China's ongoing and extensive human rights violations underscore the urgency of making human rights a key component of U.S. China policy. 1993 was the worst year for political arrests and trials since the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crackdown. 1994 promises more of the same. Amid the heightened tension of a succession battle ushering in the post-Deng era and mounting social dislocation, the Chinese government has continued to arrest and detain political dissidents and has otherwise interfered with freedom of expression, association, assembly and religion. Contrary to the claims of those touting the human rights benefits of U.S. trade ties to China, there has been no indication that the dramatic moves to a "socialist market economy" in China have engendered political liberalization.
Experience shows that China responds to credible economic pressure. In 1992, when commercial trade talks stalled, the Bush administration increased pressure on China by threatening $3.9 billion in penalties on certain Chinese goods. To avert those sanctions, the Chinese leadership quickly signed a wide-ranging market access agreement. While the Chinese leadership has attempted to make it appear that Beijing can do well enough without continued MFN, Beijing is singularly dependent on maintaining trade relations with the U.S., China's largest - and not readily replaceable - export market. 38% of all Chinese exports are shipped here. The importance of Beijing's approximately $24 billion bilateral trade surplus is all the greater because for the first time, China has a growing foreign trade deficit. As this deficit spirals upwards, the Chinese leadership's incentive to maintain MFN increases.
As of this writing, there has been no significant progress by the Chinese leadership on its human rights practices and there is little chance that Beijing will take the necessary steps between now and June 3. Given this scenario, President Clinton should use his executive powers to hike tariffs on Chinese goods by an incremental amount, roughly 10% at the outset, with further increases to follow if Beijing does not bring its practices into line with universal standards. While this will be the end of China's MFN status, it need not lead to prohibitively high tariffs that would obliterate US China bilateral trade. Instead of tariff rates automatically escalating to Smoot-Hawley levels, President Clinton can establish tariff increases of any size. Setting a less-than-punitive rate would squeeze Beijing, but trade would continue.
At the same time, it is crucial for the administration to move quickly on other fronts internationally and domestically. Washington must aggressively solicit the help of the Japanese, Korean and European governments in sending a unified message to Beijing. A multilateral effort including, but not limited to, United Nations human rights mechanisms is necessary.
Washington must also press the corporate community to act on its claim that business can be a positive force for human rights. Foreign investors are players in China's politically crucial drive for economic prosperity and they are often well-positioned to make their concerns felt.
While there are limits to the effectiveness of external human rights pressure, this is the moment
for a firm human rights policy. Experience has demonstrated that Beijing does respond to
pressure and President Clinton must demonstrate that he is not about to abandon human rights.
Given Beijing's total disregard for international norms, ending the linkage between China's MFN
status and human rights would not only have serious negative effects in China, it would cripple
the administration's ability to speak and act effectively elsewhere.
©Copyright 1994 The Human Rights Brief
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