than they were to help gas station attendants requesting assistance, and postulating that this was because lawyers had higher social status).

24. See Burnele V. Powell, Lawyer Professionalism as Ordinary Morality, Address for the John Turner Professionalism Lecture, South Texas College of Law (Mar. 10, 1993), in 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 275, 277 (1994).

25. Id. (citing ABA Blueprint, supra note 9, at 248).

26. See PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., A SURVEY OF ATTITUDES NATIONWIDE TOWARD LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1993).

27. See Hengstler, supra note 23, at 64 (asking rhetorically what American public wants and expects from the legal profession, given that the Hart survey found only 8% of Americans have confidence in law firms); Rosner, supra note 16, at 2 ("[T]he Peter Hart Survey commissioned by the Association disclosed that lawyers and the legal profession are not well-liked by the American public.").

28. See Louise A. LaMothe, Where are We Going Anyway?, LITIG., Fall 1992, at 1.

29. See generally A.B.A. Young Lawyers Division Survey, The State of the Legal Profession: 1990 (1991) [hereinafter "1990 ABA/YLD Report"] (reporting results of National Survey of Career Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction Waves I and II conducted by the Young Lawyers Division in 1984 and 1990 which surveyed attorneys of all ages); A.B.A. Young Lawyers Division, The State of the Legal Profession: 1990-Executive Summary (1992) (summarizing results of National Survey of Career Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction Waves I and II conducted by the Young Lawyers Division in 1984 and 1990); A.B.A., The Report of At The Breaking Point: A National Conference on The Emerging Crisis In the Quality of Lawyers' Health and Lives-Its Impact on Law Firms and Client Services (Apr. 5-6, 1991) [hereinafter "Breaking Point"] (presenting results of the ABA's 1984 and 1990 surveys of lawyer dissatisfaction and burnout and including reasons for the problem such as too much work, lack of communication between lawyers and with clients, isolation in the firm, lack of mentoring and training). Proposed solutions to lawyer dissatisfaction include applying business principles to the practice of law, billing and working differently, improving communication, supplying training and mentoring, encouraging diversity and flexible work schedules, and changing legal education. See id. The principal investigator of these studies was Ronald L. Hirsch, Staff Director, ABA Young Lawyers Division. See 1990 ABA/YLD Report, supra, at 81. A conference was held in April 1991 to discuss the results of these two surveys and to propose solutions to the "emerging crisis."

30. See Lawrence R. Richard, Psychological Type and Job Satisfaction Among Practicing Lawyers in the United States 22 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on file with Temple University) (citing "considerable consensus" among 1990s studies that approximately 20% of lawyers are extremely dissatisfied with their jobs). Richard suggests, however, that lawyer dissatisfaction may have declined slightly from 1991 to 1994. See id.

31. See G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., Comprehensive Lawyer Assistance Programs: Justification and Model, 16 L. & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 113, 114 nn.6-7 (1992) [hereinafter Benjamin et al., Comprehensive Lawyer] (citing studies showing elevated levels of depression among lawyers in Wisconsin and Florida); G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 233, 240-41 (1990) [hereinafter Benjamin et al., Prevalence of Depression] (stating that about 20% of lawyers in Washington and Arizona had statistically significant elevated levels of depression, compared to 3-9% in general population, and many were experiencing suicidal thoughts); William W. Eaton et al., Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive Disorder, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1079, 1081 (1990) (reporting that lawyers have decidedly higher levels of depression than the 3-5% found among the general population); Maura Dolan, Miserable with the Legal Life, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1995, at E2 (reporting that 11% of North Carolina lawyers polled in 1991 considered taking their lives once per month).

32. See Benjamin et al., Comprehensive Lawyer, supra note 31, at 115 n.13 (citing statistics from Wisconsin); Benjamin et al., Prevalence of Depression, supra note 31, at 240-41 (finding that 18% of lawyers in the State of Washington were problem drinkers, almost twice the percentage of adults in the United States who abuse or are dependent on alcohol (10%) and asserting that alcoholism among male attorneys is likely to be occurring at the same rate (18%) in Arizona (citing National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and Drug Information, "Alcohol and other drug abuse affects the lives of millions of Americans," The Fact Is . . . 1 (Oct. 1988)); see also Beck et al., supra note 2 (finding that while 9% of U.S. adults meet the criteria for alcohol abuse or dependency, 15-18% of lawyers were problem drinkers); Michael A. Bloom & Carol L. Wallinger, Lawyers and Alcoholism: Is it Time for a New Approach?, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1409, 1413 (1988) (reporting the finding that the averages for professionals, including lawyers, range from 3-30 times the rates of alcoholism for lay people, which range from 10-13%).

33. This author's Westlaw search found no less than 145 law journal and law review articles with the word "professionalism" in the title, through August 1997.

34. See Phoebe W. Brown, Russian Women Lawyers in Post-Soviet Russia, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381, 426-27 (1996) (stating that most legislators in United States are lawyers); Richard, supra note 30, at 254 (noting that most federal legislators and 16% of state legislators are attorneys).

35. See Buchanan, supra note 16, at 573 (suggesting that public confidence crisis could lead to fall of government, citing example of the unpopular Weimar Republic in post-World War I Germany). Perhaps more immediately, the question is whether a group of people who are collectively disliked and mistrusted by the American public should be running the country and whether this will have a subtly deleterious effect on the fabric of American society.

36. Most of the research on law students prior to 1980 involved predominantly male subjects. Gender differences begin to appear in the post-1970 studies. These studies will be examined separately, to accentuate the effect of the larger numbers of women law students after the mid-1970s. For example, about 80% of women lawyers entered the profession since 1970, and the percentage of women in the law has risen from 3% in 1960 and 1971 to 23% in 1995. See A.B.A. COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, BASIC FACTS FROM WOMEN IN THE LAW: A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS 8 (Dec. 1995). The pre-1980s studies of law student attributes are still relevant today, because those studies represent the current population of senior, experienced attorneys in the United States. The attributes of those students are likely to be representative of the present senior attorneys.

37. See Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Focus of Judgment Effect: A Question Wording Effect Due to Hypothesis Confirmation Bias, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 690, 695 (1992) (discussing empirical study in which the stereotypical lawyer was described as highly intelligent, self-confident, argumentative, involved in work, works long hours, well-dressed, strong drive for competence, competitive with others in the field, interested in social issues, writes convincingly, interestingly, and creatively, not uncomfortable lying, lives in a suburban upper-middle-class neighborhood, drives a sports car); see also John Collins et al., Occupational Interest and Perceived Personal Success: Effects of Gender, Sex-Role Orientation, and the Sexual Composition of the Occupation, 47 PSYCHOL. REP. 1155, 1157 (1980) (discussing empirical study indicating that legal profession is seen as a stereotypically masculine occupation); Pascal Denhaerinck et al., The Dilution Effect and Group Membership: An Instance of the Pervasive Impact of Outgroup Homogeneity, 19 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 243, 245 (1989) (discussing empirical study in which certain behaviors were assumed to be stereotypical of lawyers, thereby illustrating public's perception that there is a lawyer stereotype).

38. See Heather M. McLean & Rudolf Kalin, Congruence Between Self-Image and Occupational Stereotypes in Students Entering Gender-Dominated Occupations, 26 CAN. J. BEHAV. SCI. 142, 155-57 (1994) (reporting on survey of student perception about persons engaged in various occupations).

39. See id. at 148-49. Dominance also fell between scales labeled "arrogant-calculating" and "gregarious-extroverted," while affiliation fell between scales labeled "unassuming-ingenuous" and "gregarious-extroverted." See id.

40. See John M. Houston et al., Assessing Competitiveness: A Validation Study of the Competitiveness Index, 13 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1153, 1153-56 (1992) (analyzing 1984 study finding that 93% of law students and 90% of law faculty believe law students are competitive).

41. See Martin J. Bohn, Jr., Psychological Needs of Engineering, Pre-Law, Pre-Med, and Undecided College Freshmen, 12 J.C. STUDENT PERSONNEL 359, 359 (1971) (evaluating makeup of students who expressed strong interest in lawyering as career occupation); see also infra notes 48-55, 59-60 & 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing background and tendencies of law students).

42. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.

43. See Barbara Nachmann, Childhood Experience and Vocational Choice in Law, Dentistry, and Social Work, 7 J. COUNS. PSYCHOL. 243, 245 (1960), cited in Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 91, 95 (1968).

44. See Edwin N. Shneidman, Personality and "Success" Among a Selected Group of Lawyers, 48 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 609, 613 (1984) (noting strong social skills).

45. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.

46. See generally ALFRED ADLER, THE SCIENCE OF LIVING (1929).

47. See James L. Hafner & M. Ebrahim Fakouri, Early Recollections of Individuals Preparing for Careers in Clinical Psychology, Dentistry, and Law, 24 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 236, 239-40 (1984) (summarizing Adler's theory that an individual's style of life is designed to overcome feelings of inferiority); see also JAMES O. PROCHASKA & JOHN C. NORCROSS, SYSTEMS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: A TRANSTHEORETICAL ANALYSIS, 67-91 (1979) (discussing Alfred Adler and his theories).

48. See Nachmann, supra note 43, at 247-49. Nachmann theorized that lawyers' early childhood experiences would more often contain: (1) "the prominence of verbal aggression;" (2) a "concern with human justice;" and (3) "the exercise of privileged curiosity into the lives of others." Id.

49. See id. at 244.

50. See id. at 245. He was "both in word and deed the source of authority in the home." Id. at 247. A strong male figure other than the father, often an uncle or grandfather who was a lawyer, was more often an important influence or an admired figure in the law student's childhood. See id. at 245, 248.

51. See id. Closeness was defined within the study as encompassing emotional or geographical components. See id.

52. See id. Conversely, dental students reported an emphasis on unquestioning submission to authority. See id.

53. See id. Social work students also more frequently reported parental emphasis on school achievement and pleasurable early school experiences, as compared to the dental students. See id.

54. See id. Reading skills were taught at an early age in law students' and social work students' families, as compared to those of dental students. See id. Furthermore, law students more frequently reported having been read to and hearing stories as a child as pleasurable memories than the other two groups. See id.

55. See id. at 248-49. Nachmann asserted that her findings were particularly reliable, as she carefully excluded subjects whose reasons for entering their chosen profession were related to prestige, money, expediency and included only those who were interested in the unique qualities of the work itself. See id. at 249. In dental students' families, "the discipline more often stressed injunctions to control-'don't touch,' 'don't destroy things,' 'don't get dirty,' 'don't talk back,' etc. in contrast to an emphasis on more positive virtues-'do strive for accomplishment,' 'do learn courteous and mannerly ways of conduct,' 'do have consideration for others in the families of lawyers . . . .'" Id.

56. See id.

57. See Hafner & Fakouri, supra note 47, at 236-41 (finding that law students' early recollections consisted primarily of school whereas psychology students showed significantly more "negative affect," "threatening situations," and "less reference to groups of people").

58. See id. at 240.

59. See id.

60. See id. at 241.

61. See Leonard H. Chusmir, Law and Jurisprudence Occupations: A Look at Motivational Need Patterns, COM. L.J., May 1984, at 231-35 (finding that "jobs performed by most attorneys call for duties best matching motivational needs of individuals" with high need for achievement); Sue Winkle Williams & John C. McCullers, Personal Factors Related to Typicalness of Career and Success in Active Professional Women, 7 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 343, 350 (1983) (finding women lawyers more achievement oriented than other women).

62. Hafner & Fakouri, supra note 47, at 239. This is consistent with the finding that lawyers are disproportionately "Thinking" types, as compared to "Feeling" types, in the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator nomenclature. See generally Richard, supra note 30, at 229-34. Hafner and Fakouri relied heavily on Alfred Adler's ideas that events remembered from childhood are of great value in vocational guidance, because these events are "very near to the main interest of the individual." Hafner & Fakouri, supra, at 239. They explain, "Adler suggests that a person's style of life is designed to overcome feelings of inferiority," and that his (Adler's) own first recollection, a "traumatic medical experience," resulted in feelings of physical inferiority, which caused him to enter the field of medicine in order to conquer his somatic inferiority. See id.

63. See Richard, supra note 30, at 229-34.

64. See Shneidman, supra note 44, at 609 (discussing study of eleven lawyers, each of whom had been a subject in the Terman Study of Gifted for most of their lives).

65. In other words, professional success and marital difficulty do not go hand-in-hand. See id. at 611.

66. See id. at 609.

67. See id. at 613.

68. See id. at 614.

69. See id. at 615-16. Unfortunately, there is no comparison of the individuals studied by Shneidman with non-lawyers.

70. See G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 225, 226 ("[M]ost of the research projects [studying law students] collected data nonsystematically, episodically, or cross-sectionally and failed to separate cohort confounds, including time (semester) effects."); Bohn, Jr., supra note 41, at 359 (assessing students who expressed their probable career occupation as "lawyer"); Robert Stevens, Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551, 555 (1973) (noting that only "a handful of . . . empirical studies of law students have been completed since 1965").

71. See Bohn, Jr., supra note 41, at 360 (finding that lawyers scored at extremes on five of six "needs" tables, including dominance, self-confidence, abasement, deference, and exhibition).

72. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 573 (stating that law schools studied "appear[ed] to draw students from more affluent families"); see also A.B.A. COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, supra note 36, at 8 (noting that number of women in law school rose from 3% in 1960 and 1971 to 23% in 1995).

73. See Benjamin et al., supra note 70, at 246 (finding that among pre-law students, symptom levels were not elevated significantly when compared with the normal population).

74. See Bohn, Jr., supra note 41, at 360.

75. See id. The test used was the Adjective Check List; it was scored for fifteen psychological needs according to a standardized system. See id. The engineering and pre-medical students' scores were close to the mean on all the scales. See id. Also, the pre-law students' scores were the exact opposite image of the undecided students' scores (e.g., high on abasement and deference and low on self-confidence, dominance, and exhibition), indicating that college freshmen who were undecided about their career choices had the opposite needs of those expecting to enter law school. See id.

76. See Alexander W. Astin, Pre-law Students-A National Profile, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 73, 75 (1984); Stevens, supra note 70, at 598. A 1981 study by Alexander Astin echoes Stevens' findings regarding the elite socioeconomic backgrounds of prelaw students. See Astin, supra, at 75. Astin also found that women in 1981 were underrepresented among prelaw students (constituting 45% of total students, a 10% increase since 1969) but that minorities were not. See id. at 74-75. He also found that prelaw students were more conservative than were college undergraduates (30% vs. 21%), although all students since the late 1960s had become generally more conservative. See id. at 78-79. This conflicts with a 1983 study by Marilyn Heins and her colleagues, which found that law students were more liberal in their political beliefs than medical students or the general population. See Marilyn Heins et al., Law Students and Medical Students: A Comparison of Perceived Stress, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 511 (1983).

77. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 616-17 n.125. Interestingly, even the minority law students had a more elite background, financially and educationally, than most. See id. at 600-01. Astin also found that prelaw students were most underrepresented in the arts, sciences, and engineering and tended to major in the social sciences, consistent with Stevens' finding. See Astin, supra note 76, at 77.

78. See Benjamin et al., supra note 70, at 228.

79. See id. at 229-30.

80. See id. at 236, 247.

81. See A.B.A. COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE LAW, supra note 36, at 9-10 (reporting that 80% of women lawyers entered profession after 1970).

82. See Stephen Reich, Strong Vocational Interest Blank Patterns Associated With Law School Achievement, 39 PSYCHOL. REP. 1343, 1344 (1976) ("It is a well-observed fact that law frequently attracts students who are very uncertain about their ultimate occupational goals."). Because law prepares one for so many business and government positions, Reich contends that [s]tudents feel they can study law without pinning themselves down vocationally. . . .

[Because there are no particular prerequisites for admission to law school, t]he decision to study law can thus be made (and is frequently made) at the last hour of undergraduate training and the resultant law student body is thus a mixture of students with clear vocational goals and students who are ambivalent about their occupational future.

83. See Jean Campbell, Differential Response for Female and Male Law Students on the Strong-Campbell Interest Inventory: The Question of Separate Sex Norms, 23 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 130, 130-35 (1976) (investigating gender differences in vocational testing among sample of law students at Texas Tech University and finding that the first-, second-, and third-year law students scored highest on Lawyer scale of Strong-Campbell Interest Inventory (a widely-used vocational test) compared to other scales of the test).

84. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 623-24 (stating that slightly more than half of law students surveyed indicated uncertain career plans as of great or some importance in their decision to enter law school); see also Wagner Thielans, Jr., Some Comparisons of Entrants to Medical and Law School, in THE STUDENT PHYSICIAN 131, 141 (Robert K. Merton et al. eds., 1957) (reporting that 23% of law students reported indecision as influencing their decision to enter law).

85. See Thomas M. Goolsby, Jr., Law School Selection and Performance and Subsequent Admission to Legal Practice, 28 EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 421, 421 (1968).

86. See id. at 425 (finding that the results of the LSAT are no more accurate in predicting GPA in law school than would be any comprehensive achievement test).

87. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 623-24.

88. See id. at 559-60.

89. See id. at 576-77.

90. See id.

91. See id. at 577 (reporting that only 14% of law students at Yale University, class of 1970, cited desire for financial rewards as greatly important among their reasons for attending law school).

92. See id. (stating that 58% of law students at University of Southern California, class of 1970, reported that making money was greatly important factor in decision to attend law school).

93. Id. at 578.

94. Id. (taking issue with recent reports that purportedly underestimate importance of prestige to law students).

95. See id. at 624.

96. See id. at 579 tbl.14b. From 1960 to 1972, however, a desire to enter politics, to restructure society, and to serve the underprivileged became increasingly more important motives for entering law. See id. at 624. This is not surprising, given the political and social events occurring during this time. For example, the Vietnam War may have sparked individuals' desire to go to law school for these reasons (and also to avoid the draft). The civil rights movement also may have encouraged more altruistic individuals to enter law at this time. Altruistic motives may have become rarer after the 1960s and early 1970s.

97. See Don S. Anderson et al., Conservatism in Recruits to the Professions, 9 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. SOC. 42, 42-45 (1973).

98. See id. at 43.

99. Altruistic concerns were a motivator for 25% of entering engineering and medical students and for 35% of teacher trainees. See id.

100. See James M. Hedegard, The Impact of Legal Education: An In-Depth Examination of Career-Relevant Interests, Attitudes, and Personality Traits Among First-Year Law Students, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 791, 814.

101. See id.

102. See id.

103. For example, Stevens found that more than 95% of law students surveyed indicated that the desire for intellectual stimulation or an interest in the subject matter motivated them to enter law school. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 614.

104. See id. at 616 tbl.35.

105. See id.

106. Astin, supra note 76, at 82 (reporting the results of a study of college undergraduates in 1981 and comparing it to results of a similar study in 1969).

107. See id.

108. See id. at 83 (finding a trend in this regard). Astin theorized that, because the goal of developing a meaningful philosophy of life had become less popular during this time, perhaps making money had become students' primary philosophy of life, reflecting a "deep-seated value shift" among young people from 1969 to 1981. See id.

109. See id. at 82-83 (finding that almost one-third of prelaw students did not endorse the goal of helping others in difficulty, which was surprising given the "helping" nature of the legal profession).

110. See id. at 612. Stevens found, in 1973, that 54.7% of women law students surveyed indicated that financial rewards had been of no importance to their decision to enter law school, while only 13.6% of the male law students said that it had been of no importance. See id. Also, the vast majority of all law students surveyed indicated that prestige was of some importance in their decision, and the importance of money in the decision to become a lawyer apparently increased during the 1960s. See id. at 577-78.

111. See Anderson et al., supra note 97, at 43; see also Georgina Williams LaRussa, Portia's Decision: Women's Motives for Studying Law and Their Later Career Satisfaction as Attorneys, 1 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 350, 360 (1977) (reporting that altruistic motives were of primary importance to women law students); Stevens, supra note 70, at 613 (explaining that women and minorities were significantly more likely than men to enter law school in order to restructure society or serve underprivileged). An extensive study conducted with students and graduates of Stanford Law School as of December 1986, found that, among other things, significantly more male than female students indicated they went to law school because of (1) a desire to make money and (2) an interest in politics. See Janet Taber et al., Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1238 (1988). Graduates were slightly different; female graduates more often reported (1) a desire to serve society and (2) the need for further education in order to obtain a job as motivations to go to law school. See id. Male graduates more often cited (1) a desire to make money and (2) an interest in going into business as motives for law school. See id. There is no comparison of these motives with motivations of students or graduates of other professional schools. It should be noted, however, that there were clear gender differences between the law students and lawyers as to their motives for choosing the law. See id. More male students than female students cited an interest in politics (39.2% versus 20%) or a desire to make money (38.7% versus 20.6%) as an incentive for going to law school. See id. More female graduates of Stanford Law School than male graduates cited a desire to serve society (81.5% versus 69.3%) or the need for further education in order to obtain a job (50% versus 31.4%) as a motivation for going to law school. See id. Furthermore, male graduates were more likely than female graduates to admit the desire to make money as a motivator for law school (49.5% versus 38%). See id. But see James J. White, Women In the Law, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1069-70 (1967) (finding that women are not more motivated to enter law for "social worker," altruistic reasons than are men, and that women are also motivated by money, contrary to expectations).

112. See Anderson et al., supra note 97, at 43.

113. See Taber et al., supra note 111, at 1238 (finding that male law students cited making money as a motivation for entering law more frequently than did women).

114. See id. at 1240. These researchers explain the gender difference regarding desire to make money with the following rationale: it is socially acceptable for men to state openly that they want to work for money, while women have been socialized to feel uncomfortable if not devoting their efforts to the good of others without concern for their personal needs. See id. Thus, women simply feel uncomfortable admitting a desire for financial rewards. See id. Alternatively, men may actually feel more pressure to make money, due to social norms about "breadwinning." See id.

115. See LaRussa, supra note 111, at 361-62 (finding that high satisfaction in legal career will be found by women whose reasons for entering law were practical, realistic, or materialistic).

116. See id. at 355 tbl.1. Motives fell into eight thematic categories (listed in order of frequency): altruistic; realistic; self-enhancement (increased personal image); stimulation (intellectually challenging, difficult); self-fulfillment (developing existing talents or fulfilling personal goal); professional-identification (wanted to be a lawyer); action-oriented (interest in the tangible results of lawyering); and theoretical-interest (interest in law for its own sake, as a scholarly discipline). See id. at 353-54.

117. See id. at 356-57. The highly satisfied graduates more frequently reported self-fulfillment and realistic (and, to a lesser extent, theoretical-interest) motives for entering law, while those least satisfied more frequently reported action-oriented and stimulation motives. See id.

118. See id. at 353-58.

119. See Richard, supra note 30, at 250 (finding that lawyers who prefer the dimensions of Extroversion, Thinking, and Judging are more satisfied than those who prefer Introversion, Feeling, and Perceiving). Richard explains how these dimensions might relate to job satisfaction. See id. at 232-34; see also infra note 354 and accompanying text (illustrating this relationship between the dimensions and lawyer job satisfaction).

120. Stevens, supra note 70, at 608-09 (noting responses from law students at Yale University, class of 1972, who were questioned about various issues relating to the type of people attending law school).

121. See id. at 609.

122. See, e.g., Hedegard, supra note 100, at 862 (finding, contrary to expectations of critics, that students' temperaments were slightly more heterogeneous after one year of law school).

123. There are twenty-six studies of law students discussed in this section. As Amiram Elwork and Andrew Benjamin aptly point out, however, the existing research on lawyers is a "hodgepodge"; the studies suffer from "various methodological deficiencies," and are thus "suggestive rather than definitive and need replication." Amiram Elwork & G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Lawyers In Distress, 23 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205, 206-07 (1995).

124. See Norman Solkoff, The Use of Personality and Attitude Tests in Predicting the Academic Success of Medical and Law Students, 43 J. MED. EDUC. 1250 (1968) (detailing empirical findings concerning personality traits of medical and law school students); Norman Solkoff & Joan Markowitz, Personality Characteristics of First-Year Medical and Law Students, 42 J. MED. EDUC. 195 (1967).

125. These studies were conducted while Dr. Solkoff was an Associate Professor of Psychology within the Department of Psychiatry at the State University of New York, Buffalo School of Medicine. See Solkoff, supra note 124, at 1250; Solkoff & Markowitz, supra note 124, at 195.

126. For example, police departments and suicide prevention centers often use the MMPI to screen out inappropriate job applicants. The MMPI was designed to distinguish abnormal personality characteristics from normal ones, in contrast to the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), which was developed to distinguish among normal personality types and does not indicate whether dysfunction is present or not. The MMPI is used in clinical settings; the MBTI is more often used as a counseling tool. The MBTI has been used in many seminars and workplace interventions designed to help people understand their "psychological type" and work more effectively with one another. It has also been introduced into the law office and legal education. See, e.g., Don Peters, Forever Jung: Psychological Type Theory, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Learning Negotiation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (stating that students at University of Florida College of Law are assessed with the MBTI in several negotiation and dispute settlement courses); Don Peters & Martha Peters, Maybe That's Why I Do That: Psychological Type Theory, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, and Learning Legal Interviewing, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 169, 174 n.20 (1990) (noting that MBTI has been used within law firms to develop collaborative work environments).

127. See Solkoff & Markowitz, supra note 124, at 197-99. Cynicism is defined as "a contemptuous disbelief in man's sincerity of motives or rectitude of conduct characterized by the conviction that human conduct is suggested or directed by self-interest or self-indulgence." Id. at 197.

128. See id. at 198. Humanitarianism is defined as "a regard for the interests of mankind, benevolence, philanthropy." Id. at 197; see Paul Van R. Miller, Personality Differences and Student Survival in Law School, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 460-67 (1967) (defining "Feeling" type in 1967 study and finding that almost twice as many "Feeling" types dropped out of law school as compared to "Thinking" types); infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.

129. See Solkoff & Markowitz, supra note 124, at 199. Authoritarianism was defined as "acceptance of the idea of survival of the fittest, hero worship of acquaintances, and rugged individualism." Id. at 197.

130. See id. at 197-99. In particular, the law students' Pd (psychopathic deviate) and Ma (hypomania) scores were significantly higher than those of the medical students, while the medical students' D (depression) and Mf (Masculine-Feminine) scores were higher than those of the law students. See id. at 197. Other viable interpretations of these scales included: Pd measuring trouble with the law, lack of concern about social and moral standards of conduct, family discord, authority problems, social alienation, self alienation, social imperturbability (often thought of as anger); Ma measuring over-ambitiousness, extroversion, high aspirations, amorality, psychomotor acceleration, imperturbability, and ego inflation. See S. R. HATHAWAY & J. C. MCKINLEY, MINNESOTA MULTIPHASIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY-2: MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATION AND SCORING 29-30 (1989).

131. See Solkoff & Markowitz, supra note 124, at 199.

132. See id. at 198.

133. See Solkoff, supra note 124, at 1251.

134. Id. at 1252. This latter characteristic was evidenced by higher L (Lie) scores on the MMPI among the lower-ranked students. See id. Solkoff's findings are fairly consistent with a later study by Reich in 1976 in which no relationships between personality dimensions (measured by the California Psychological Inventory) and first-year law school academic achievement were found. See Stephen Reich, California Psychological Inventory: Profile of a Sample of First-Year Law Students, 39 PSYCHOL. REP. 871, 872 (1976). Generally, it appears that there are few personality attributes which accurately predict law school academic performance. See Solkoff, supra note 124, at 1253. Interestingly, Solkoff's finding that, of the academic measures, only IQ score accurately predicted academic performance is consistent with a later study finding a relatively weak correlation between LSAT scores and law school grades. See Goolsby, Jr., supra note 85, at 424. Goolsby concluded that "any comprehensive test of achievement would serve as well as the LSAT as a predictor of success in law school." Id. at 425. These studies suggest that IQ may be more closely associated with success in law school than are undergraduate grade point average or LSAT score, which are the two criteria currently used for admission to law school. See Solkoff, supra note 124, at 1252-53.

135. See Solkoff, supra note 124, at 1253.

136. See Miller, supra note 128, at 460-67 (specifically, "Feeling" types as measured by the MBTI).

137. See id. (11% of "Thinking" types dropped out compared to 20% of "Feeling" types, as measured by the MBTI; the ESFJ type, who values people, had the highest drop-out rate (28.1%)).

138. See Richard, supra note 30, at 248 ("Thinkers" report higher job satisfaction than "Feelers," referring to MBTI dimensions).

139. Reich, supra note 82, at 1344. The top students scored significantly higher on the Strong Vocational Interest Blank scales named Physician, Psychiatrist, Psychologist, Biologist, Artist, Musician-Performer, Lawyer, and Author-Journalist. See id. The bottom students scored significantly higher on the Public Speaking, Business Management, Merchandising, Office Practices, Mechanical, Religious Activities, Production Manager, Accountant, Office Worker, Purchasing Agent, Banker, Pharmacist, Funeral Director, Salesman, President-Manufacturing, Credit Manager, and Business Education Teacher scales. See id. Women students were excluded from the study, probably due to the small number in the sample. See id.

140. See id. These results are consistent with other studies of medical, engineering, and male and female undergraduates; top students generally score higher on professional or intellectual scales and bottom students score higher on business or commercial scales. See id.

141. Conducted in 1963 with students in their first week of law school at four law schools, this study measured drop-outs after the first year of law school and attempted to find correlates among academic predictors and personality type (using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator). It found that dropping out from the first year of law school is unrelated to academic promise as a law student, based on undergraduate grade point average and Law School Admissions Test scores. See Miller, supra note 128, at 460-61.

142. See id. at 465-66.

143. Seventy-two percent of the law students preferred Thinking over Feeling, while only fifty-four percent of the male college students preferred Thinking. See id. at 465.

144. See Richard, supra note 30, at 229-30 (finding that 76.5% of lawyers sampled preferred Thinking over Feeling, while only 47.5% of the general population preferred the same).

145. SUSAN J. BELL & LAWRENCE R. RICHARD, Anatomy of a Lawyer: Personality and Long-Term Career Satisfaction, in FULL DISCLOSURE: DO YOU REALLY WANT TO BE A LAWYER? 149, 152 (Susan J. Bell ed., 2d ed. 1992). Richard also notes that the Thinking/Feeling scale is the most significant personality trait for predicting lawyer satisfaction, stating, "those with a preference for Feeling are swimming against the tide." Id. at 153.

146. See Richard, supra note 30, at 229-31, 233-34.

147. All of the early studies (1967-68) excluded women from the sample studied.

148. See Miller, supra note 128, at 466 (stating that 11% of Thinkers dropped out, compared to 20% of Feelers). As shall be seen later, Feeling may also be incompatible with the contented practice of law. See Bell & Richard, supra note 145, at 153 (finding that those with "Feeling" preference were most likely to be disenchanted with practice of law); Richard, supra note 30, at 233-34.

149. The least common personality type had the highest drop-out rate; the most common personality type had the lowest drop-out rate, and so on. An overrepresented type is one that is more prevalent in the law student sample than it is in the general population (i.e., it was self-selected into law school). See Miller, supra note 128, at 466.

150. Id. at 466.

151. This is the ISTJ type reflecting a preference for Introversion, Sensing, Thinking, and Judging. See id.

152. Id.

153. This is the ESFJ type reflecting a preference for Extroversion, Sensing, Feeling, and Judging. See id.

154. See id. at 465-66. One of the most ominous conclusions drawn by Miller, however, is the statement that "the only objective criteria now used to select students were impotent in predicting survival." Id. at 467. These objective criteria are the undergraduate grade point average and the LSAT score. See id. Miller continues, stating that "[p]resumably, the purpose of a law school is to train future lawyers and not to titillate the faculty by supplying them with intellectually able first-year students-although the two are not, of course, mutually exclusive." Id.

155. See Chusmir, supra note 61, at 231-34 (concluding that most attorney positions are most happily filled by individuals with high achievement needs, moderate power needs, and low affiliation needs).

156. See supra notes 70, 76 & 88-96 and accompanying text.

157. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 571-72 n.46.

158. See id. at 572-74.

159. See id. at 574. Of course, this trend may have been present in many young people at the time, given the political and social climate of the 1960s.

160. See id.

161. See Astin, supra note 76, at 77 (social science was most popular pre-law major); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.

162. At the very least this indicates a change in their intellectual approaches to life. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 575. Stevens also demonstrated that law students are academic achievers, in that 50% of law students ranked in the top quarter of their undergraduate classes. See id.

163. See Lawrence Dubin, The Role of Law School in Balancing a Lawyer's Personal and Professional Life, 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 57, 61 (1982) (finding that law students come from higher social and economic levels than do other college graduates, which may be consistent with idea that they seek to achieve socioeconomic level equal to that of their parents (citing S. WARKOV & J. ZELAN, LAWYERS IN THE MAKING 2-6 (1965))); Kay Standley et al., Family Constellations of Law and Medical Students, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241, 242-46 (1974); see also Williams & McCullers, supra note 61, at 351 (1983) (finding that women lawyers and physicians are more likely to be first-born or only children and to share other similarities).

164. See Standley et al., supra note 163, at 244-45. The authors suggest that sons of physicians might have a clearer idea of what their fathers do on a daily basis at work than do sons of attorneys. See id. This is consistent with Stephen Reich's theory that prospective law students do not have as clear an idea of what attorneys do than do students in medicine, engineering, psychology, and dentistry. See Reich, supra note 82, at 1344. Also, this study excluded female students in its results due to the small number of women in the sample studied. The preliminary results with the women students suggested that these same results may not be true for women medical and law students. See Standley et al., supra note 163, at 245.

165. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 673-75.

166. See id.

167. See id.

168. See id. at 673.

169. See id. at 674.

170. See id. at 675.

171. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text (discussing the study in detail).

172. See Alan N. Katz & Mark P. Denbeaux, Trust, Cynicism, and Machiavellianism Among Entering First-Year Law Students, 53 J. URB. L. 397, 398 (1976). At the same time, the American Bar Association increased its focus on monitoring attorney behavior, perhaps spurred by the Watergate events. See id.

173. See id. at 401.

174. See id. at 402. Richard Christie's "Machiavellian Scale" was designed to "tap a person's general strategy for dealing with people, especially the degree to which he feels other people are manipulable in interpersonal situations." Id. This study also investigated the students' perceptions of their likely behavior as attorneys by asking whether they would be traditionalists/passive or reformers/active, and by asking them to detail their feelings about the ethics of the legal profession. See id. at 402-03.

175. See id. at 403-05. Part of the reason they were more trustful than adults generally may have been the subjects' young age. See id. at 400.

176. See, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 97, at 45.

177. See Katz & Denbeaux, supra note 172, at 400.

178. Id. at 410-11. They rated the ethics of law professors and judges even higher. See id. The authors found that these results were consistent with the other findings of noncynicism in these law students. See id. The authors also believed that these ratings reflected a generally high esteem for the entire judicial system and an idealistic perception about their new experience in law school, due to the fact that the students were in their first week of classes. See id.

179. See id. at 410.

180. See id. at 411 (observing that 91% of 69 law students surveyed rated honesty of doctors above that of lawyers (citing Jean Campbell, The Attitudes of First-Year Law Students at the University of New Mexico, 20 J. LEGAL EDUC. 71, 75 (1967))).

181. See id. at 411 (noting a 1975 Gallup Poll of 904 undergraduates in which 66% rated honesty and ethical standards of doctors as High or Very High, while only 40% gave similar ranking to lawyers (citing The Gallup Poll Index, Sept. 1975, at 13)).

182. See id. at 412 (commenting that first-year law students surveyed hold less cynical perception of the legal profession than do practicing attorneys); see also infra notes 298-99 and accompanying text (finding that first-year law students generally described lawyers in complimentary terms).

183. See A.B.A. COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, supra note 36, at 1; see also Astin, supra note 76, at 74 (10% of prelaw students in 1969 were women; by 1981, this figure reached 45%).

184. See Jane W. Coplin & John E. Williams, Women Law Students' Descriptions of Self and the Ideal Lawyer, 2 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 323, 329-31 (1978).

185. See Bohn, Jr., supra note 41, at 360.

186. See Coplin & Williams, supra note 184, at 329-30.

187. See id. at 329-31. The study used the Adjective Check List to determine needs as well as personality traits. There was one interesting "reversal" in these findings; the women law students described themselves as more aggressive and less nurturing than their ideal lawyer, perhaps as a result of overcompensation and de-emphasis on feminine traits. See id. at 331.

188. See infra notes 327-28 and accompanying text (discussing empirical study of professional and non-professional women).

189. See McLean & Kalin, supra note 38, at 153-54.

190. See id.

191. See id. at 154-55. This correlation was only 0.14, which was the lowest correlation between self-description and stereotype for all the occupations studied, including engineering, nursing, teaching, rehabilitation, therapy, medicine, and law.

192. See id. at 155.

193. Janet S. St. Lawrence et al., Stress Management Training For Law Students: Cognitive Behavioral Intervention, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 101, 106 (1983).

194. See id.

195. See id.

196. See Solkoff & Markowitz, supra note 124, at 198; see also Hedegard, supra note 100, at 803 (summarizing research conducted prior to 1979 as indicating that law students were more confident, expressive, dominant, assertive, socially outgoing, introspective, and philosophical in outlook than other students).

197. Humanitarianism was defined in Solkoff's study as "a regard for the interests of mankind, benevolence, philanthropy." Solkoff & Markowitz, supra note 124, at 197; cf. supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing Miller's definition of "Feeling" types). This lack of humanitarianism may have intensified in the 1960s and 1970s, as evidenced by a change in the usual undergraduate preparation of law students from humanistic disciplines to social science disciplines during these years. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 575.

198. See Miller, supra note 128, at 466.

199. See Hedegard, supra note 100, at 814 (finding that altruism was an influential factor in less than one-third of law students surveyed); supra notes 88-114, 295-97 and accompanying text (presenting divergent results in attitudes and motivating factors that were characteristic of law students). Results on cynicism among law students are inconsistent. Compare Anderson, supra note 97, at 45 (indicating that law students have increased cynicism and decreased idealism), and Solkoff & Markowitz, supra note 124, at 198 (discovering that cynicism in law students increases the longer one is in law school), with Katz & Denbeaux, supra note 172, at 400 (finding law students to be less cynical than other adults) (citing Wagner P. Thielens, The Socialization of Law Students: A Case Study in Three Parts (1965) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on file with Dept. of Sociology, Columbia University)).

200. See Reich, supra note 134, at 871-74.

201. See id. at 873-74.

202. See id. at 872. A list of these scales is set forth in Table 1 of Reich's study. See id.

203. See id. at 873.

204. See Solkoff & Markowitz, supra note 124, at 198 (noting that law students display greater ebullience, sociability and ease in interpersonal relations).

205. See Hafner & Fakouri, supra note 47, at 240 (finding that law students as children tend to take comparatively high initiative).

206. See Reich, supra note 134, at 873. The "sense of well-being scale" identifies persons who minimize their worries and complaints and who are relatively free from self-doubt and disillusionment. See id.

207. Id.

208. Id.

209. Id.

210. Id.

211. Id. at 873-74 (emphasis added). Reich continues, Law is a role-playing profession. The law students who privately are insecure are able to ignore their inner feelings and to concentrate on championing the rights of someone else; they take on his role and focus on his problems rather than their own. The . . . [test results indicate that] law students are frequently engaged in playing a part in their lives and have not as yet really dealt with their genuine feelings.

Id. at 874. Reich contends that legal education will not be likely to change this pattern since law school encourages law students to continue to act in roles rather than to explore how they, as private persons, would deal with the situation. See id. This may explain why some commentators are calling for law schools to focus on teaching ethics and values and why traditional legal education has been unsuccessful in getting students to explore how they would deal with ethical dilemmas. It is plausible that these students are so used to acting in roles that they are unprepared to deal with their own feelings in troublesome situations. It also may help explain the public's low opinion of lawyers and why clients and others complain that they cannot relate to their attorneys. See John A. DeVault III, "My Lawyer's Dialing Finger is Broken," FLA. B.J., July-Aug. 1995, at 12. Finally, Reich concludes that possibly one of the strongest motivations for these students to become lawyers is the chance to continue their current mode of operating ("demonstrations of public vigor and dominance while being privately anxious and uncertain") and have this personality style validated and rewarded "through the choice of a socially prestigious and valued profession." Reich, supra note 134, at 874.

212. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text; see also JAMES O. PROCHASKA, SYSTEMS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: A TRANSTHEORETICAL ANALYSIS 70-71 (1979) (contending that manner in which individuals choose career paths is influenced by inner feelings such as self-esteem).

213. See Reich, supra note 134, at 874. Further, a legal career solves the conflict by providing a socially desirable "role" for the individual to don and thereby effectively conceal the inner feelings of inadequacy and insecurity.

214. See Stephen B. Shanfield & G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Psychiatric Distress in Law Students, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 69 (1985) (reporting "higher rates of psychiatric distress" for law students than the general population). See generally Benjamin et al., supra note 70, at 227-28 (discussing studies showing increased stress levels in law students).

215. See Leonard D. Eron & Robert S. Redmount, The Effect of Legal Education on Attitudes, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431, 435 (1957).

216. See id. at 519 (noting that overall, law students did not report any greater level of anxiety than medical students). Further research has shown that within legal education, women experience more stress than men. In 1988, Janet Taber and her colleagues presented evidence that women experienced more stress during law school than men. See Taber et al., supra note 111, at 1251-53 (reporting differences between men and women's stress-related indicators, such as crying, having nightmares, experiencing insomnia, drinking alcohol, and overeating). This was particularly true of women alumni and less so of women law students, see id. at 1251-52, prompting these researchers to wonder if the law school environment has improved for women in recent years. See id. at 1253. The authors suggest that the difference may merely reflect varying "perception as memories of these experiences" and that the "graduates' memories of their stressful experiences may be exaggerated or distorted by time." Id. Furthermore, because the study tested reactions to stress, the authors suggest that men and women may experience the same level of stress, but react differently to it. See id. Women graduates also reported more stress as practicing attorneys than did men, see id. at 1258, yet women's levels of job satisfaction did not differ from that of men. See id. at 1245-46. The authors note, however, that the American Bar Association has interpreted the results of several surveys as showing that women lawyers are generally less satisfied with their jobs than are men. See id. at 1222 & n.80 (citing Myth v. Ms., BARRISTER, Winter 1986, at 28). Finally, Beck noted that women generally tend to report more symptoms of distress than men, so these gender differences may simply reflect this general phenomenon. See Beck et al., supra note 2, at 48-49.

217. This relationship is often called the "Yerkes-Dodson Law." The Yerkes-Dodson Law holds that an optimal level of arousal or difficulty in a task (i.e., stress) is necessary for optimal performance. Too little or too much arousal is associated with poor task performance. See LUDY T. BENJAMIN, JR. ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY 339 (1994). In 1968, Lawrence Silver demonstrated that this relationship operates in the first semester of law school. See Lawrence Silver, Comment, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School, 4 WIS. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (1968). Although Silver's sample of law students was too small to support significant statistical analysis of his data (only nine first-year students were interviewed), Silver found that students with high and low levels of anxiety failed to achieve grades after the first-semester consistent with their predicted grades. See id. at 1216.

218. See Heins et al., supra note 76, at 520-21 (noting that unlike law students, medical students were four times more likely to seek help, and most often indicated that they received help or support from family or friends).

219. See id. at 521.

220. See Shanfield & Benjamin, supra note 214, at 69. Law students had a higher rate of psychiatric distress than either a contrasting normal population or a medical student population. See id. at 65-66. These authors reviewed earlier studies and noted low response rates, nonsystematic approaches, little empirical data, inordinate focus on the first year, failure to compare law students to other professional students, and use of personality tests which do not measure psychiatric symptoms. See id.

221. See id. at 67, 74. These scales measured anxiety, depression, hostility, obsessive-compulsivity, interpersonal sensitivity, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, psychoticism, overall distress, intensity of symptoms, and total number of symptoms. See id. It is important to note that "interpersonal sensitivity" in this context does not mean being attuned to other people; here it denotes "feelings of inadequacy and inferiority, particularly in comparison with others." Beck et al., supra note 2, at 14. The assertion throughout this Article that lawyers are not interpersonally sensitive, meaning not attuned to the emotions, needs, and concerns of other people and not concerned with interpersonal issues or harmony, is therefore not inconsistent with the research finding that lawyers' "interpersonal sensitivity" (as a measure of psychological distress) is elevated.

222. Id. at 68. These authors used the Beck Depression Inventory, a well-respected, validated self-report instrument measuring depression; the Brief Symptom Inventory, which measures nine symptom dimensions such as somatization, hostility, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, and anxiety, and three global indices including the Global Severity Index, the Positive Symptom Distress Index, and the Positive Symptom Total; and the Multiple Affect Adjective Checklist, which is a "validated survey of feeling states" scored for anxiety, depression, and hostility. See id. at 67-68.

223. See id. at 71 (indicating that these results were consistent with earlier studies).

224. See id. at 72.

225. See id. at 69.

226. See id. at 66-67 (describing method used in gathering and analyzing data).

227. Id. at 73.

228. See Benjamin et al., supra note 70, at 228 (describing study of students and alumni of University of Arizona Law School); infra notes 229-52 and accompanying text (analyzing studies indicating percentages of law students showing psychological distress).

229. See Benjamin et al., supra note 70, at 228-33 (detailing methods and procedures used in Arizona law school study).

230. See id. at 246.

231. See id.

232. See id.

233. See id.

234. See id. at 250-51. Other contributors to distress may include excessive workloads, time management problems, and a high student-faculty ratio. See id. at 248-49.

235. See id. at 226-28 (noting that study avoided methodological flaws by using standardized social science instruments).

236. A cross-sectional method would have measured different subjects simultaneously, such as first-, second-, and third-year students and alumni. There may be inherent differences between the groups. Because a longitudinal design assesses the same subjects at different points in time, differences between the groups are likely to reflect true effects of time, not simply inherent differences among the subjects themselves. A closed-end questionnaire was used to gather various information. See id. at 231.

237. Id. at 236. The criteria for the cutoff was two standard deviations above the mean. See id.

238. See id.

239. See id. at 247.

240. See id. at 247 n.50 (citing J.H. Boyd & M.M. Weisman, Epidemiology of Affective Disorders, 38 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1039 (1981)).

241. See id. at 246.

242. Id.

243. See id.

244. See id. at 251.

245. See id. at 252.

246. See id.

247. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 652-57. According to Professor Stevens' study, by the fifth semester of law school, most students have a two-day work week and intellectually participate in law school on a part-time basis. See id. at 653. Only about 5% of the students were still tense in the fifth semester or found their studies difficult; 20% found their studies stimulating. In the first semester, only 12% felt relaxed; in the fifth semester, almost 75% felt relaxed and about 30% felt bored and unchallenged. See id. at 653-54.

248. See supra notes 228-46 and accompanying text (finding that symptoms of psychological distress did not appreciably decline in third year). With respect to tension, perhaps the situation changed from 1973 to 1986 (the latter being the year Benjamin reported his findings), or perhaps the manner in which Stevens assessed tension failed to account for the psychological symptoms of distress that Benjamin captured. Students may not have reported feeling tense in response to law school because they dealt with the tension via one of the maladaptive behaviors Benjamin studied (e.g., obsessive-compulsiveness, paranoia, or substance abuse).

249. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 658 (suggesting various explanations for data showing that low levels of student interest are most prevalent among students who held summer jobs). Stevens found that the best predictor of tension during the second semester was not grades, but was tension during the first semester, suggesting that tension in law school may be a stable personality trait, not the result simply of external forces. See id. at 656.

250. See id. at 250.

251. See id.

252. See id. (citing F.K. ZEMANS & V.G. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION 1, 137 (1981)).

253. See Miller, supra note 128; Richard, supra note 30.

254. Benjamin et al., supra note 70, at 250 n.65 (quoting M. Meltsner, Feeling Like a Lawyer, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 624, 633 (1983)).

255. See id. at 246.

256. See Heins et al., supra note 76, at 520-21 (noting that law students are less likely to seek help as compared to medical students).

257. M.J. Hamilton et al., Thirty-Five Law Student Suicides, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 335, 342 (1983).

258. See id. (comparing suicide rates for male and female law students to rates for other graduate students). Note, however, that the frequency of suicides among both law school and medical school students shared a slight increase during the third year of study. See id. The similarity between these increases among law and medical students suggests that this phenomenon is common to professional school. The rate for law students, however, still appeared to be lower than that for medical students. See id. at 342. The authors then suggest that law school may serve as a stabilizing, socially integrating influence which inhibits suicide. See id. at 343.

259. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 677-78 (finding relationship between tension, ambition, and aggression).

260. See Association of Am. Law Schools, Report of the AALS Special Committee on Problems of Substance Abuse in the Law Schools, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35, 42-43 (1994) [hereinafter AALS Special Committee Report] (using evidence from Law Student Survey, a comprehensive 1991 survey of all law students at 19 law schools).

261. An additional explanation for increased alcohol consumption by third-year law students as reported by the AALS is that third-year students have learned how to manage their time more effectively, allowing more time for diversions, and they generally are less interested in law school. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 653 (finding reduced workload and some boredom for law students in their fifth semester).

262. See AALS Special Committee Report, supra note 260, at 41-42. Law students also appear to use barbiturates, LSD, other psychedelics, marijuana, and cocaine more often than do medical students. See id. at 42.

263. See id.

264. See id. at 42-43.

265. See id. at 45 (reporting that many law students used alcohol in order to relieve anxious feelings).

266. See id. at 44. The AALS Committee noted that it conducted its survey, in part, "[b]ecause substance abuse is such a serious problem in the legal profession" and the survey results would help law schools educate students about substance abuse. See id. at 36. The report also refers to the establishment of the American Bar Association Commission on Impaired Attorneys in 1988 to respond "to the high incidence of alcoholism and chemical dependency in the legal profession . . . ." Id. at 45-46.

267. See Paul D. Carrington & James J. Conley, The Alienation of Law Students, 75 MICH. L. REV. 887, 889-90 (1977) (stating that primary characteristics of alienated students are sense of disconnection from law school community and lack of interest in classes, activities, and other students).

268. See id. Carrington and Conley were motivated to perform this study after a large number (up to 20%) of law students at the University of Michigan Law School left after their first year. The authors set out to explore possible causes for the high incidence of dropouts, as well as what the authors termed as dropping out "emotionally and intellectually" while remaining in school. See id. at 887.

269. See id. at 889-92 (describing alienation factor). Alienation appears to be a special brand of cynicism directed toward school, the law, faculty, and peers. See id. at 890-91.

270. See id. at 891.

271. See id.

272. See id. Carrington and Conley theorized that the alienated students worked during undergraduate school because they were more materialistic and less academically oriented. They apparently did not need to work because there was no correlation between working and family income. See id.

273. See id. at 891-92.

274. See id. at 892 (suggesting that alienated law students will likely become cynical lawyers).

275. See id. at 893 n.9 (reporting 29 out of a sample of 185 manifested extreme dissatisfaction).

276. See id. at 894.

277. Id. at 893 (suggesting that alienated students are disinterested and disconnected from law school community, while dissatisfied students are angry and hostile towards certain aspects of the community).

278. See id. at 894.

279. See id. at 894-95.

280. See id. at 895.

281. See id.

282. See id.

283. See id. at 898 (alienation was present at the same rate among first-, second-, and third-year students). The authors suggest that alienated students could be screened out of law school via the admissions process, but admit their inability to provide a means of doing so. See id.

284. See id. at 898-99.

285. See id. at 896 (defining sociability factor).

286. See id. at 897.

287. See id. at 898. They stated that it is "unlikely that the sociable student's desire for more emotionally satisfying relationships in the law school can be fully gratified." Id. One wonders whether Carrington and Conley's "sociability" is a trait similar to Richard, Miller, and Natter's "Feeling" preference. The Myers-Briggs dimension of Feeling, like sociability, is associated with unhappiness in law school. Perhaps the same individuals are "Feelers" and "sociable." See Miller, supra note 128, at 465-66; Frank L. Natter, The Human Factor: Psychological Type in Legal Education, 3 RES. PSYCHOL. TYPE 55, 56 (1981); Richard, supra note 30, at 179 (stating that Feelers generally report lower job satisfaction than other Myers-Briggs personality types).

288. One study of the effects of law school on law students cited Eron's early work which argued that the strong altruistic impulses held by medical students at the start of medical school tended to dissipate as their medical training progressed. See Anderson et al., supra note 97, at 42-43 (citing L. D. Eron, Effect of Medical Education on Medical Students, 10 J. MED. EDUC. 535, 559-66 (1955); L. D. Eron, The Effect of Medical Education on Attitudes: A Follow-up Study, 33 J. MED. EDUC. 25, 33 (1958)). Therefore, although a decline in altruism may be present in law students, it may not be unique to legal education.

289. See Anderson et al., supra note 97, at 42-43.

290. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 558-59 (investigating whether homogeneous attitudes develop as a result of attendance at law school).

291. See Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like a Lawyer, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 121, 121-23 (1994).

292. See Hedegard, supra note 100, at 832-35.

293. See Anderson et al., supra note 97, at 44.

294. See Hedegard, supra note 100, at 804-05 (citing Michael J. Patton, The Student, the Situation, and Performance During the First Year of Law School, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 10 (1968); see also Stuart C. Goldberg, How Lawful is the Practice of Law, 2 LEARNING & L. 43 (1975).

295. See Eron & Redmount, supra note 215, at 440 (legal training associated with a lessening of skeptical attitudes); see also Katz & Denbeaux, supra note 172, at 400.

296. See Anderson et al., supra note 97, at 42; see also Hedegard, supra note 100, at 804 n.24 (citing four studies for idea that law students' career plans shift away from legal aid, criminal prosecution, public defending, and government agency work); Solkoff & Markowitz, supra note 124, at 198.

297. See Hedegard, supra note 100, at 805 n.34 at 825 (finding this shift among Brigham Young University law students from their orientation week to end of their first year).

298. See id. at 832; see also Katz & Denbeaux, supra note 172, at 410-11 (finding first-year law students' attitudes towards lawyers generally positive).

299. Hedegard, supra note 100, at 832.

300. See id. at 834.

301. See id. at 832-35. Hedegard also points to prior studies similarly finding that law school is not a homogenizing influence on students' attitudes. See id. at 805.

302. See id. at 810, 836-37. The questionnaire used was the Omnibus Personality Inventory, a 385-item questionnaire consisting of 14 scales: thinking introversion (introverts prefer reflective thought, ideas, abstractions, and academic activities; in contrast, extroverts prefer action and value practical applications); theoretical orientation (a preference for theoretical concerns, the scientific method, and logical, analytical and critical in approach); estheticism (diverse interests in the arts, literature, music, and drama, and highly responsive to such stimuli); complexity (an experimental and flexible orientation instead of a fixed way of viewing events, and a high tolerance for ambiguity, uncertainty, and new situations); autonomy (liberal, nonauthoritarian thinking, and a need for independence); religious orientation (skeptical of conventional religious beliefs); social extroversion (a preference for relating to people in a social context and for social activities); impulse expression (a readiness to express impulses, a need to seek gratification, active imagination, and may also feel rebellious and aggressive); personal integration (socially alienated or emotionally disturbed, feelings of hostility, aggression, isolation, or rejection); anxiety level (an absence of tension or anxiety); altruism (trusting and ethical in dealing with others and concerned for the welfare of others); practical outlook (an interest in practical, applied activities, materialism, and immediate utility, often authoritarian, conservative, and nonintellectual); masculinity-femininity (a degree of adherence to typical gender stereotypes); and response bias (an attempt to make a good impression or present a good image). See id. at 810-12.

303. See id. at 835. Scale scores showed a decrease in thinking introversion, theoretical orientation, social extroversion, and altruism, and an increase in impulse expression, anxiety, personal integration, autonomy, complexity, and estheticism. See id. at 836 tbl. 6. There was no change in the scale measuring adherence to male or female stereotypes, including traits such as competitiveness and practicality. See id. at 835.

304. See id. at 866.

305. See id. at 837.

306. See id. at 863-64.

307. See id. at 867.

308. See id. at 813.

309. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 675-80.

310. See id. at 678 n.203.

311. See id. at 678.

312. See id. (concluding that there existed "a positive relationship between perceived competition and increased aggression").

313. See id.

314. See id. at 678-79 (concluding that students' perceived friendly relationships with professors coincided with students' increased ambition).

315. See id. The author noted, however, that "[i]t would be interesting to pursue the rather anomalous finding further to see how those who remained tense but became less ambitious differ from those who remained tense and became more ambitious." Id. at 679 n.205.

316. See id. at 679.

317. See id. at 680.

318. See id. at 681.

319. See Michael J. Patton, The Student, The Situation and Performance During the First Year of Law School, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 10, 43-45 (1968).

320. See id.

321. See id.

322. See id. at 44.

323. See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.

324. See Williams & McCullers, supra note 61, at 343 (studying comparison of women lawyers, doctors, secretaries, and medical assistants).

325. See John M. Houston et al., Assessing Competitiveness: A Validation Study of the Competitiveness Index, 13(10) PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1153, 1155 (1992).

326. Id. at 1153.

327. See Williams & McCullers, supra note 61, at 350. In this study, women in all levels of law demonstrated higher achievement motivation than women in all levels of medicine. See id. The female lawyers also had higher achievement motivation and less parental pressure to fit a traditionally feminine stereotype. See id. Female lawyers and doctors both scored higher on intellectual ability than women in more traditionally feminine jobs. See id. at 349. Masculinity was assessed by the Bem Sex-Role Inventory, and the authors seem to link masculinity on this instrument with competitiveness and aggression. See id. at 347, 354. While greater masculinity (i.e., aggressiveness and competitiveness) distinguished female lawyers from female doctors, both groups were more masculine than women in more typical occupations. See id. at 354.

328. See id. Further, this study arguably surveyed an atypical group of women (those who would have entered the law when it was still a male-dominated profession), who might have been more "masculine" than today's female lawyers. The authors concluded that although a high level of intellectual ability is necessary to become a doctor or lawyer, which career one chooses depends on "factors other than intelligence" (presumably personality factors). See id. at 344-45. This study supports Alfred Adler's idea that individuals select a career to compensate for feelings of inferiority generated by early childhood experiences. These lawyers may have selected legal careers in order to overcome discomfort or feelings of inferiority stemming from their unhappy adolescent experiences.

329. See Chusmir, supra note 61, at 231-35.

330. See id. at 231.

331. See id.

332. Notable exceptions are criminal lawyers, law librarians, and judges, who are motivated by a need for power rather than achievement. See id. at 233-34.

333. The author theorized that since attorneys and judges have different needs, it is likely that happy judges were unhappy as attorneys. See id. at 234. Attorneys' jobs would require satisfaction of high needs for achievement, whereas judges' duties would require satisfaction of high needs for power. This study determined which needs are associated with different legal positions by analyzing the duties typically performed in each position, rather than by surveying legal personnel and asking them about their perceptions of their own motivations.

334. Id. at 235.

335. See id.

336. See Jeff Dionese, Striving for Happiness, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 41 (analyzing the St. Louis Report, a survey of 1,975 lawyers in the St. Louis area conducted by Hirsch Consulting for the Bar Association of Metropolitan St. Louis).

337. See id.; see also Anderson et al., supra note 97, at 45 (finding that altruism decreased among Australian lawyers during their first three years of practice more than it did among engineers).

338. See Dionese, supra note 336, at 41. Other goals included: making a substantial income, serving the client, having control over one's work life, and being respected and intellectually challenged. See id.

339. The Myers-Briggs test evaluates individuals' preferences with respect to four dimensions: (1) Introversion vs. Extraversion; (2) Sensing vs. Intuition; (3) Thinking vs. Feeling; and (4) Judging vs. Perceiving. See Richard, supra note 30, at 29. Extraversion and Introversion are "an 'attitude' . . . . Extraverts focus on the outer world or the stimuli outside their consciousness. Introverts focus their attention on their inner world . . . ." Id. Introverts are likely to enjoy "quiet and concentration, thinking things through, reflecting, reading and writing." Id. Sensing and Intuition are "two different ways of perceiving the data that a individual constantly takes in." Id. Sensors attend more to concrete, realistic things and tend to enjoy working with real facts and details. See id. at 232. Intuitors are likely to enjoy "solving complex problems, learning about new things, paying attention to global themes, abstractions, and 'big picture' thinking." Id. (citing S. K. HIRSH & J. M. KUMMEROW, INTRODUCTION TO TYPE IN ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS (1987)). Thinking and Feeling are "two different ways of . . . coming to closure or making decisions." Id. at 29. Thinkers tend to prefer "logical analysis, principles, cool and impersonal reasoning and cost/benefit analysis" and are "more tolerant of conflict and criticism." Id. at 233. Feelers prefer "harmonizing, building relationships, pleasing people, making decisions on the basis of one's personal likes and dislikes, and being attentive to the personal needs of others." Id. at 233. Finally, Judging and Perceiving are general approaches. Judges tend to prefer "structure, schedules, closure on decisions, planning, follow through and a 'cut-to-the-chase' approach." Id. at 234. Perceivers tend to prefer a "go with the flow and see what develops" approach. See id. at 77 (concluding that Perceivers are more flexible, try to roll with the punches, and try not to make decisions until the last possible moment). Richard explains that it is "not a clinical test-that is, it does not measure whether you are mentally healthy," but rather, a test demonstrating ways in which individuals prefer to focus mental energy, gather data, make decisions, perform mental tasks, and deal with the external world. The Myers-Briggs test, developed in the 1940s by Katharine Cook Briggs and Isabel Briggs Myers, is based on Carl Jung's theories about personality differences, and has become widely used in corporate and professional settings as a tool to understand differences in individual work habits and approaches. See BELL & RICHARD, supra note 145, at 152.

340. See Miller, supra note 128, at 462.

341. See Richard, supra note 30, at 229-30.

342. Most of the studies done in the 1960s and 1970s excluded women from the population sampled, either because there were no women in the sample or because the number of women was so small that they were removed to factor out any gender influences. Richard's 1993 study, however, included a reasonable proportion of women lawyers. See Richard, supra note 30, at 209-10. The Myers-Briggs findings did not change appreciably when women were included in the sample, even though more women in the general adult population are the "Feeling" type (60%), rather than the "Thinking" type (40%). In contrast, 40-50% of women lawyers are Feelers, while 50-60% are Thinkers. See Debra Cassens Moss, Lawyer Personality, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 34 (reporting statistics from Larry Richard's Philadelphia-based company, Lawgistics).

343. See Paul Van R. Miller, A Follow-up Study of Personality Factors as Predictors of Law School Performance (1967) (unpublished report to the LSAT Council, 1966-67, Princeton, New Jersey: Educational Testing Service)); Frank L. Natter, The Human Factor: Psychological Type in Legal Education, 3 RES. PSYCHOL. TYPE 55, 55-67 (1981) (citing Paul Van R. Miller, The Contribution of Non-cognitive Variables to the Prediction of Student Performance in Law School (1965) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on file with University Microfilms No. 66-4630 at the University of Pennsylvania); see also Miller, supra note 128, at 465.

344. See Natter, supra note 343, at 56. Natter's sample came from law students enrolled in an elective, experiential Legal Process course, which may have attracted a somewhat atypical group of law students. See id.

345. See Richard, supra note 30, at 229-30.

346. See Larry Richard, How Your Personality Affects Your Practice-The Lawyer Types, 79 A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 74 (describing study which led Richard to conclude that lawyers are different from the general population).

347. See id. at 77 (finding that lawyers fall predominantly into four categories: Introvert-Sensor-Thinker-Judger; Extravert-Sensor-Thinker-Judger; Introvert-Intuitive-Thinker-Judger; Extravert-Intuitive-Thinker-Perceiver). Three of the four categories are Thinker-Judger combinations. See id.

348. See id. at 75-78.

349. According to Richard: (1) about 75% of the adults in the United States prefer Extraversion, while 57% of lawyers prefer Introversion; (2) about 70% of the United States population prefer Sensing, while 57% of lawyers prefer Intuiting; (3) about 60% of all men and 35% of women in the United States prefer Thinking, while 81% of male lawyers and 66% of female lawyers prefer Thinking; and (4) about 55% of the U.S. population prefer Judging, while 63% of lawyers prefer Judging. See Richard, supra note 346, at 74. Introversion and Intuiting preferences are relatively stable across one's lifetime, suggesting that these characteristics are pre-existing prior to law school. Electronic mail communication with Lawrence Richard, Psychologist (Aug. 24, 1995).

350. See Richard, supra note 346, at 75-78.

351. See id.

352. See id. at 78 (advocating that understanding personality differences between lawyers and lay persons will improve lawyers' communication skills).

353. See id. at 250.

354. See Richard, supra note 30, at 233-34.

355. See infra notes 356, 361 (detailing studies that have inquired into attributes associated with successful legal practitioners).

356. See generally Shneidman, supra note 44, at 609. The Terman study's basic finding was that gifted children are, contrary to popular opinion, generally more physically and mentally healthy than their less-than-gifted counterparts. See id. at 609-10.

357. Scores came from third-party raters, who listened to tapes of interviews with the subjects to make their ratings; they were not self-report scores from the subjects. See id. at 610.

358. See id. at 613. It also found that lack of professional success was associated with marital difficulty, thus success in love and work went hand-in-hand. See id. at 611.

359. See id. at 614. Both groups were rated as conscientious and responsible, indicating that these traits may be unrelated to success, as defined in this study. See id.

360. See id. at 615.

361. See Robert F. Kelly & Sarah H. Ramsey, The Legal Representation of Children in Protection Proceedings: Some Empirical Findings and a Reflection on Public Policy, 34(2) FAM. REL. 277, 282 (1985).

362. See id. (finding specifically that attorneys representing children had no beneficial effect "in a state such as North Carolina characterized by high levels of judicial custodial intervention").

363. See id. at 282. It is unknown if these findings apply to other forms of legal representation.

364. See infra notes 367-85 and accompanying text.

365. See LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 636-38 (1984); see also Lawrence J. Landwehr, Lawyers as Social Progressives or Reactionaries: The Law and Order Cognitive Orientation of Lawyers, 7 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 39, 39-42 (1982); Thomas Willging & Thomas Dunn, The Moral Development of the Law Student: Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306, 329 (1981).

366. See id. Kohlberg's theory has been extensively studied and verified among children, adolescents, and adults in the United States as well as in other countries. See Michael D. Daneker, Moral Reasoning and the Quest for Legitimacy, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 54-56 (1993) (presenting scholarly research and views about Kohlberg's ideas). Kohlberg developed a method for determining individuals' stage of moral development using hypothetical ethical dilemmas and an interview technique. See Kohlberg, supra note 365, at 634-36. Although an individual's responses do not necessarily reflect a single stage, Kohlberg believes it is proper to characterize an individual as generally operating at one of the six stages of moral development. See id. at 634-38. Kohlberg's six stages of moral development are: Stage 1 Punishment and Obedience-the physical consequences of an action determine its goodness or badness, punishment is avoided, and power is respected; Stage 2 Instrumental-Relativist-pragmatic, marketplace considerations determine right action, i.e., "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours;" Stage 3 Interpersonal Concordance-good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved of by society; the individual conforms to stereotypes of nice, natural, or majority behavior; Stage 4 Law and Order-behavior is determined by reference to laws, rules, authority, maintaining the social order, and doing one's duty; Stage 5 Social Contract/Legalistic-the individual is aware of the relative nature of personal values and opinions and determines behavior on the basis of social utility. According to some, Stage 5 is the official morality of the American government and the U.S. Constitution. See Landwehr, supra note 365, at 40 n.2. Stage 6 Universal Ethical Principle-right behavior is defined by reference to abstract, universal, self-chosen ethical principles which transcend society's laws. See id. Stage 5 is further subdivided into Stage 5A-"normative and utilitarian, with judgments based on external sources," Willging & Dunn, supra note 365, at 322 (citing Kohlberg, supra note 365, at 40-41), and Stage 5B, described as an "awareness of rules combined with an internal evaluation of their fairness," id. at 322.

367. See id. at 354.

368. See id. at 356.

369. See Landwehr, supra note 365, at 39-51. The results of Landwehr's nationwide survey revealed that 90.3% of the responding lawyers were at Stage 4 (Law and Order Orientation) and that negligible proportions were at Stage 5 (Social Contract/Utilitarian Orientation) (2.5%) and Stage 3 (Interpersonal Concordance Orientation) (7.2%). See id. at 44.

370. June Louin Tapp & Felicia J. Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22-23 n.86 (1974).

371. See id.

372. See id. at 30.

373. See Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 509-10 (1995) (summarizing Kohlbergian stages of moral development). "Conventionally oriented individuals conceive legitimate rule violation as an exception, representing what any good actor has a role or obligation to perform. Thus they typically do not acknowledge the legitimacy of a role rejecting posture." Tapp & Levine, supra note 370, at 26. Postconventional individuals maintain that compliance with the law must be "weighed against the inherent rightness or morality of the rule." Id.

374. Willging & Dunn, supra note 365, at 323.

375. See id. at 343.

376. See Landwehr, supra note 365, at 44; Tapp & Levine, supra note 370, at 29-31.

377. See Tapp & Levine, supra note 370, at 25-26.

378. See Willging & Dunn, supra note 365, at 350, 356.

379. See id. at 349-50, 354.

380. See Hartwell, supra note 373, at 522-30.

381. See Wagner P. Thielens, The Influence of the Law School Experience on the Professional Ethics of Law Students, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 587, 590-91 (1969). The number of unethical responses was disappointingly high, however, indicating a disparity between professional ethical norms and their acceptance by law students. See id.

382. See id. This study also compared law students to practicing attorneys and found that the percentage of unethical responses of lawyers (47.2%) was higher than that of even first-year law students (45.6%), suggesting a regression in ethics after graduation. See id. Third-year law students had the lowest percentage of unethical responses at 39.2%. See id.

383. See Saunders & Levine, supra note 291, at 181; see also Taber et al., supra note 111, at 1277 (suggesting that law students do not adopt global approach to solving legal hypotheticals but rather use case-by-case approach, in which various factors are weighted depending on situation).

384. Carol Gilligan has criticized Kohlberg's theory by positing that it fails to consider that female moral reasoning differs qualitatively from male reasoning. According to Gilligan, when Kohlberg's methodology is applied to women, female moral reasoning often appears less developed (i.e., at a lower Kohlbergian stage) because Kohlberg's method and theory ignore factors characteristic of advanced moral reasoning in women. See, e.g., Carol Gilligan et al., Contributions of Women's Elimination of Sex Bias in Moral Development Theory and Research, Final Report to National Institute of Education (1982), cited in LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT (VOLUME II) 344 (1984) (providing basis for different premises adhered to by Kohlberg and Gilligan respectively). Empirical research seeking to verify Gilligan's assertions has yielded inconsistent results, yet the controversy continues between Kohlberg and Gilligan. See id. at 338-61.

385. See infra notes 386-408 and accompanying text (discussing in part the conclusions of the Taber and Janoff studies).

386. See Taber et al., supra note 111, at 1209 (stating that a portion of Taber's study attempted to examine whether there are gender differences in the "moral voice" of respondents and whether that moral voice reflects concerns about contextual factors as opposed to abstract factors). In general, scholars had written little about gender differences in law school, and the studies from the 1960s and 1970s focused on women's reasons for attending law school. See id. at 1218-19. In 1966, women comprised six percent of those taking the LSAT; in 1970, women comprised thirteen percent. See id. at 1218 n.63. Astin reported that in 1969, 10% of prelaw students were women; in 1981, 45% were. See Astin, supra note 76, at 74.

387. See Taber et al., supra note 111, at 1248 (defining "contextual factors" measured in Taber's 1988 survey).

388. Carol Gilligan describes women's morality as embodying an "ethic of care," while Kohlberg's moral development theory is said to have a "rights-orientation." See supra note 384 (discussing Gilligan's criticisms of Kohlberg's theories).

389. See Taber et al., supra note 111, at 1248 (defining terms Taber used in her 1988 survey designed to measure the "moral voice" of respondents and relate that moral voice to concerns about contextual versus abstract factors).

390. See id. at 1249-50 (finding that women's responses to contextual factors were not always significantly different than male responses). Taber's study measured contextual and abstract factors of an individual's moral voice by giving respondents two hypotheticals involving media law and the law of standing and asking respondents to rate the importance of various factors on the outcome of the hypothetical. See id. at 1248. This latter idea that legal education socializes women to value abstract factors is supported by later research by Sandra Janoff. See Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV. 193, 234 (1991) (finding that women's moral orientation tended to shift from care perspectives (similar to Taber's contextual factors) to rights perspectives (similar to Taber's abstract factors) after one year of law school); see also infra notes 391-412 and accompanying text.

391. See Janoff, supra note 390, at 218, 222, 226. The methods employed were a Sentence Completion Test compiled from the Washington University Sentence Completion Test, the Real-Life Moral Conflict and Choice Interview, and a demographic information questionnaire. See id. at 211-12. The study's population was the 1992 class of Temple University School of Law (n=417, 46.8% female, 53.2% male) and the subjects for the Sentence Completion Test consisted of a random sample of 200 students from the first year class; subjects for the interview were fifteen males and fifteen females randomly selected from that same first-year class. See id. at 209-10. The Sentence Completion Test and Interview were coded and scored for a care-orientation versus a rights-orientation. See id. at 214-16. Resulting data were then statistically analyzed for significant differences. See id. at 217 n.31. Men expressed both orientations, but tended to favor rights orientations overall; Janoff explains that the two orientations are not mutually exclusive. See id. at 233. Because the Sentence Completion Test used to assess orientation is a projective test, coders used an established system to evaluate responses and classify responses in terms of care or rights oriented factors. See id. at 215. The research interviews were evaluated in a similar manner and coded similarly. See id. at 216.

392. See id. at 219-22.

393. See id. at 222-33.

394. See id.

395. See id. at 223-25.

396. See Landwehr, supra note 365, at 40 n.2 (noting that Stage 4 is an orientation toward fixed rules, authority, and maintenance of social order).

397. See Richard, supra note 346, at 76 (defining Thinkers as those who make decisions in a logical and detached manner); see also supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.

398. See Tapp & Levine, supra note 370, at 22 (noting that conventional reasoning seeks to maintain conformity, formal rules, social order, and group norms). The author concedes, however, that the rights orientation could also be interpreted as different from these other three attributes.

399. See Janoff, supra note 390, at 238 (stating that after one year of an educational environment which emphasizes rights and rules, women express their connectedness less often and their objectivity and separateness more frequently).

400. See id. at 229-30 (stating that students who displayed a rights orientation at the beginning of the first year did so again at the year's end with their rights orientation being even stronger at the end of the first year).

401. See id. at 227.

402. See id. Here, the classic "chicken and egg" problem exists: given that law students may be predominantly Thinkers before they come to law school, and that law professors are likely to be predominantly Thinkers as well, it is unlikely that legal education is the sole reason for the lack of emphasis on relationships and human issues. Rather, this orientation may be the reflection of preferences inherent in the individuals who make up law schools. Richard suspects that Thinkers in law school are both self-selected into law school and molded by legal education to prefer Thinking. He indicated that this is based on studies finding that Thinking scores of law students are relatively stable over time, with the exception that they tend to increase (prefer Thinking more) during law school. Electronic mail with Lawrence Richard, Psychologist (Aug. 24, 1995).

403. See Janoff, supra note 390, at 228. Janoff also asserts that lawyers are trained to ignore their personal feelings about their client and the client's causes in order to be an effective advocate and to pay more attention to attaining ultimate success for their client than to how asserting their client's rights might affect others. See id. at 228-29.

404. See id. at 230-31 (discussing anxiety of women in law school and rights orientation). This shift may be one of the reasons for the findings of Janoff and her colleagues suggesting that women law students experience more stress in law school than do men. See id. at 230 (finding that some women's strategy of coping with the conflict between having a caring, emotional personality and being a lawyer did not work, resulting in continued disequilibrium and struggle) (citing RAND JACK & DANA C. JACK, MORAL VISIONS AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 130-55 (1988)).

405. See id. at 228-29.

406. See id. at 233.

407. See id. at 226-27.

408. See id. at 236 (stating that the hope that women in the legal profession will decrease rights orientation "seems remote" because "law school education silences the care voice").

409. See id. at 230 (stating that Jack and Jack found a majority of women used the first two responses and isolated their personal characteristics that were incompatible with the role of lawyer while a minority of women used the third approach, attempting to incorporate their personality into their work and reshape the lawyer's role (citing JACK & JACK, supra note 404, at 130-55)).

410. The relationship of substance abuse to suppressing one's emotions is clear from clinical literature explaining that substance abuse is often engaged in to deal with stress and unwanted emotions. See BURL E. GILLILAND & RICHARD K. JAMES, CRISIS INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 285 (1988) (quoting a university professor and recovering alcoholic, "[w]hen you get stressed out, there may be a number of things you do to get over it . . . jog, pray, meditate, have a fight with your wife, chop wood . . . [w]hen I get stressed out I drink [and drinking is more efficient because the payoff is always the same]"). Alcoholics tend to rely on the defense mechanism of repression and deal with "threatening and hurtful events by burying them in unconscious memory." See Janoff, supra note 390, at 287. These authors also state that "[a]lcoholics use fantasy to escape from a variety of threatening circumstances and emotions" by using alcohol or drugs to escape anxiety or frustration. See id. at 286. Workaholism can be viewed as simply another form of addictive behavior. As Gilliland and James state:

All of us have addictions, whether they be drinking alcohol, eating chocolate, gambling on blackjack, buying plaid sport coats, overspending on credit cards, or reading the sports page at breakfast. Anything that we start out wanting and not necessarily needing, but end up either psychologically or physically craving, may be considered addicting.

Id. at 329.

411. See id. at 237 (noting that care oriented students in law school experience "psychological dissonance"). Janoff also states that Jack and Jack found that women tended to express a care orientation when talking about themselves, but shifted to a rights orientation when discussing legal hypotheticals. See id. at 231-32. Men, however, tended to express care and rights orientations consistently in both personal and professional contexts. See id.

412. See id. at 230 (citing JACK & JACK, supra note 404, at 149-55). Only two out of eighteen women in Jack and Jack's study responded by trying to change the lawyer's role and lawyering to better reflect a care-orientation. See id.

413. To change the lawyer's role as in this third approach, one needs the support and cooperation of others such as clients, other lawyers, and society as a whole.

414. See Janoff, supra note 390, at 235-36 (discussing the advantages of the care orientation in the legal profession, particularly in enhancing the attorney client relationship).

415. See Bohn, Jr., supra note 41, at 360.

416. See Benjamin et al., supra note 70, at 228 (stating that pre-law students tested during the summer prior to law school did not show elevated psychological distress, but that two months after the start of law school, students' psychological distress had elevated significantly).

417. See supra notes 81-109 and accompanying text.

418. See Taber et al., supra note 111, at 1240 (noting that "more male graduates tended to be influenced by the prospect of making money when deciding to attend law school" than female graduates who responded to study's survey); supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.

419. See Taber et al., supra note 111, at 1240-41 (finding that more female than male graduates expressed desire to serve society and that male graduates were more likely to express interests in making money and business related careers as reason for attending law school).

420. See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.

421. See Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1037, 1098-1103 (1996) (suggesting that gender differences such as male dominance result from a combination of biological and culturally learned behaviors, and that gender stereotypes perpetuate ideas that men should be outwardly aggressive and dominant, but that women should not); Taber et al., supra note 111, at 1241 (stating that more female law school graduates expressed a desire to serve society than did male graduates).

422. See Chusmir, supra note 61, at 231 (finding lawyers' primary need for "achievement"); Williams & McCullers, supra note 61, at 354 (finding similar results for women lawyers).

423. See id.; see also Janoff, supra note 390, at 205-06 (reporting that between 20-40% of women stated that they went to law school for self-enhancement, stimulation, self-interest, and a desire to be identified as a member of a profession).

424. See Hafner & Fakouri, supra note 47, at 236-41 (detailing results of study showing individuals in legal profession or academia are less emotionally oriented than remainder of population); Richard, supra note 346, at 76 (finding that 78% of all lawyers are Thinkers, making effort not to allow "personal preferences" to interfere with their decision making process and instead reach decisions in detached manner); supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.

425. See Richard, supra note 346, at 76 (concluding that such individuals "are often criticized for being overly sentimental" and that constant "adversarial mentality" in legal profession "wears" on them); supra notes 353-54 and accompanying text. For studies, see supra notes 148-53, 285-87 and accompanying text.

426. See supra notes 141-47, 340-51, 385-404 and accompanying text (stating that lawyers tend to be "Thinkers" and law school tends to reduce care orientation-in favor of a rights orientation).

427. See id.; see also Janoff, supra note 390, at 224 (stating that a person operating in a rights orientation tends to adopt an impartial standpoint and to consider negative and positive consequences).

428. See id. at 232 (discussing finding of significant increase in rights oriented responses after conclusion of first year of law school).

429. See id. at 231 (describing that in male students who traditionally entered with rights oriented perspective, responses remained consistent therewith).

430. See id. at 232 (noting increase of rights oriented responses in women who typically entered law school with a care oriented approach).

431. See supra notes 293, 295-96 298-300 and accompanying text.

432. See Audrey James Schwartz, Law, Lawyers, and Law School: Perspectives from the First-Year Class, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 437, 462 (1980) (finding that after one year of law school, males tended to change their views to believe that lawyers are oriented toward profit rather than public service, while females tended to believe lawyers are the guardians of the have-nots and public service was an important goal of lawyers); supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.

433. See Hedegard, supra note 100, at 805 n.34, 825; see also Astin, supra note 76, at 83 (stating that over the past decade, pre-law students have become more interested in material and power goals and are less inclined to be concerned about social issues).

434. See Hedegard, supra note 100, at 863-64.

435. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 598, 600-01; see also Astin, supra note 76, at 83 (suggesting that pre-law students tend to come from more highly educated, affluent families than the general population and that they tend to have a strong political orientation, identifying themselves as liberal, but that like students in general, pre-law students have become more conservative over the past decade).

436. See Coplin & Williams, supra note 184, at 329.

437. See McLean & Kalin, supra note 38, at 153-54; St. Lawrence et al., supra note 193, at 101, 106; see also Janoff, supra note 390, at 204 (noting that, because of adversarial nature of legal system, competition is essential to "good lawyering").

438. See Miller, supra note 128, at 466; Solkoff & Markowitz, supra note 124, at 197.

439. See Reich, supra note 134, at 873.

440. See Solkoff & Markowitz, supra note 124, at 197; see also supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing attributes of law students as children).

441. See Hedegard, supra note 100, at 837.

442. See supra notes 214-17, 220-42 and accompanying text; AALS Special Committee Report, supra note 260, at 73 (describing incidence of substance abuse among law students and finding such abuse to be problematic for profession).

443. See Benjamin et al., supra note 70, at 246 (finding that prior to law school, law students do not differ from the general population on incidence of psychiatric symptomology; however, during law school, a greater than normal percentage of students develop symptoms of obsessive-compulsive behavior, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, and isolation).

444. See supra notes 250-59 and accompanying text.

445. See supra notes 257-84, 309-18 and accompanying text; see also Beck et al., supra note 2, at 5-6 (finding that although 9% of U.S. adults meet the criteria for alcohol abuse or dependency, 15-18% of lawyers are problem drinkers). Controlled aggressiveness can be a valuable asset to a lawyer, but uncontrolled anger and aggression tends to alienate families, friends, and co-workers. See id. at 9.

446. See Janoff, supra note 390, at 206-08 (stating that women law students reported feeling alienated from the legal classroom and feeling they must repudiate their own orientation to "play a man's game" in order to succeed in law school). See generally supra notes 391-412 and accompanying text (discussing Janoff's study).

447. See Williams & McCullers, supra note 61, at 350.

448. See Houston et al., supra note 325, at 1155.

449. See Chusmir, supra note 61, at 231-35; Dionese, supra note 336, at 41.

450. See Richard, supra note 346, at 75 (finding that majority of lawyers were in those categories).

451. See Landwehr, supra note 365, at 44 (stating that 90.3% of lawyers reason at Stage 4 of moral reasoning and that only 30-50% of adults in general do so).

452. See Benjamin et al., Prevalence of Depression, supra note 31, at 241 (alcohol abuse and depression among lawyers twice that of the general population); see also Beck et al., supra note 2, at 51 (noting that 70% of lawyers sampled were likely to develop alcohol problems over their lifetime).

453. See Landwehr, supra note 365, at 39-42 (Stage 4 morality associated with lawyers); Tapp & Levine, supra note 370, at 21-22 (conventional morality characteristic of lawyers); supra notes 369-76 and accompanying text.

454. See Willging & Dunn, supra note 365, at 356.

455. See supra notes 377-84 and accompanying text.

456. See supra notes 385-400 and accompanying text.

457. See Janoff, supra note 390, at 232 (noting shift of women to rights oriented approach); Taber et al., supra note 111, at 1250 (noting that "the socialization of legal training may have lead women to respond [to survey] in the traditional manner to legal precedent").

458. See supra note 384 and accompanying text (discussing gender differences in moral reasoning).

459. See supra note 390 and accompanying text.

460. Third, proposed solutions to the tripartite crisis can be critically evaluated in light of these lawyer attributes to assess the likelihood of their implementation, efficacy, and success; however, this is beyond the scope of this article. It is this author's hope that this analysis will suggest some new and as yet unexplored solution to the tripartite crisis, perhaps one involving profound, structural personality changes in lawyers themselves. As is often quoted in professionalism articles, "the problem is not in the stars, but in the lawyers themselves." A discussion of the conditions necessary for lasting personality change in adults is also beyond the scope of this article, and reserved for another time.

461. These three problems are interrelated and circular. Lawyer dissatisfaction likely contributes to lawyers' uncivil behavior. This behavior then contributes to the public's poor image of lawyers, which in turn plays a role in lawyer unhappiness and lawyer-client problems.

462. See supra notes 340-49, 368-79 and accompanying text.

463. This is based on differences in incidence of Thinking vs. Feeling in lawyers and in the general population. See Richard, supra note 346, at 74.

464. See McLean & Kalin, supra note 38, at 155.

465. See id. at 143.

466. See Rosner, supra note 16, at 2 (chair of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Professionalism at the time, notes an "explosion" in the number of lawyers and a shrinking demand for their services); see also Cramton, supra note 16, at 610 (expecting competition in the legal profession to continue into the 21st century).

467. At the least, impartial lawyers are important so that each litigant receives legal representation. Without such impartiality, some litigants' positions would be so unpopular that no lawyer would represent them. See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 616-19 (arguing that such impartiality on the part of lawyers preserves autonomy, diversity, and equal access to justice).

468. Although these two groups of qualities are not mutually exclusive, they have usually been viewed as dichotomous categories rather than extremes. See Richard, supra note 30, at 61, 75-77. For example, Thinking and Feeling on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator are usually viewed as dichotomous categories rather than as extreme ends of a continuous trait. See id.

469. In fact, it is possible that some of the current emphasis on logic, rights, rational analysis etc., in legal education and the legal profession is a reaction to perceived injustices worked by the American legal system prior to the events of the 1960s (such as the civil rights movement). See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1316 (1995) (documenting the historical development of the current emphasis on rights, etc., and arguing that it gained importance during the 1950s and 1960s when lawyers were used as instruments to help protect individual liberties and civil and constitutional rights); see also Daniel R. Coquillette, Professionalism: The Deep Theory, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1271, 1273-76 (1994) (arguing that the profession's emphasis has shifted from "justice" to simply serving as a means to achieving the client's ends).

470. See Hafner & Fakouri, supra note 47, at 236-41 (positing that lawyers as children "might be expected to see life in less emotional terms").

471. See Hedegard, supra note 100, at 835 (decreased interest in people); Janoff, supra note 390, at 195 (shift away from care orientation).

472. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.

473. See Beck et al., supra note 2, at 47 (noting that "for many lawyers psychological distress levels remain high [more than general population] throughout their career span"); Benjamin et al., supra note 70, at 226.

474. See Beck et al., supra note 2, at 47 (tracing lawyers' emotional distress from law school to legal practice).

475. See Silver, supra note 217, at 1202-16 (noting that purpose of study was to discover general problems encountered by first-year law school students).

476. See id. at 1201-02.

477. See id. at 1202-04.

478. See id. at 1204-09.

479. See id. at 1208 (stating that law school students were hesitant "to give up a method proven successful in the past especially if the student is unable to determine what success his efforts are obtaining").

480. See Phyllis W. Beck & David Burns, Anxiety and Depression in Law Students: Cognitive Intervention, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 270, 285-86 (1979) (citing James B. Taylor, Law School Stress and Deformation Professionals, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 251, 251 (1975)). Beck and Burns generally discuss the benefits of cognitive behavioral intervention, a therapy technique focused on negative, irrational thinking and typically used to treat anxiety and depression, in treating law student stress. See id. at 283.

481. See id.

482. See Patton, supra note 319, at 43-45 (discussing competition, isolation, and professionalism).

483. See id. (noting that higher achieving students' relationships were characterized by more competitive, 'professional' behavior).

484. See Miller, supra note 128, at 460-67 (Feeling associated with dropping out of law school).

485. See Amiram Elwork & G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Lawyers In Distress, 1995 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205, 216 (noting that lawyers' traits cause them to be unbalanced).

486. See Janoff, supra note 390, at 228.

487. See Richard, supra note 30, at 250.

488. See Beck et al., supra note 2, at 46 (noting increased symptoms among newer lawyers).

489. See Astin, supra note 76, at 74-75.

490. Beck & Burns, supra note 480, at 286.

491. Id. at 287. Amiram Elwork and Andrew Benjamin appear to agree with a "dual causation" model in explaining lawyer stress. See Elwork & Benjamin, supra note 485, at 207-08.

492. See Beck & Burns, supra note 480, at 273.

493. Id. This erroneous interpretation of external stimuli causes the individual to feel hopeless, anxious, inadequate, and a failure. See id. The internal thoughts appear to continue to misinterpret the external stimuli and cause a downward emotional spiral from which the individual finds it difficult to emerge. See id. at 274.

494. AMIRAM ELWORK, STRESS MANAGEMENT FOR LAWYERS 3-5 (1995).

495. See id. at 13.

496. See Beck & Burns, supra note 480, at 286-87.

497. See ELWORK, supra note 494, at 15.

498. See id.; see also Elwork & Benjamin, supra note 485, at 212-15 (describing study in which researchers found that "level of hostility, cynicism, and aggression" felt by lawyers during law school was highly correlated with their mortality rate thirty years later).

499. See ELWORK, supra note 494, at 15.

500. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.

501. See Beck et al., supra note 2 (identifying anger, hostility, insecurity, paranoia, and low self-esteem as traits characteristic of attorneys); Bohn, Jr., supra notes 70, 74-75 (discussing pre-law students' need for dominance); Houston et al., supra note 325, at 1155 (noting competitiveness of male and female attorneys); Reich, supra note 134, at 873-74 (concluding that law students are "insecure, defensive, distant, and lacking in maturity and socialization"); Solkoff & Markowitz, supra note 124, at 199; Stevens, supra note 70, at 673-75 (studying perceived competitiveness, aggression and congeniality among law students); Williams & McCullers, supra note 61, at 350 (commenting that women lawyers are more achievement-oriented than other women).

502. See Beck et al., supra note 2, at 53, 57 (increased anger and hostility, obsessive-compulsiveness, interpersonal sensitivity, and anxiety, which are characteristic of attorneys, are useful in the practice of law).

503. See id. at 53, 57 (anger is not, however, adaptive at home and may harm the attorney's primary relationship; obsessive-compulsive symptoms characteristic of attorneys are maladaptive in the high pressure, adversarial arena). Beck and her colleagues assert that certain lawyer attributes (anger and hostility, obsessive-compulsiveness, interpersonal sensitivity, and anxiety) were important to being a successful lawyer but either were maladaptive to the lawyer's home life or caused other problems, such as depression, isolation, and social alienation. See id. at 57. Beck found that both male and female attorneys' satisfaction with their primary relationships was significantly less than that of the general population. See id. at 30.

504. See ELWORK, supra note 494, at 16-20.

505. See id. at 17.

506. See Benjamin et al., supra note 70 (finding higher rates of anxiety and paranoia among law students).

507. See Janoff, supra note 390, at 235-38 (noting differences between male and female law students' resolution of moral dilemmas dissipates after first year); Landwehr, supra note 365, at 39-42 (commenting on different stages of moral development).

508. See ELWORK, supra note 494, at 18-19.

509. See id. at 18-20.

510. See Reich, supra note 134, at 873.

511. Notwithstanding the issue of whether the conflict identified between the outer image and inner feelings of law students exists before or develops in law school, if it continues into practice, it can likely drive attorneys to compensate for the inner insecurity in some fashion, such as an increased drive to succeed, to achieve, and to make money, or increased aggression, workaholism, and perfectionism, or substance abuse. See Reich, supra note 134, at 874.

512. See ELWORK, supra note 494, at 20.

513. See Richard, supra note 30, at 250.

514. See Chusmir, supra note 61, at 231 (claiming that need for achievement motivates most lawyers). This channeling could be understood as a form of the defense mechanism known as "sublimation." Sublimation has been defined as "transforming frustrated urges . . . into more socially acceptable forms of behavior," BENJAMIN, JR. ET AL., supra note 217, at 386 (defining the major psychoanalytic defense mechanisms).

515. See supra notes 250-58 and accompanying text.

516. See Beck et al., supra note 2, at 6 (looking at aggravating and mitigating variables for lawyers' psychological distress and substance abuse, such as "social support and satisfaction with social support, marital satisfaction, anger, and perceived stress").

517. See id. at 24, Table 5 (reporting results on ten scales for lawyers and adults generally).

518. See id. at 51 (using a multivariate model, "clearly the association driving the model is between anger and global psychological distress").

519. See id. at 53 (some lawyers may bring these emotions home).

520. See id. at 50, 58.

521. See id. at 51 (she studied lawyers in Washington state) and 53 (regarding the relationship between anger and alcohol).

522. See id. at 54-55 (anxiety and tension here measured as "interpersonal sensitivity" and included feelings of inferiority, similar to Reich's findings with respect to law students, see supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text).

523. See id. at 55 (resulting in a cycle of distress).

524. See Bohn, Jr., supra note 41, at 260 (documenting law students' need for dominance and wish for attention as part of personality trait); Chusmir, supra note 61, at 231-34 (commenting on lawyers' desire for achievement).

525. See Richard, supra note 30, at 233-34 (confirming lawyers' preference for "Judging" personality trait).

526. See Hafner & Fakouri, supra note 47, at 241 (commenting on initiative-taking as integral part of lawyer behavior); Houston, supra note 325, at 1155 (commenting on competitiveness as component of lawyer behavior); Solkoff & Markowitz, supra note 124, at 199 (documenting authoritarianism as personality trait prominent in lawyers).

527. See Chusmir, supra note 61, at 231-35 (commenting that lawyers need to receive recognition and have some authority, not necessarily power over others).

528. See ELWORK, supra note 494, at 4.

529. See Silver, supra note 217, at 1216 (analyzing clash between demands of first year law school and personality traits of law students).

530. Cf. ELWORK, supra note 494, at 15 (acknowledging belief in inalterable destiny as an added stressor present in lawyers).

531. See Beck & Burns, supra note 480, at 287.

532. See Rosner, supra note 16, at 2 (finding increase in number of attorneys and decrease in demand for services).

533. Roger Cramton refers to "an extreme model of adversarial advocacy" or "Rambo litigation" and asserts that it is in part responsible for the erosion of traditional professionalism. See Cramton, supra note 16, at 610-11; see also Mashburn, supra note 16, at 657 (referring to "Rambo" litigators in the context of a perceived decline in professionalism).

534. See Chusmir, supra note 61, at 233-34 (noting need for achievement); Houston, supra note 325, at 1155 (discussing manner in which competitiveness breeds unprofessional behavior).

535. See Hartwell, supra note 380, at 509-12 (stage of moral development increased as a result of certain law school courses). Further, researchers have not isolated the features of these courses which appear to have caused the improvement; thus, it is unknown exactly how to improve students' moral development. See id. at 531-35; see also William Y. Penn, Jr., Teaching Ethics-A Direct Approach, 19(2) J. MORAL EDUC. 124, 130 (1990) (finding through empirical study that undergraduate students' "P" scores on the Defining Issues Test of moral development significantly increased as a result of an undergraduate ethics course which integrated the study of logic, developmental theory, and philosophy and taught the skills of logic, role-taking, and justice operations).

536. See Richard N. Tsujimoto & Kathy A. Emmons, Predicting Moral Conduct: Kohlberg's and Hogan's Theories, 115 J. PSYCHOL. 241, 241-44 (1983) (finding that moral development does not correlate directly with moral behavior).

537. See Reich, supra note 134, at 871-74.

538. See Janoff, supra note 390, at 227.

539. See supra notes 250-59, 309-22 and accompanying text.

540. See Benjamin et al., Prevalence of Depression, supra note 31, at 244 (sixty percent of malpractice cases involved a substance abusing attorney (citing C. Greene, Half of Lawyer Malpractice and Discipline Stems from Substance Abuse-Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Aug. 6, 1988))); Jonathan Goodliffe, Alcohol and Depression in English and American Disciplinary Proceedings, 89 ADDICTION 1237, 1243 (1994) (acknowledging link between depression and malpractice suits against attorneys).

541. See Astin, supra note 76, at 82 (reporting that 65% of law students (and 74% of pre-law students) viewed "being very well-off financially" as an "essential" or "very important" goal); Hedegard, supra note 100, at 814 (finding 28-31% of students motivated by prestige and money); Stevens, supra note 91, at 577 (14-58% said money was greatly important in choosing law).

542. See Rehnquist, supra note 15, at 46 (stating that law has become too focused on profit-maximization).

543. See Re, supra note 16, at 98 (noting that increasing salaries and billing practices of lawyers foster belief in commercialization of legal profession).

544. See Rehnquist, supra note 15, at 46.

545. See Franzese, supra note 15, at 493 n.33 (arguing that the profession's preoccupation with income maximization lies at the heart of the legal profession's problems).

546. See Rehnquist, supra note 15, at 46.

547. See id.

548. See Attorneys Take Lion's Share of Earnings Among Professionals, 96-2 LAW OFF. MGMT. & ADMIN. REP. 4 (1996). Legal services ranked second only to computer services for revenues per employee among all professional services. Law firms averaged $109,476 in revenue for every secretary, paralegal, and attorney employed by the firm. See id.

549. See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text; see also Astin, supra note 76, at 82 (reporting 1981 data).

550. See supra note 541 and accompanying text. Stevens studied the classes of 1960, 1970, and 1972; Hedegard's study finding slightly greater percentages of students admitting materialistic motives was reported in 1979; Astin's study finding again greater percentages of students admitting desires to be well-off financially was done in 1981. There may be a trend towards increasing materialism among law students, based on these studies.

551. See Rehnquist, supra note 15, at 44-46. For example, Ellen Podgor notes that community service and pro bono work are what distinguish a profession from a trade. See Podgor, supra note 11, at 533.

552. See supra notes 141-47, 339-51 & 391-99 and accompanying text.

553. See Stevens, supra note 70, at 575.

554. Advertising may also have developed a crass and perhaps distasteful flavor in the mouths of the general public, due to lawyers' lack of sensitivity to interpersonal concerns. Lawyers, being rational and logical, may see direct advertising as sensible, and may be blind to the human or emotional impact it may have on others. Thus, what lawyers tolerate in their own profession could appear to the public as unprofessional and insensitive. It could be logically reasonable to the attorneys, as businessmen, but emotionally unpleasant to the public. There is evidence, however, that attorneys actually view lawyer advertising more negatively than do clients, suggesting that attitudes towards advertising are not well understood and not easily related to lawyer attributes. See Roy M. Sobelson, The Ethics of Advertising By Georgia Lawyers: Survey and Analysis, 6 GA. ST. L. REV. 23, 67 (1989) (noting that many lawyers also feel that "advertising is not in the best interests of consumers").

555. Additional research is necessary to determine if lawyers are predisposed to develop psychological distress. Benjamin and his colleagues suspect this is true, stating that many lawyers are "victims of child abuse, neglect, and exploitation" and that lawyers overachieve as a way to overcompensate for "these earlier narcissistic injuries inflicted upon them by their parents," which suffices so "long as the challenges are not too difficult." Benjamin et al., Prevalence of Depression, supra note 31, at 246 n.50; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text. However, in today's crowded and competitive legal profession, the challenges appear to have become too "difficult." Benjamin et al., Prevalence of Depression, supra note 31, at 248. Benjamin and his colleagues have suggested that the dramatic increases in psychological problems (such as tension, anxiety, and depression), in a group of otherwise "normal" individuals, resulting from law school, must be further investigated. See id. at 245. It is imperative to determine (1) whether law students are in any way predisposed to develop this psychological distress, (2) what law school does to create it, and (3) why the distress does not abate after graduation. See id. at 241.