Human Rights Brief
A Legal Resource for the International Human Rights CommunitySummer 1994
Professor Explores Lessons of Somalia
by Fatimah A. Mateen
The last of the U.S. troops have pulled out of Somalia leaving behind a tragic legacy: countless Somalies dead, 26 U.S. serviceman killed, 24 Pakistani peace-keepers massacred in a single day, and General Mohamed Farah Aided, the man believed to be responsible for much of the carnage, still on the loose.
As the United Nations licks its wounds, received in its ill-fated Somalia mission, Professor Tom Farer, Director of The American University's Joint Degree Program between Washington College of Law and the School of International Service, is pondering the question 'what went wrong?'
Last year Professor Farer was retained as a legal consultant to the Director of UN Operations in Somalia to address issues relating to the reconstruction of that war-torn country. He was in Somalia during the June 5, 1993 attack on Pakistani UN peace-keeping forces and was asked to conduct an inquiry as to who was responsible for the massacre.
Professor Farer was assisted in his investigation by UN lawyers and a Pakistani major who acted as a liaison for the UN armed forces. They met with UN personnel and various Somalis, some of whom represented General Aided. Although Aided invited Professor Farer to interview witnesses, the interviews did not take place as Professor Farer could not guarantee that witnesses, whose names appeared on UN arrest lists, would not be taken into custody; other interviews did not go forward because Aided agreed to make the witnesses available only as part of a "package deal."
Professor Farer concludes that there was a "strong prima facia showing that General Aided was responsible for the attack on the UN troops." His investigation revealed that Aided "had notice of where the troops would be on the day they were attacked." A day before the massacre, notice was sent to Aided indicating that an arms inspection was to occur the following day at Radio Mogadishu, Somalia's only operating radio station and one of five sites where Aided had indicated weapons were being stored. The Pakistanis were ambushed when they arrived to conduct the inspection.
"Aided had the means to carry out an attack, because the militia was under his control, and the southern portion of the city where the attack occurred was completely controlled by him." said Professor Farer. He believes that Aided was motivated out of fear that the U.N. would gain control of the radio station.
Professor Farer feels that the UN "mishandled" Aided. "General Aided should have been allowed to define himself outside of the political process" and the UN should have given Aided "the benefit of the doubt until he demonstrated that he was incorrigible."
Professor Farer presented his report to the Secretary General in August 1993. He believes, "overall, I think that the UN tried to do too much, but, its intentions certainly were excellent." He suggests that another, and arguably less costly option than deploying troops, would have been to "deploy the carrot of large scale economic assistance to those areas of the countries that had achieved peace," as a means of encouraging the warring clans to end their fighting.
Professor Farer believes that in the future, the "UN will be less likely be heavily involved in sending troops to confront local actors, and instead, will concentrate on what it has done in the past," which has been to intervene with UN troops only after receiving the consent of local officials. He believes that in order for the UN to succeed, "the Secretariat needs to vastly improve its ability to acquire information so that the UN is able to anticipate a crises." He suggests that promotions and recruitment should be based on merit, instead of geographical quotas, that training programs for UN staff become more innovative, and that the UN become more accessible to the press and public.
Professor Farer believes that the UN has a role to play in every conflict, "whether it is providing good offices, mediation, or promoting negotiations." Farer maintains that currently, the UN's "economic measures are not strong, well coordinated or directed," though he does not place the blame on the Secretary General. "The leading economic powers, starting with the United States, have not given the Secretary General the power to coordinate international institutions, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund."
Professor Farer believes that until the UN establishes a communications network and control over intelligence and supply, the UN will be forced to continue working with states or other organizations to respond to international disputes. "UN officers are being blamed for the UN's failure, when it is really the board of directors [UN members] who must bear a large portion of the responsibility," he contends.
Since returning from Somalia, Professor Farer has addressed a number of audiences regarding the lessons learned from Somalia, including the House Foreign Affairs Committee, key members of the Senate and House of Representatives, and scholars at Cambridge University in England.
The proper citation for this article in the Human Rights Brief Volume 1, Number 2, beginning at page 1 is: 1 No. 2 Hum. Rts. Brief 1 (1994).
