[I]s not systemic change in China far more likely to occur as a result of inexorably increasing internal pressures - rising out of an exploding market economy and the growing exposure to Western values? Can the United States most effectively advance economic and political liberalization in China through normalized, indeed, enhanced commercial and cultural engagement?
The Clinton administration appears, confusingly, to come down on both sides of this fundamental issue. On the one hand, Christopher and other State Department officials admonish the Chinese that they are failing to meet the terms of Clinton's executive order. On the other hand, Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen and Chairman of the National Economic Council Robert Rubin have stressed the compelling American interest in normal trade relations with China. They have publicly suggested that if only the Chinese could satisfy the President's relatively modest conditions this one time, then MFN should no longer be linked to America's human rights objectives. Of course, the very existence of the issue can only be considered a historical accident. In the emotional months after Tiananmen Square in 1989, there was no serious debate about withdrawing from normal trade relations.
But beginning in 1990, Congress sought to impose new conditions on MFN in the areas of trade, security, and human rights. In Congress, to vote for conditional MFN was to go on record in support of important American objectives in China. And as China each year took certain palliative measures to address the concerns of its congressional critics, members of Congress believed they were playing "bad cop" to Bush's "good cop."
Clinton, in issuing the executive order, has essentially adopted the congressional position on the conditionality of MFN; U.S. policy now alternates between ritual invocation of the MFN threat and frequent high-level meetings with the Chinese, seeking anxiously to find reasons not to use this weapon. The administration thus finds itself in the untenable position of attempting to play "bad cop" and "good cop" at the same time. Of course, given the implications for American interests of withdrawal of MFN, the Clinton administration now has a tremendous incentive to characterize any Chinese initiatives in human rights as meaningful.
But in diplomacy as elsewhere, it is generally unwise to engage in threats unless one is prepared to act upon them. Brandishing a mutually destructive and therefore dubious weapon - in pursuit of worthy but very limited objectives - does little to enhance America's standing in the world. This has indeed been a policy that gives every appearance of having been dictated by yesterday's battles in Washington, not today's challenges in China.
It is no wonder that Lloyd Bentsen and Robert Rubin have publicly suggested that America's human rights concerns should be "de-linked" from MFN. They focus, wisely, on U.S. initiatives to expand China's markets. This approach would further both our commercial interests and our political ideals.
There are more credible ways the administration can promote human rights. The United States, for example, should take greater advantage of its leverage in multilateral organizations, such as the U.N. Human Rights Commission and international lending institutions. The administration could demonstrate support for Chinese democracy by establishing official contact with the government of Taiwan. And the President can speak out, when circumstances warrant, in support of the cause of freedom.
The most sensible American policy will be one that takes full cognizance of the remarkable
changes that have already occurred, moves beyond earlier political debates in Washington and
effectively pursues the opportunities that China now presents for the advancement of American
ideals and interests. In the final analysis, it should be recognized that the inspiration of American
ideals is far more powerful in advancing human rights than the threat of economic sanctions.
©Copyright 1994 The Human Rights Brief
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